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Summary
This thesis focuses on fractional ownership in the context of the sharing economy. It
studies the conditions under which, subject to group coordination, fractional owner-
ship and collaborative consumption generate higher consumer utility than individual
ownership and consumption, leading also to higher societal benefits and more sus-
tainable consumption.
An extensive literature studies the models and benefits of fractional ownership. On
the other hand, the literature on the sharing economy has focussed mostly on the
shared consumption of goods that are often ultimately owned individually, overlook-
ing shared purchase and ownership. To trace the origins of the sharing economy
in relation to the fractional ownership, and to investigate theoretical (dis)connections
among the two, in the first paper I study the evolution of both literatures using biblio-
metric tools. I find that the literature on sharing economy builds upon the theory of
psychological ownership (that is the temporary sense of ownership) but it deviates
from the theory of commons and the logic of group cooperation, that are at the roots
of fractional ownership. These findings indicate that the sharing economy seems to
evolve along the lines of a neo-capitalistic model.
To study under which conditions fractional ownership is viable in the context of the
sharing economy I develop agent-based models.
First, I model the co-evolution between coalition formation and diffusion of indivis-
iv
ible goods that can be afforded only by groups of consumers (e.g. decentralised
energy infrastructures). While coalition formation is a necessary condition for diffu-
sion of such goods, adoption hinders coalition formation by changing the consumer
network. Larger coalitions, where free-riding is minimised, are preferred over small
ones because of lower costs. However, costs increase when higher quantities are
purchased and owned collectively. Higher network connectivity and rapid communi-
cation increase diffusion and reduce downside effects of adoption in group, such as
consumer isolation.
Second, I analyse under which conditions shared goods may replace individual con-
sumption of goods (e.g. cars), when consumers can also purchase a public service
(e.g. public transport) to satisfy their demand. Fractional ownership can reduce the
negative externalities of producing goods that remain idle, while offering the same
benefits of individual ownership. By exploring the full parameter space of the model,
I find that fractional ownership does not diffuse beyond a consumer niche with rel-
atively low budget, high demand and high preference for sharing. Price and infras-
tructure policies have a positive impact on increasing fractional ownership, reducing
the inefficient use of resources.
The sharing economy literature has not yet studied options for fractional ownership to
emerge. Results from this thesis show that group coordination and cooperation can
prompt such ownership models, generating individual and societal benefits. Frac-
tional ownership in the context of the sharing economy can boost the diffusion of
sustainable goods and reduce the inefficient use of resources. These results are
useful to inform policymakers that address consumer participation into the transition
process towards a more sustainable society.
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The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations calls for new
models of production and consumption, in order to promote sustainable transition
towards low-carbon and green economies and poverty alleviation (United Nation
2020). Rather than the traditional search for efficiency in production, this thesis stud-
ies models to improve efficiency in consumption: a more efficient use of resources
may allow for improvements in living conditions. In particular this thesis focuses
on whether social cooperation and coordination via sharing can enable sustainable
consumption of goods that provide essential services to consumers.
Sharing the consumption of a good can contribute to its sustainability. First, sharing
may reduce the environmental impact when the same consumer need is satisfied
by smaller amount of the good. Second, sharing may increase affordable access
to the good for low-income consumers which increases inclusion. However, both
of these objectives depend on the feasibility of designing truly sustainable sharing
practices.
The academic literature has recently debated sharing practices in the context of the
sharing economy. The sharing economy is commonly understood as all borrowing,
lending, renting, bartering and swapping practices that are mediated by a digital
platform (Botsman & Roger 2010). In these practices, consumers give temporary
access to under-utilised goods that they own, in exchange for a fee, but with no
transfer of ownership (Belk 2007, Bardhi & Eckhardt 2012, Frenken & Schor 2017).
Thus, the sharing economy, via sharing consumption, can reduce environmental im-
pact, since it allows more efficient use of goods and reduces idle capacity (Heinrichs
2013, Hamari et al. 2016, Ertz & Leblanc-Proulx 2018). It can also extend access
to goods for consumers who would not be able to afford to purchase the good indi-
vidually (Lamberton & Rose 2012, Fraiberger & Sundararajan 2015). However, the
3
sharing economy model of consumption without ownership (Belk 2014b) can also
be a potential driver of inequality, by increasing polarisation and concentration of
ownership and accumulation of resources (Richardson 2015, Schor et al. 2016, Slee
2017).
Is it possible to exploit the positive aspects of the sharing economy without increasing
inequality? One option is the fractional ownership model in which both consumption
and ownership are shared.
The first contribution of my thesis is to analyse the role of ownership in the shar-
ing economy and the notion of both shared consumption and shared ownership.
Shared consumption and ownership are discussed in the works on fractional own-
ership, which describe how consumers organise in groups to share ownership and
consumption of a good. Most of these studies focus on fractional ownership of lux-
ury goods (e.g., holiday homes, aircraft), which are too expensive for a single user
to own. However, luxury goods do not satisfy essential needs and low-income con-
sumers would likely be excluded a priori from their use. So this stream of work needs
to be extended to include sustainable goods and goods in everyday use and to focus
not on their access (as in the sharing economy), but rather on diffusion of sustainable
practices that do not increase inequality.
To explore this possibility of shared ownership in the sharing economy, we need to
understand the theoretical foundations of fractional ownership and sharing economy,
and the extent to which these differ from or feed each other. This will allow an
exploration of sustainable consumption models that boost the diffusion of a shared
good that provides an essential service to consumers.
Examples of sharing practices to achieve sustainable consumption are studied in
the academic literature on grassroots innovation. This literature debates forms of
shared ownership and consumption to increase consumer empowerment and partic-
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ipation in sustainable energy choices (Seyfang & Smith 2007, Seyfang & Haxeltine
2012, Seyfang et al. 2014). The bottom-up process leading to the formation of lo-
cal energy communities favours the diffusion of shared energy infrastructures and
energy provision on site to satisfy consumer needs independently from the national
grid (Watson 2004, Bauwens et al. 2016, Goedkoop & Devine-Wright 2016, Müller
& Welpe 2018). This body of work proposes a model of consumption that includes
ownership, which makes sharing more equitable and more appropriate and helps to
explain the diffusion of grassroots localised practices.
Local energy communities are typical examples of groups of consumers who organ-
ise spontaneously to share ownership and consumption of the same good. Contrarily
to individual adoption that does not require coordination effort, spontaneous group-
ings require coordination, and the diffusion of the shared good within groups is a
process driven by the collective adoption decision. The collective decision is based
on both individual and collective benefits, which group members may (or may not)
gain from adopting the shared good. This decision does not have to be immediate;
it depends on the formation of the sharing group, which is not pre-established, but is
formed precisely to pursue shared ownership and consumption.
There are several theories related to different aspects of the diffusion of a shared
good within a group of consumers; however, these are mostly disconnected. For
example, the theory of innovation diffusion (Rogers 1962) studies diffusion as a pro-
cess driven by an individual decision to adopt and does not consider potential adop-
tion by groups that have yet to be established. The literature on collective action
(Olson 1971, Hardin 1982, Oliver 1993) studies group adoption and consumption
(Borcherding & Filson 2002), but with no focus on the prior step of group formation.
Game theory and, in particular, the theory of coalition formation (Caplow 1956, Gam-
son 1961), study the process by which agents form groups to share resources, but
do not consider the potential impact on subsequent common actions such as adop-
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tion of shared goods. Network theory examines how network structure affects the
diffusion process (Rogers 1976, Cowan & Jonard 2004) and how networks evolve
according to the dynamic and spatial-dependent formation of links among network
nodes (Jackson & Wolinsky 1996, Bala & Goyal 1998, Johnson & Gilles 2000, Jack-
son & Watts 2002). However, this strand of work does not investigate the mutual
effects of diffusion and network formation, nor diffusion and coalition formation.
A second contribution of this thesis is that it bridges these gaps in the existing lit-
erature by proposing a study of how shared goods are diffused in coalitions and by
modelling the co-evolution of diffusion and coalition formation. The diffusion of a
shared good is subject to the adoption decision by a newly formed group established
to enable shared consumption of the good. This differs from studies of diffusion
which focus on a single entity (i.e., an individual, a household, etc.) that adopts
and consumes the good individually or in an already existing group. Modelling the
co-evolution of diffusion and coalition formation allows us to study the sustainable
consumption of two types of goods: non-movable and expensive shared goods which
are not affordable individually (e.g., a shared energy infrastructure) and movable and
cheaper goods which can be adopted individually (e.g., private car).
I first study the diffusion of sustainable shared good that consumers adopt in order
to produce a service, on site and independently, at a cost that is lower than the
public service, but which requires an initial investment. An example here, is the
case of a shared energy infrastructure, such as a Decentralised Energy System
(DES), which a local energy community adopts as an alternative to the centralised
national grid. This option provides higher utility and lower cost to the members of the
consumer group and implies that the diffusion of a shared good fosters a sustainable
model of consumption. However, the shared good does not diffuse to the whole
population or include all potential consumers, because of geographical constraints
to communication and the opportunity to share the good.
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I also examine the conditions under which the adoption of a shared good replaces
the adoption of an individual good, in the presence of the public service. I use of
the example of individual ownership and consumption of private cars, which is chal-
lenging sustainability in cities. A niche of individual consumers may decide to shift
to a shared good, adopted in a coalition. The niche will be increased by specific
consumer and good conditions: lower income, higher need for the service and a
small-sized good. The transition from an individual to a shared good reduces the
number of the good produced, which increases sustainability. The transition is ac-
celerated by a pricing policy that increases the cost of individual consumption of the
good (taxation) or favours the adoption of a shared good (incentives) which provides
the service to a small coalition.
1.2 Contextualising Shared Goods in the Literature
The focus on the diffusion of shared goods in groups of consumers offers insights
into how sustainable consumption could be increased. There are several examples
showing that adoption of shared goods can reduce environmental impacts and/or
increase access and inclusiveness. In this section I first present these examples and
then I contextualise shared goods drawing on key elements in the literature.
For example, the transition from a centralised (often fossil fuel based) energy in-
frastructure to a DES can improve the efficiency of the grid, increase the share of
renewable energy and reduce energy poverty (Dóci & Vasileiadou 2015, Van Der
Schoor & Scholtens 2015, Koirala et al. 2016). DES are small-scaled energy infras-
tructures, located close to final consumers who generate and use the energy they
need independent of the central grid. The formation of a coalition to adopt a shared
energy infrastructure can increase access to energy and reduce consumers’ energy
expenses compared to the public provision (Kanagawa & Nakata 2007, 2008).
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In an urban context, the purchase and ownership of private cars is challenging the
sustainability of our cities, since individual use implies more traffic congestion and
more idle capacity when the car is parked (Camagni et al. 2002). Users purchase
private cars because they allow more flexible solutions to travel needs and, espe-
cially, if the public transport provision is unable to meet their demand (Sheller &
Urry 2000, Murray 2001, Urry 2006, McLeod et al. 2017). Studying the formation of
sharing groups includes consideration of reduced individual purchase and increased
sustainability in urban areas.
The sharing economy literature has also analysed cases of car sharing cooperatives
in Switzerland and in Germany (Truffer 2003, Vaskelainen & Münzel 2018). These
initiatives consist of groups of consumers that come together in formalised coopera-
tives to get access to multiple goods of the same kind, and that are shared within the
cooperative. Although users’ cooperatives slightly differ from the idea of fractional
ownership where users share a single good rather than multiple goods, they provide
important insights on how coordination and collaboration can enhance sustainable
consumption by increasing access and efficient utilisation of shared resources.
Groups of consumers can coordinate to share the ownership and use of even smaller
goods, such as internet routers, which are more accessible than cars, but provide an
essential service. While many houses may own an independent internet connec-
tion, it might be used up to only a fraction of its total capacity. Less advantaged
families often do not to have internet connection at home and are reliant on data
via smartphones. This is limited to basic needs and does not provide the high qual-
ity connection which has been shown to be essential during the current Covid-19
pandemic, to allow online teaching and blended learning and home working (Nature
Editorias 2020). Although reducing the number of routers that are produced may not
have a major environmental benefit, shared adoption of routers would have a positive
impact on access to an internet connection.
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The above are present-day examples, but the economic development literature has
studied the positive impact of sharing on access to other essential goods. It consid-
ers shared consumption and ownership of common resources as enablers for rural
development. In the context of land property rights, shared ownership is discussed
as an efficient way to manage a common resource (Ellickson 1993). For example,
farmers can coordinate and contribute to adoption of an agricultural infrastructure,
such as an irrigation system, to enable efficient sharing of use of the common re-
source (Bardhan 1993a,b, 2000).
These examples of shared consumption and shared ownership help to frame the
type of shared good that are the focus of this thesis, whose diffusion could improve
both individual and societal utility.
I draw on classical economic theory to study shared goods that are similar to club
goods (Buchanan 1965), which require the formation of sharing groups (Lindenberg
1982) for efficient and effective coordination and cooperation. Since shared goods
are not entirely public nor entirely private, they fall into a category between purely
private goods and purely public goods and become common resources for the group
of consumers who adopt them. I focus on shared goods that are rivalrous and non-
excludable within the group, but which are excludable externally since the group has
the power to exclude non-members from using them (Bowles 2004). Group members
cannot be excluded from using the good (they have access to the resource); however,
the portion of the good used by one consumer is not available to the others.
The theory of governing common resources (Ouchi 1980, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al.
1994) is used to study shared goods where the local interaction approach is the
most adequate and effective to allow participation. Users autonomously organise
into communities and, assuming that everyone has the same bargaining power, co-
operate in order to achieve the maximum benefit from the common property. This is
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different from the two approaches studied in the theory of common resources which
involve power asymmetries. In the external regulation approach, the government
designs and enforces rules and regulations about the common property (an entirely
public good, such as a centralised energy grid, or public transport). In the privatisa-
tion approach, one actor owns the common property (entirely private good such as
a private car or an internet router) and establishes a contractual relationship, a mar-
ket transaction or an exchanges mechanism (as in the sharing economy where one
actor - the provider/owner of the good - sells access to it to another consumer).
To explain how shared goods affect the consumer’s attitudes to consumption and
ownership, I draw on the literatures on fractional ownership of luxury goods and
sharing economy. Based on work on the sharing economy, I study shared goods that
enable shared consumption which promotes efficient use of the goods and a more
sustainable model of consumption. Drawing on the fractional ownership literature, I
consider ownership of a good that is shared by the group of adopters. As in the case
of the sharing economy, there is no transfer of ownership among users, but, as in the
case of fractional ownership, the good is purchased in the market and, once adopted
by group, all members have fractional rights of ownership of the shared good.
Therefore, I study a consumption commitment that is short-term and access-based,
since it depends on consumption coordination with others. However, in contrast to
the notion of sharing economy, but similar to fractional ownership, the group’s con-
sumption commitment is also long-term. This is because when the group decides to
adopt a shared good, the adopters commit to using the same good for a long time.
Temporary use of a shared good generates a feeling of psychological ownership, that
is, the perception of ownership (Pierce et al. 2003, Paundra et al. 2017). While indi-
vidual access in the sharing economy generate individual psychological ownership, I
consider that collective adoption of a shared good generates collective psychological
ownership (Pierce & Jussila 2010). This is reinforced by the need to share the good
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with others. This sharing can be asymmetric among group members since the level
of individual psychological ownership relates to the different effort required for some
consumers to share the good (Kovacheva & Lamberton 2018).
1.3 Research Questions and Thesis Outline
This doctoral thesis is composed of three papers which address three crucial re-
search questions about fractional ownership and sharing economy, how shared goods
diffuse in a coalition, and whether they can replace individual goods. Each paper
constitutes a thesis chapter.1 Chapter 5 concludes, offers some implications for pol-
icy, and discusses some limitations and future directions for research. Chapter 2
addresses the following main research question:
• RQ1: Do fractional ownership and sharing economy differ, and what are
their conceptual and theoretical roots?
Chapter 2 investigates the extent to which two streams of work contribute to defining
the concept of sharing: the sharing economy and fractional ownership literatures.
The first focuses almost exclusively on shared consumption and mostly overlooks
the question of shared ownership; this is debated in the literature on fractional own-
ership. I analyse the citation networks related to these two literatures, to identify the
main topics studied and how these have evolved over time. I look for the existence
of a common conceptual base and whether elements of one stream of work feed
elements of the other stream.
The citation network analysis uses two bibliometric methods: the Leiden algorithm
for community detection (Traag et al. 2019, Waltman & van Eck 2012, 2013) and
1Chapter 2 has been published in the SPRU Working Paper Series and cited in this thesis as
’Pasimeni 2020’. An early version of Chapter 3 has been published in the SPRU Working Paper
Series (2018-24) and cited in this thesis as ’Pasimeni & Ciarli 2018’.
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Main-Path Analysis (MPA) (Hummon & Dereian 1989, Verspagen 2007). The Leiden
algorithm for community detection identifies clusters (or communities) of publica-
tions that are highly connected through direct citations. Analysis of the publications
included in these clusters identifies the main topics studied in the literature on shar-
ing economy and fractional ownership and the topics that connect these literatures.
MPA identifies the historical development and knowledge flows in these literatures,
and the key publications that link fractional ownership to sharing economy.
To answer RQ1 I address the following research sub-questions:
• What are the theoretical foundations of the fractional ownership and sharing
economy? To what extent do these foundation differ?
I show that the theoretical foundations of the sharing economy literature originated
in consumer research that discusses sharing as opposed to possession, and in work
on transaction costs. The fractional ownership literature is a fairly well established
body of research and is related mostly to economics and finance.
• Do fractional ownership and sharing economy feed each other to define the
concept of sharing, and if so how?
The findings show that three aspects of fractional ownership have contributed to
shaping the sharing economy literature: psychological ownership, the tragedy of the
anticommons and (negation of) group cooperation. Psychological ownership refers
to the exploitation of a temporary feeling of ownership perceived by sharing economy
users when accessing and using the shared good for a limited time. The tragedy of
the anticommons suggests that individual ownership in the sharing economy endows
the right of exclusion and privileged exclusive use of the shared goods. The negation
of group cooperation refers to the fact that, in the sharing economy, the benefit of
group cooperation to increase access to a good and to reduce its cost by cost-sharing
is undermined.
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• How do fractional ownership and sharing economy contribute to defining a con-
sumption and ownership model based on a shared good?
To make the sharing economy more equitable with shared consumption and shared
ownership, the shared good model should be studied in relation to collective partic-
ipation. The analysis shows that local energy communities are frequently debated
in the literature on fractional ownership, to which the sharing economy literature that
focuses on grassroots innovation also contributes. This is an important real expe-
rience of sustainable consumption models based on shared goods that also boost
inclusiveness.
I model the key features from this specific case of diffusion of sustainable goods in
local communities and address the following question in Chapter 3:
• RQ2: How does the diffusion of a shared good coevolve with the forma-
tion of a consumer coalition?
In this chapter I draw on the case of adoption of a DES to model the diffusion of
shared goods that occurs in coalitions. While several models analyse the diffusion of
goods among agents connected within a network, and several models analyse the
formation of coalitions, there is no theory and no evidence related to the coevolution
of adoption with coalition formation. I address this gap by developing a model that
combines an evolutionary coalition formation game with a model of diffusion, within
a regular network.
I develop an Agent-Based Model (ABM) derived from the sequential games in coali-
tion formation literature (Bloch 1995, 1996, Mutuswami & Winter 2002), which is
closer to the evolutionary model of firm formation (Axtell 1999, 2002). I use this ABM
to model diffusion as a process by which consumers form coalitions with the inten-
tion to adopt and use a good collectively. The collective adoption decision is mod-
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elled as a spontaneous and bottom-up process driven by heterogeneous agents with
bounded rationality. Agents autonomously interact and negotiate to reach agreement
to form a coalition and, eventually, adopt a shared good to satisfy a demand. When
the agents reach agreement, coalitions are established, leading to the adoption of a
shared good, thereby increasing its diffusion.
To answer RQ2 I address the following research sub-questions:
• How do shared goods diffuse in a coalition? What is the relation between
diffusion and coalition formation?
Shared goods are assumed to be too expensive for the individual purchase and to
be only affordable for purchase by a group. Shared goods are indivisible and non-
movable, meaning that, once adopted, they must be located close to the final users.
The adoption decision is irrevocable, meaning that replacement of the shared good is
not possible. Shared goods satisfy a need that is supplied alternatively by a general
provider and is always available to the consumers. Because coalition formation is a
necessary condition for the adoption of a shared good, it is also an obstacle to its
complete diffusion.
• To what extent do the geographical constraints of a consumer network hamper
shared adoption and diffusion of a shared good?
The results show that the smaller the neighbourhood that the shared good can serve,
the lower is the share of adopters. This is because agents that do not enter the coali-
tion at an early stage remain isolated by being outside the already formed coalition
and too distant from agents not yet in a coalition. This geographic constraint also
limits the spread of information about the new shared good, hampering the diffusion
process before consumers have been able to assess the convenience related to join-
ing a coalition.
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This chapter increase our understanding of the co-evolution of coalition formation
and diffusion of a shared good. However, it assumes that sustainable shared goods
(such as DES) are too expensive for individual adoption whereas adoption of a good
in a coalition can be a consumption alternative to reduce individual unsustainable
ownership (e.g. of a private car). This leads to the following research question which
is addressed in Chapter 4:
• RQ3: Do consumers shift from an individual good to a shared good?
In this chapter I study the conditions under which consumers may prefer to purchase
and own a shared good in coalition rather than owning the good individually, in the
presence of the public service. Individual ownership and consumption lead to idle
capacity of goods that could be shared to improve efficiency in utilisation and reduce
over-production.
I extend the ABM developed in the previous chapter in four ways. First, agents evalu-
ate the option of individual purchase, since the cost of the (shared) good is assumed
also to be affordable individually. Second, the public service is not unlimited, but
it reduces in relation to the congestion impeding access, which lowers consumers’
utility. Third, the shared good is movable and agents can connect in a random net-
work. Fourth, the duration of the good is assumed to be limited in time because of
depreciation. Consequently, agents need to replace the (shared) good.
Because ABMs include complex interactions among several parameters, a simple
sensitivity analysis of a few parameters could overlook important effects of other pa-
rameters on the model outcomes. Therefore, I iteratively analyse the full parameter
space of the model to identify the conditions under which shared adoption emerges
as an option that maximises the utility of some consumers.
First, I apply the Elementary Effects (EE) procedure to reduce the dimensionality
of the model parameters; this allows to study only the ones most relevant to the
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model output (Morris 1991, Campolongo et al. 2007). Second, I apply the Near
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design of experiments, to optimise the number
of model sampling points to be observed for the selected parameters (Cioppa &
Lucas 2007). Based on these observed points, the Kirging meta-model studies the
parameter space (Rasmussen & Williams 2006), in which the number of consumers
opting for shared purchase is maximised. Third, I apply global sensitivity analysis
using the Sobol decomposition to evaluate the individual and interaction effects of
the model parameters on the variance of the model output (Saltelli et al. 2000, Saltelli
& Annoni 2010).
To answer RQ3 I address the following research sub-questions:
• Under which conditions does adoption of a shared good replace adoption of an
individual good?
The first result is that adoption of a shared good only occurs in a niche of consumers.
I focus on this niche and run a second global sensitivity analysis (NOLH, Kriging
meta-model and Sobol decomposition) in a smaller parametric space. The results
show that shared good is adopted by a relatively low income and high demand popu-
lation with a higher preference for consumption. Coalitions tend to be formed mostly
if the shared good is relatively small. The coalition is also of small size because con-
sensus and coordination in large coalitions is more problematic and there are higher
chances of defection and reversion to individual adoption.
• To what extent does shared consumption reduce the amount of the good that
is produced?
The transition from an individual to a shared good is driven by consumers who once
owned the good individually, with no change in the number of users relying on the
public service. Importantly, the transition to a shared good reduces the overall num-
bers of the good that is produced.
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• Which policies help to increase adoption of shared goods?
Policies that reduce the relative price of the shared good (incentives) or reduce the
relative price of the individual goods (taxation) will accelerate transition. However,
policies are effective only if the shared goods can be used by relatively smaller coali-
tions where coordination is easier.
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Chapter 2
The Origin of the Sharing Economy




The sharing economy is changing the consumption and ownership of goods. As
consumption becomes more and more characterised by sharing and access-based
consumption, ownership is becoming more concentrated. The literature on the shar-
ing economy focuses almost exclusively on shared consumption practices and rather
overlooks the question of ownership despite a substantial body of work on forms of
shared ownership, that is, fractional ownership. In this paper, I study the extent of
the linking between these two streams of work and whether they have a common
conceptual base. I analyse the citations networks of these academic literatures, us-
ing the Leiden algorithm of community detection and main-path analysis. I find that
the sharing economy literature originated in consumer research that debates over
sharing as opposed to possession, and in work on transaction costs. I draw on the
strand of work on fractional ownership and identify three sharing economy aspects:
psychological ownership, anticommons and exclusion of group cooperation. The
findings allow a better understanding of the characteristics of the sharing economy
and open avenues for future research on fractional ownership models in the sharing
economy.
2.1 Introduction
In the last ten years, the emergence of a sharing economy has modified the way
goods are consumed and owned. The sharing economy is generally understood
as all borrowing, lending, renting, sharing, bartering and swapping practices medi-
ated by digital platforms (Botsman & Roger 2010). In practical terms, consumers
give temporary access to the goods they own, but which are under-utilised, in ex-
change for a fee, but involving any transfer of ownership (Belk 2007, Bardhi & Eck-
hardt 2012, Frenken & Schor 2017). This access-based consumption characterises
19
sharing practices in the sharing economy. The novelty of the sharing economy is
the temporary access granted by the owner of the good (the providers) via a digital
platform. All the actors involved seem to benefit: consumers pay a low price to gain
access to a good that they might not be able to afford to buy on their own, providers
generate extra income by selling access to privately owned goods that are being
under-utilised, and platforms exploit this new business model. Moreover, the shared
consumption reduces idle capacity of goods making their consumption more efficient
and sustainable.
The sharing economy promotes collaborative consumption of under-utilised goods
that exhibit systematic overcapacity, which allows them to be shared (Benkler 2004,
Botsman & Roger 2010, Hamari et al. 2016). Consumers use the same good at
different points in time, which is slightly different from the collaborative consumption
which was defined as “those events in which one or more persons consume eco-
nomic goods or services in the process of engaging in joint activities with one or
more others” (Felson & Spaeth 1978, p.614). This highlights the importance of joint
activities and engagement in collaborative consumption. Consumption in the sharing
economy is not collaborative; it does not require engagement in a joint activity. It can
be described as pseudo-sharing characterised by short-term rental activity and the
absence of a sense of community (Belk 2014b,a, Eckhardt & Bardhi 2015).
Also, ownership of the shared good in the sharing economy is individual, determining
polarisation of ownership, accumulation of resources and risk of rising inequalities
(Richardson 2015, Slee 2017). Ownership is individual whether the shared good
is owned by an individual (i.e., an apartment, a car, a drill) or is a company asset
(i.e., a fleet of shared cars or bicycles). For instance, AirBnB allows houseowners
to share their house with others. Similarly, Couchsurfing provides accommodation
for travellers in individually owned (or temporally owned) apartments. BlaBlaCar
allows the driver of a car, who often is the car’s owner, to share the car journey
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with others while Uber drivers use their cars to transport people from one place to
another. Companies such as Zipcar and ShareNow make the fleets of cars they own
available to subscribers for short-term usage.
I believe that the absence of cooperation and collaboration in both consumption and
ownership in the sharing economy, merits further investigation. The literature on
the sharing economy mostly does not discuss the situation where a group of people
autonomously organise and coordinate, to share ownership and consumption of a
common resource and enjoy the benefit of a collective action (Olson 1965, Hardin
1982). These cases can be described as fractional ownership, such as sharing the
ownership of a luxury good, collective ownership and utilisation of land and agri-
cultural infrastructure, cooperatives and employee-owned enterprises, or community
ownership in a local energy initiative.
So why are these fractional ownership practices not a part of sharing economy re-
search? Does the sharing economy literature have links to work on fractional owner-
ship? What might we learn from fractional ownership about the origins of the sharing
economy? Our understanding of the sharing economy would be increased by a more
systematic investigation of fractional ownership and why certain aspects of social co-
ordination and cooperation seem not to typify the sharing economy.
I address these questions by constructing a citation network drawing on scholarly
work on fractional ownership and the sharing economy. Publications are interesting
because they link each other via citations. Therefore, analysis of these citations al-
lows the construction of citation network. To analyse these two bodies of work I use
bibliometrics techniques. First, I apply the Leiden algorithm for community detec-
tion (Traag et al. 2019) to group the publications into scientific community clusters.
The links between these communities suggest that fractional ownership and shar-
ing economy have a common conceptual base. Second, I apply Main-Path Analysis
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(MPA) (Hummon & Dereian 1989) to trace the historical development of these two
literatures and identify publications which link fractional ownership and sharing econ-
omy.
The strand of work on fractional ownership is a fairly well established body of re-
search related mostly to economics and finance. Work on the sharing economy,
which is more recent, draws on several areas, such as consumer research, trans-
port, business and management. I identified three main theoretical aspects of frac-
tional ownership that have contributed to shaping the sharing economy literature:
psychological ownership, the tragedy of the anticommons and (negation of) group
cooperation. Psychological ownership refers to the exploitation of a temporary feel-
ing of ownership perceived by sharing economy users when accessing and using
the shared good for a limited time. The tragedy of the anticommons suggests that
individual ownership in the sharing economy endows right of exclusion and exclusive
privileged use of the shared goods. The negation of group cooperation refers to the
fact that in the sharing economy the benefit of group cooperation to increase ac-
cess to a good and to reduce its cost by cost-sharing is undermined. These aspects
add to the narratives related to the sharing economy and how it is portrayed in the
literature.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews key aspects of
the sharing economy and discusses the concept of ownership in the sharing econ-
omy; it touches on fractional ownership and highlights what fractional ownership has
in common with the sharing economy. Section 2.3 describes the five step process
involved in constructing the citation networks for the two strands of work: keywords,
data collection, exclusion of false positives, data harmonisation and inclusion of false
negatives. It describes the bibliometrics techniques applied to systematically anal-
yse the citation networks. Section 2.4 describes the citation network and presents
descriptive statistics for these strands of work. It presents the results of the Leiden
22
algorithm and the MPA. The networks are first analysed separately and then in com-
bination in order to identify connections. Section 2.5 discusses the main findings and
Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
Key Aspects of the Sharing Economy
Research on the sharing economy has increased since 2010. New types of interac-
tion between consumers and providers and a modified approach to consumption and
ownership have promoted interest in the sharing economy. Digital platforms play a
critical role in the sharing economy and create business opportunities and space for
market interactions between providers and consumers (Matzler et al. 2015, Schor
& Fitzmaurice 2015, Puschmann & Alt 2016, Benoit et al. 2017, de Rivera et al.
2017).
On the one side, digital platforms mediate the transactions that allow providers to
grant access to consumers, in faster and cheaper ways than in the past. Almost
anyone can sell access to the resources he or she owns which are under-utilised.
However, these new entrepreneurial activities are challenging the incumbents, for ex-
ample Uber and Airbnb have disrupted the taxi and hotel sectors (Tussyadiah 2016,
Tussyadiah & Pesonen 2016, Zervas et al. 2017). On the other side, consumers are
becoming more interested in sharing goods, and access to these goods is facilitated
by digital platforms. Sharing has become more appealing than in the past (Botsman
& Roger 2010, 2011, Bardhi & Eckhardt 2012), particularly among younger people
for whom ownership is less important than for older people (Godelnik 2017, Amaro
et al. 2019).
The new mode of connection between the contracting parties, based on digital and
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distant interactions (multi-sided platforms) is, arguably, one of the main reason be-
hind the popularity of the sharing economy. However, these organisational changes
are triggering societal tensions (Rauch & Schleicher 2015, Edelman et al. 2017) and
questions about workers’ right (Morozov 2013, Codagnone, Abadie & Biagi 2016,
Newlands et al. 2018) and inequality (Richardson 2015, Schor et al. 2016). For these
reasons, policy-makers are making efforts to regulate the sharing economy and to
ensure both equal rights and fair market competition (Witt et al. 2015, Codagnone,
Biagi & Abadie 2016, Hartl et al. 2016, McKee 2017).
The main characteristic of the sharing economy is that goods are used by more than
one person without a change in direct ownership. This has two positive effects. First,
on the consumer side, the reduction or elimination of ownership costs allows savings
which can be used for other purposes. Collaborative consumption was boosted by
the 2008-09 financial and economic crisis, which resulted in many consumers suffer-
ing from loss of goods and shortage of resources and this focused attention on how
to avoid unnecessary expenses (Rauch & Schleicher 2015, Schor 2016). Sharing
has become a viable option to reduce scarcity and increase access to goods, partic-
ular to those not affordable to most individually (Lamberton & Rose 2012, Fraiberger
& Sundararajan 2015, Hamari et al. 2016). Second, goods are used more efficiently.
Shared consumption allows exploitation of idle capacity which may be abundant if the
goods are owned and used individually (Frenken & Schor 2017). Advocates of the
sharing economy highlight its positive impact on the environment and more sustain-
able consumption (Heinrichs 2013, Piscicelli et al. 2015, Martin 2016), particularly in
relation to the specific case of car sharing and car pooling (Firnkorn & Müller 2011,
Baptista et al. 2014, Hartl et al. 2020).
However, the individual ownership characterising the sharing economy can be con-
troversial. Richardson (2015) argues that the sharing economy creates new forms
of inequality and polarisation of ownership, Schor et al. (2016) argue that class and
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other forms of inequality operate within this type of economic arrangement, Acquier
et al. (2017) suggest that the sharing economy may not deliver on its promise and
shows contradictions and Murillo et al. (2017) point to the potential for intensifica-
tion of the unequal distribution of wealth. Add to these aspects is the need of higher
democratisation of ownership and the governance of the platforms enabling the shar-
ing of goods (Scholz 2016, Schor 2016), and it becomes evident that the sharing
economy has not reached its full potential and needs further adjustment to increase
social equity and widespread well-being.
Ownership in the Sharing Economy
The rise of the sharing economy has shifted the focus of traditional business models
based on individual ownership, to new models of access without ownership (Gansky
2010, Belk 2014b). The post-ownership model of consumption modifies the tradi-
tional presupposition that links possession to the extended self (Belk 1988). In the
past, ownership has been studied as an important determinant of social status (Furby
1980, Dittmar 1992, Beggan & Brown 1994), and possession the ultimate expression
of consumer desire (Chen 2009). From this perspective, ownership is a crucial de-
terminant of individual behaviour and social interactions, particularly for individuals
who identify with the owned objects, their value and the socio-economic status they
endow (Rudmin 1991, Beggan 1992).
In the sharing economy, ownership is a perceived feeling. Psychological ownership is
perceived in relation to both physical goods (Atasoy & Morewedge 2018) and shared
experiences (Kovacheva & Lamberton 2018), which latter are extremely relevant in
the sharing economy (Paundra et al. 2017, Helm et al. 2019, Lee et al. 2019, Kim &
Jin 2020). The temporality aspect of ownership is the main novelty brought by the
sharing economy. It not only modifies consumers’ behaviour but it has also shaped
consumers’ perception of ownership. The sense of ownership in the sharing econ-
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omy is mainly an individual feeling, which arises when the user gets access to a good
and uses it (i.e. drives a shared car). This is different from the perception of collec-
tive psychological ownership, which refers to “the collectively held sense (feeling)
that this target of ownership (or a piece of that target) is collectively ’ours’” (Pierce &
Jussila 2010, p.812). The collective feeling of ownership is a psychological construct
which leads to co-ownership, since it intensifies cooperation, social relationships and
sense of community, despite being driven self-interest (Mitchell et al. 2012).
Sharing ownership of an asset eliminates the need for formal agreements that char-
acterise individual ownership and, which, in the sharing economy, allow an owner to
grant access to others. Shared ownership can involve family members, for example,
in relation to a sofa, food and domestic equipment that is available to all members
of the household and does not involve formal permission being sought for their use
(Belk 2007, 2010). Shared goods are seen as ours, they belong to the entire group
and can be categorised as common-pool resources, since they are non-exclusive,
but rival.
In contrast, individual ownership of an object defines full control (Kanngiesser et al.
2010), enabling the right of exclusion and formal permission for its utilisation (Neary
et al. 2009). The sharing economy, ultimately, is characterised by individual owner-
ship. Access to goods is granted formally in exchange for money, making the shared
goods excludable and rivalrous. Some scholars wrongly associate collaborative con-
sumption of goods in the sharing economy to the case of a common good (Bradley &
Pargman 2017, Albergaria & Jabbour 2019). This association does not hold because
the sharing economy rarely leads to the social dilemma of the tragedy of commons
(Hardin 1968).
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Literature on Fractional Ownership
Sharing resources with others is not a completely new model of consumption; it has
existed for decades as a way to govern the commons (Bowles 2004, Ostrom 1990,
Ostrom et al. 1994). Buchanan (1965) and Lindenberg (1982) suggest that sharing
groups are the optimal formation to control and access a club good and to benefit
from cost-sharing. For similar reasons, Bardhan (1993a,b, 2000) considers the agri-
cultural infrastructure a common asset that tends to be managed in common by local
farmers, Thornton (2009) shows that community-based agriculture secures owner-
ship rights to rural groups and alleviates poverty and Sims & Kienzle (2016) suggest
that group ownership can accelerate agricultural production. Fractional ownership
is another option to achieve cost-sharing and efficient shared utilisation of luxury
goods, such as holiday homes, private jets and yachts (Hastings et al. 2006, Yang
et al. 2008, Lawson 2010), whose ownership individually is not affordable for most
people.
Fractional ownership favours the formation of local communities to manage social
projects, reduces poverty and increases access to critical resources. The US Com-
munity Land Trust is an alternative land- and home- ownership structure, run by non-
profit communities, aimed at providing affordable housing to people on low incomes
(Gray 2008). In 2014, the UK government launched its Shared Ownership Frame-
work, to exploit synergies between companies and local communities to allow shared
ownership of renewable energy projects (Goedkoop & Devine-Wright 2016), which
supports the argument that fractional ownership may be important for the green tran-
sition (Hasanov & Zuidema 2018, Pasimeni 2019). However, there is no consensus
in the literature on the benefits of local cooperation (Benkler 2011, Sharzer 2012),
and the formation of sharing communities faces coordination problems which do not
arise if goods are used and owned individually (Pasimeni & Ciarli 2018).
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The sharing economy literature related to shared mobility initially focused on frac-
tional ownership as a sub-model of car-sharing (Shaheen & Cohen 2013, Shaheen
& Chan 2016) and then was extended to cases of “true sharing” with specific refer-
ence to the case of Göteborgs Bilkoop in Sweden, (Belk 2017, Dreyer et al. 2017,
Czakó et al. 2019). Bilkoop involves members of a cooperative who own a fleet of
cars and share their use and is a good example of fractional ownership: cooperation
and coordination permit shared ownership and consumption of shared resources
via a community based on long-term relationships and mutual trust (Hofmann et al.
2017, Crucke & Slabbinck 2019). These cases show that there are situations when
fractional ownership is a good way to organise communities and to manage owner-
ship and collaborative consumption of shared resources. There is a small strand of
work on the sharing economy in relation to fractional ownership, which suggests a
common conceptual base.
Common basis between Fractional Ownership and Sharing Economy
Both fractional ownership and the sharing economy focus on shared consumption
as a way to increase efficient utilisation of goods and promote sustainable models
of consumption. Both enable temporary access to allow consumption, but in the
sharing economy this is time limited depending on the access granted and paid for.
In the case of fractional ownership, this is time limited only by the fact that the good
is shared by a group so its use requires some coordination within the group.
The temporal aspect of consumption generates a perceived feeling of ownership in
the case of both fractional ownership and sharing consumption. While in the former
it is a collective psychological ownership because it is shared with others, in the latter
psychological ownership is individual and, again, lasts for as long as the duration of
the access to the good is granted (or paid for). In fact, ownership in the sharing econ-
omy ultimately is individual; the good does not belong to the consumers. Ownership
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in fractional ownership is shared among a group of individuals who organise exactly
for that purpose. One of the main differences related to these two modes is that
the sharing economy is mediated by a digital platform while in fractional ownership it
may not be necessary, but could be used to match consumers potentially interested
in fractional ownership (Lowies et al. 2018).
Fractional ownership and sharing economy are separate concepts, but they have
many similarities. Therefore, I argue that there is a need to understand why fractional
ownership is not more prominent in the sharing economy literature. I believe that a
better understanding of fractional ownership would increase our understanding of
the origins of the sharing economy. Analysis of these two literature strands should
provide evidence of connections between fractional ownership and sharing economy.
The academic literatures includes publications which are linked via cross citations,
which makes it possible to build a citation network and identify the links between
these bodies of work. The next section describes the method of analysis.
2.3 Method
I describe the procedure followed to build the citation networks for the academic
literatures related to fractional ownership (FO) and sharing economy (SE) (Section
2.3.1). This involves five steps which are described below. The first step consisted of
identifying keywords needed to find relevant publications. The second step was data
collection. The third step was checking the dataset to exclude publications not re-
lated to FO or SE (i.e., false positives). The fourth step involved data harmonisation,
to eliminate data inconsistencies. The fifth step extended the dataset by including
publications in the search communities of FO and SE not detected using the keyword
search in the first step (i.e., including false negatives to ensure high recall).
Having defined the scientific publications dataset, I built the citation networks for the
29
two literatures. In these citation networks, nodes are publications and links repre-
sent the directed relationships among them, where one node cites another or, in the
opposite direction, a node that is cited by another node. In the network, publications
that are cited, but that do not cite are source nodes, while publications that cite, but
that are not cited are sink nodes.
At the end of this section, I present the two bibliometric methods (the Leiden commu-
nity detection algorithm and the MPA) applied to systematically analyse the citation
networks (Section 2.3.2).
2.3.1 Building the Citation Network
Step 1: Keywords




Collaborative Ownership Fractional Ownership
Collective Ownership Group Ownership
Combined Ownership Joint Ownership
Common Ownership Mutual Ownership
Communal Ownership Shared Ownership
Cooperative Ownership Sharing Ownership
CoOwnership Timeshare
SE-keyword
Access Economy Peer Economy
Access-Based Consumption Peer-to-Peer Economy
Car Sharing Platform Economy
Collaborative Consumption Ride Sharing
Collaborative Economy Share Economy
Gift Economy Shared Economy
Gig Economy Shared Mobility
On-demand Economy Sharing Economy
Notes: FO and SE keywords searched within article titles, abstracts and keywords. The keyword
search was run in Web of Science and Scopus, limiting publications published up to 2019. From the
dataset of publications in both literatures, false positives are excluded (precision) and false negative
included (recall).
Table 2.1: Selected keywords for fractional ownership and sharing economy
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Keywords related to the FO literature were selected to extract publications that study
ownership of material goods. Ownership is shared among a group of people, where
participants concur via a monetary contribution. To identify this literature, I used
various synonyms for the words Fractional and Shared which were selected and
associated to the word Ownership. I also used Employee Ownership because this
refers to employees who contribute to jointly own and manage an organisation. I
included Timeshare which defines fractional ownership of holiday homes. I excluded
from the list of FO keywords, terms related to publications studying shared production
of services, software, publications or algorithms that do not refer to shared ownership
of material goods. However, if other literatures contributed to FO, the inclusion of
false negatives would ensure they were captured and included in the dataset (the
fifth step).
For SE, the keywords were selected from those proposed in the literature (WEF
2017, Ertz & Leblanc-Proulx 2018, Görör 2018, Botsman 2019, Curtis & Lehner
2019).1 To make the SE and FO literatures comparable, the selected keywords
were aimed at extracting publications on access to material goods and shared con-
sumption (Access Economy, Access-Based Consumption, Collaborative Consump-
tion and Collaborative Economy ) and sharing practices mediated by digital platforms
(Gig Economy, On-demand Economy, Peer Economy, Peer-to-Peer Economy and
Platform Economy). Gift Economy identified publications analysing consumers’ at-
titudes to ownership compared to traditional forms of possession and transfer of
ownership. Car Sharing, Ride Sharing and Shared Mobility identified work in the SE
literature on shared mobility which considers fractional ownership practices.
I did not include keywords related to the digital infrastructure enabling implementa-
tion of sharing practices or work that referred only to the act of engaging with others,
but not shared consumption. This choice is likely to not be able to include in the
1I also thank Prof. Koen Frenken for his suggestions.
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analysis the literature concerning ICT practices that resemble the characteristics of
the sharing economy business models but have connections to concept of fractional
ownership. For example, the idea of product-as-a-services consists of users paying
to access an individually owned good (e.g., a cloud space) to satisfy specific needs
such as computing, storing files or running applications. Business models and or-
ganisational frameworks developed in this area can be of further inspiration to define
the sharing of goods.
Step 2: Data Collection
The publications were downloaded from all the databases included in the Web of
Science (WoS) core collections, and Scopus, the cross disciplinary database pro-
vided by Elsevier Science. WoS and Scopus are not completely overlapping and so
widened the spectrum of publications; use of just one or the other could overlook
or exclude relevant papers (Gavel & Iselid 2008, Archambault et al. 2009, Vieira &
Gomes 2009, Mongeon & Paul-Hus 2016, van Eck & Waltman 2017). Publications
were downloaded in February 2020, limiting results to publications published up to
2019.
In WoS and Scopus, I ran a multi-keyword query to search on the selected keywords
(Table 2.1) within article titles, abstracts and keywords. Bibliographic information
were obtained for all the publications extracted, such as author(s) names, publication
year, article title, type of publication, journal title, volume, page, DOI. The identified
publications from WoS and Scopus were merged to produce a unique list. I checked
for duplicates by matching DOI, then title and eventually the string combining au-
thor(s)’ name, publication year, volume and page.
Publications extracted through the keyword search are the nodes in the citation net-
works. These are called Citing Publications (CP) because they refer to previous
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work, by citing another publication. Backward citations, or Cited References (CR),
of CP publications were also downloaded from WoS and Scopus. CR publications
are additional nodes introduced in the networks, each one linked to its own CP. A CP
node can also be a CR node if it is cited by another CP publication. Also, several CP
nodes can cite (i.e., can be linked to) a CR publication.
CP in under the following categories are maintained in the network, being part of
the academic literature: journal articles, proceedings or conference papers, book
chapters, reviews, editorial materials. Book reviews, meeting abstracts, news items
and discussion or correction papers were excluded. From the list of CR publications,
I excluded grey literature (i.e. press articles, government or institution documents,
policy literature, reports and other documents not part of the academic literature).
Books in both CP and CR were retained given their relevance in the academic litera-
ture, although it was not possible to extract their citations from either WoS or Scopus.
Hence, books in the citation network are source nodes.
Step 3: Precision - Exclusion of False Positives
The keywords in Table 2.1 could result in false positives, that is, CP not related to the
two literatures. To detect and eliminate false positives and to increase the precision
of the two datasets, 10% of the CP extracted based on keywords were assessed
(for each keyword) for their relevance to the literature. The assessment was done
manually by reading the title and abstract of the publications. If the share of false
positive was higher than the 10% threshold, the keyword search was adjusted with
additional search conditions. The objective was to obtain a dataset with above 90%
precision.
The keyword Shared Ownership generated false positives in the FO literature. It
retrieved publications studying entry mode choice by multinational corporations in
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foreign markets, where shared ownership refers to ownership of foreign subsidiaries.
It also retrieved publications on the public-private shared ownership of organisations.
To increase precision, I excluded publications whose title or abstract included any of
the following terms: foreign ownership, foreign acquisition, foreign affiliates, foreign
direct investment. Group Ownership retrieved publications on Radio Frequency Iden-
tification (RFID) systems as the protocol for ownership transfer of goods in logistics.
These publications are beyond the FO literature and I excluded papers with the terms
radio frequency identification or RFID in the title or abstract.
The keyword Timeshare generated false positives in the FO literature. This term is
used in publications studying technological aspects not related to fractional owner-
ship of holiday homes. Examples are: display and computer technologies, remote
timeshare applications, timeshare systems for analysis and laser optical timeshare.
Given the limited number of publications identified using this keyword (around 100)
the entire set of publications was assessed and only those referring to shared com-
mon property (such as a holiday home) were retained, the rest were excluded.
In the dataset of publications related to SE, Car Sharing, Ride Sharing and Shared
Mobility introduce several false positives. These terms identify publications that de-
veloped models or algorithms to optimise car sharing or ride sharing systems, in-
cluding optimal distribution of charging stations for electric vehicle and minimisa-
tion of travel distances or relocation efforts. Some publications dealt with intelligent
communication systems among autonomous vehicles and human-vehicle. These
were excluded from the SE literature since their focus was primarily on the technol-
ogy infrastructure enabling the functioning of the shared mobility, and car sharing
or ride sharing were related solely to technical applications. To systematically de-
tect these false positives, publications in the disciplines of engineering, computer
science, mathematics, decision sciences, operations research were excluded.
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Step 4: Data Harmonisation
To build the citation networks, it was necessary to identify each unique node/publication.
CP and CR publications were labelled with a string composed of the following ele-
ments: first author’s surname, first letter of first author’s name, year of publication,
volume number and first page number. Unfortunately, bibliographic information on
CR publications are not always reported correctly or are incomplete. Inconsisten-
cies lead to different identification (strings) for the same publication, hence, multiple
rather than one node in the network. I manually harmonised bibliographic informa-
tion to build strings that recognised uniquely both CP and CR publications. Table A1
in Annex A.1 provides an illustrative example of the data cleaning process.
During the process of data harmonisation, references to books are treated differ-
ently, specifically if they are second or third or other editions of the original book.
Authors produce subsequent editions of books to provide updates and other small
improvements. However, subsequent editions do not include substantial changes
and maintain the same theoretical frameworks, fundamental ideas and contributions
to the literature. Based on this rationale, references to subsequent editions of the
same book were harmonised to the original edition.
It should be noted that this harmonisation of book references had no impact on the
citation networks. This is because books are source nodes because it was not pos-
sible to extract their cited references. So, the harmonisation of subsequent book
editions to the original edition reduced the number of source nodes and focused on
the original edition, which represents the moment in time when a theoretical novelty
was introduced in the literature.
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Step 5: Recall - Inclusion of False Negatives
The citation networks of the two literatures was extended further by including false
negatives, to ensure high recall. False negatives are publications not detected by
keywords in Table 2.1 but relevant to the literature. Since it is impossible to know a-
priori which publications have been left out and which additional keywords might be
needed, I followed the approach in Batagelj et al. (2017). This consisted of searching
the most cited backward citations (i.e. CR publications) within the search commu-
nity of a literature. In other words, false negatives emerged autonomously from the
relevant literature on FO and SE, already identified in steps 1-4.
To include false negatives in the citation networks, top cited references were included
as CP nodes together with their CR publications. These are among the top 1% of
the total publications in a given literature, ranked by number of citations received.
Bibliographic information was extracted from either WoS or Scopus. Figure A1 in
Annex A.1 provides an illustrative example of how the networks expanded with the
addition of false negatives.
Backward citations further extended the original networks defined through keywords.
This historical extension of the citation networks means that the literature includes
previous work that influenced development of the FO and SE literatures. Although
this method does not consider forward citations, the more extensive search and
knowledge of the two literatures reassured me that the method did not overlook major
publications related to FO and SE.
2.3.2 Bibliometric Methods
The five steps described above allowed the construction of the two separate citation
networks for FO and SE, and a combined network. Descriptive statistics help to char-
acterise these bodies of work (i.e., number of publications, top cited publications, top
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publishing journals, top cited authors). However, to enable their systematic analysis,
I apply two bibliometric methods: the Leiden algorithm of community detection and
the Main-Path Analysis.
Leiden Algorithm of Community Detection
The Leiden algorithm of community detection (Traag et al. 2019, Waltman & van
Eck 2012, 2013) enables recognition of clusters of network nodes that hare highly
connected and which have fewer links to other clusters that, instead, closely link
other nodes. The algorithm starts with singleton nodes that move iteratively between
network partitions, which are refined and aggregated to obtain final communities with
the highest levels of connectivity among nodes.
Communities in the citation networks are quasi-independent clusters of publications
that contribute to a specific topic. Also, communities link one another. Therefore,
by running the community detection algorithm on the citation network merging the
two literatures, I can study the connections between clusters of publications related
to FO and SE. To label clusters in the citation network, I ran co-word analysis using
VOSviewer software (van Eck & Waltman 2010). This scans and extracts all terms
present in publication titles and abstracts and creates a co-occurrence map based
on text data. The most frequently occurring words are used as labels.
I apply the Leiden algorithm to analyse the citation networks among CP publications
only, since CR publications are sink nodes and titles and abstracts were not down-
loaded and, hence, they cannot contribute to the co-wording analysis. The results of
the community detection were visualised using Gephi software (Bastian et al. 2009),
which provides a graphical representation of the publications clusters in the citation
networks and their proximity.
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Main-Path Analysis
MPA was proposed originally by Hummon & Dereian (1989) and was extended by
Verspagen (2007). In the citation networks, MPA considers the links between nodes
and identifies the historical development or knowledge flows, in a particular literature,
allowing graphical visualisation to ease interpretation of the results. I use MPA to
follow the historical development of FO and SE, based on the most important path
from source to sink nodes/publications. In the combined analysis, the MPA identifies
key publications which connect FO and SE.
The objective of MPA is to identify relevant links in the network and, consequently,
relevant nodes, which define the main-path or the main search stream in the litera-
ture. Batagelj (2003) proposed Search Path Count (SPC) as a way to quantify the
level of connectivity among nodes. SPC counts how many times a link is crossed
by all possible paths in the network. A path starts chronologically from a source
node and ends in a more recent sink node. This value is the accumulated traver-
sal count of a link and measures the indirect influence of each publication in the
historical development of the literature, regardless of how many times it is cited. I
use local key-route MPA (Liu & Lu 2012) to detect the historical development of a
literature. First, it selects the top 40 links in the network, ranked by their traversal or
SPCs and then connects these links (backward and forward) to other links to reach
a source node and a sink node. Local key-route MPA produces a broader pattern
of the knowledge flows within a literature and allows for multiple paths. Figure A2 in
Annex A.1 provides an illustrative example of how the traversal count is computed
and how the key-route main-path is selected in a network.
The MPA is run in Pajek (Batagelj 2003, Mrvar & Batagelj 2016). By definition, a
citation network should be acyclic, since a more recent publication cites necessarily
an older one, or a publication in the same year. However, if two publications in the
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same year cite each other (for example, it may occur when these are forthcoming)
the network becomes nonacyclic, breaking the temporal consequentiality rule of the
development of a literature. Therefore, before starting the traversal counts, in Pajek
it is necessary to run a preprint transformation. This transformation adds preprint
publications to publications that cite each other and are published in the same year.
The original node cites its own and the preprint version of the other publication. Fig-
ure A3 in Annex A.1 provides an illustrative example of preprint transformation.
Different disciplines could have contributed to the development of the FO and SE
literatures; the citation rate of these disciplines may be not the same. The divergence
in the citation rates of different disciplines will have an impact on the descriptive
network statistics, such as top cited article, journal or authors, but will have no impact
on the outcome of the two bibliometric methods. The community detection algorithm
considers only if there is a link between two publications to determine clusters of
publications with high level of connectivity. Similarly, the MPA considers the traversal
counts of all the links in the network and then searches for the main-path. Neither
method considers how many times a publication is cited.
2.4 Results
In this section, I present the citation networks (Section 2.4.1) and the descriptive
statistics for the two literatures (Section 2.4.2). I analyse the citation networks us-
ing two bibliometric methods: the Leiden algorithm of community detection (Section
2.4.3) and MPA (Section 2.4.4). In both cases, I analyse the two citation networks in
isolation and then merge them to find the connections between FO and SE.
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2.4.1 Citation Network
The FO literature includes 2,356 CP (2,072 of them identified through the keyword
search and cleaned of false positive, and 284 added as highly cited false nega-
tives) and 68,709 CR publications. The SE literature includes 4,241 CP (3,898 plus
343) and 109,889 CR publications. The two literatures have 32 CP in common, 9
of them retrieved by the first keyword search and 23 added as highly cited false
negatives.
Figure 2.1 depicts the full network of publications/nodes for the merged FO and SE
literatures. Nodes are organised chronologically, meaning that those at the bottom
are more recent publications and those at the top are the older publications. The
network shows that there are eight categories of publications.
The red nodes on the left of the figure are CP from the FO literature, which cite only
or are only cited by other FO publications. The light red nodes are CR publications
cited only by red nodes. The blue nodes are CP in the SE literature that cite or
are cited by other SE publications. The light blue nodes are CR publications cited
only by CP nodes in the SE literature. The green nodes are the 32 publications
common to both literatures and the light green nodes are CR publications cited by
CP nodes in both the FO and SE literatures. The orange and azure coloured nodes
are CP related respectively to the FO and SE literatures; these publications cite the
common literature (green and light green nodes) or cite each other.
On average, the FO publications (red and red light) are older than the SE publica-
tions (blue and blue light): average publication year for the red nodes is 2008 and
for the blue nodes is 2016 (Table 2.2). Red nodes are more distributed across time,
while the blue nodes are concentrated towards the bottom of the figure. Green and
light green nodes are the circa 5,000 publications cited by both the orange and azure
nodes, with an average publication year of 1993 feeding both the FO and SE liter-
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Notes: The figure shows the citation network that merges FO and SE literatures. Nodes on the left (red, light red and orange) are FO publications.
Nodes on the right (blue, light blue and azure) are SE publications. Nodes in the centre (green and light green) are publications in common to the
two literatures. Years are on the vertical axis: nodes at the bottom are most recent publications. For visualisation purposes, not all links between
nodes are shown and CR publications with one citation only are excluded. VOSviewer is used to create and visualise the citation network (van Eck &
Waltman 2010)
Figure 2.1: Citation network combining the literature of FO and SE
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atures. The orange and azure nodes are older than the red and blue nodes in the
respective literatures (1995 for orange nodes and 2003 for azure nodes) and have
the highest ratio of citations per node in the respective bodies of work, indicating
their high relevance to the topic (Table 2.2).
Literature Type Avg. Year Num. Nodes Total Cit. Cit. per node
FO Red 2008 2215 3781 1.71
FO Red light 1996 5123 14345 2.80
FO Orange 1995 109 1719 15.77
FO & SE Green 1993 32 1389 43.41
FO & SE Green light 1993 4758 23424 4.92
SE Azure 2003 136 6583 48.40
SE Blue light 2007 15227 51251 3.37
SE Blue 2016 4073 18399 4.52
Notes: Characteristics of the eight categories of nodes in the citation network. These are: the average
publication year, the number of nodes/publications, the total number of citations that publications have
received, and the ratio of citations per node in each category.
Table 2.2: Characteristics of the eight categories of publications in FO and SE literatures
For example, the orange nodes include seminal work on the ownership structure
of firms and their governance (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Shleifer & Vishny 1997,
Grossman & Hart 1986) and the role of psychological ownership in organisations
(Pierce et al. 1991, 2003, Van Dyne & Pierce 2004). Similarly, azure nodes group
key SE publications which have contributed to framing the sharing economy (Benkler
2004, Belk 2010, Bardhi & Eckhardt 2012, Belk 2014b, Hamari et al. 2016) and
to developing peripheral, but important theories such as planned behaviour (Ajzen
1991) and technology acceptance (Davis 1989). This suggests that key publications
in both literatures build on similar references and they cite each other, which is the
first indication of a connection between the two literatures.
Among the green nodes, nine publications are common to both literatures (and were
extracted by the multi-keyword search based on both the FO and SE keywords). A
review of these nine publications indicates that certain research areas have analysed
cases of fractional ownership in the context of the sharing economy. These include
housing sector, shared mobility, organisation of digital content and firm structure
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research. Furthermore, shared ownership in the sharing economy is seen as occur-
ring more frequently in local rather than global contexts, and as a modern example of
reciprocity. This gives an initial understanding about which research areas are more
likely to embody both topics.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The left side of Figure 2.2, plots the number of CP related to the two literatures (FO
in red, SE in blue) by publication year, that is how many publications are published
every year. On the right, curves plot the sum of CP and CR publications for the two
literatures by publication year. This indicates the number of publications (including
their citation) that each year are added to the two citation networks.
Notes: Trend of publications in the citation network of the two literatures (FO in red, SE in blue)
published from 1939 to 2019. Plot on the left shows the number of CP publications, while plot on the
right shows the number of both CP and CR publications.
Figure 2.2: Trend of the number of CP and CR publications in FO and SE literatures
The curves on the left in Figure 2.2 indicate that earlier CP of FO literature are
published in the 50’s. Since then the number of CP in FO literature continues to grow,
until 2019 when the number of publications reaches about 190. SE literature is much
younger than FO. CP concentrate almost entirely in the last 5 years, with a much
larger quantity compared to FO. SE publications continue to increase each year, up
to about 1300 published only in 2019. Despite its infancy, the SE literature has more
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publications than FO: in total, it includes about twice the number of CP.
The curves on the right side of Figure 2.2 show the difference in how the two citation
networks develop over time. FO shows a publications peak (about 2,500) in 2000
while SE publications reach a high in 2017 (about 9,000) and can be expected to
continue to increase. The early decline in FO publication is indicative that this liter-
ature stream has reached maturity and that recent publications cite older work very
frequently. In contrast, the number of SE-nodes continues to grow; the final fall in the
curve is due to the citation time lag between year of publication and time needed to
be cited.
Table 2.3 lists the top 10 cited publications in the two literatures. The number of
citations counts publications cited by CP, since CR publications are sink nodes and
their citations are not extracted.
In the FO literature, the most recent and highly cited publication was published in
1990, confirming the earlier origins of this literature compared to the strand of work
on SE. The latest SE publication year among the top 10 cited publications is 2016.
The most cited FO publication has 102 citations, five times less than the most cited
SE publication (581 citations).
A review of these publications suggests that the top FO publications focus on the
theory of the firm and the theory of the commons. They also study the ownership
structure of organisations, analysing whether collaborative ownership by employees
might represent an opportunity or a threat for the firm. The top SE publications tend
to define the sharing economy and use consumer research to explain the emergence
of collaborative or access-based consumption and the drivers of sharing attitudes
among consumers.
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Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and
ownership structure Article 102
Alchian &
Demsetz 1972 Production, information costs, and economic organization Article 85
Pierce et al. 1991 Employee ownership: A conceptual model of process andeffects Article 75
Grossman &
Hart 1986
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration Article 72
Williamson 1975 Markets and hierarchies Book 72
Williamson 1985 The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, Markets,Relational Contracting Book 71
Hardin 1968 The Tragedy of the Commons Article 69
Klein 1987 Employee stock ownership and employee attitudes: A testof three models Article 68
Ostrom 1990 Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions forCollective Action Book 68
Hart & Moore 1990 Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm Article 63
SE
Belk 2014b You are what you can access: Sharing and collaborativeconsumption online Article 581
Botsman &
Roger 2010
What’s Mine Is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative
Consumption Book 581
Hamari et al. 2016 The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate inCollaborative Consumption Article 511
Bardhi &
Eckhardt 2012 Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing Article 427
Guttentag 2015 Airbnb: disruptive innovation and the rise of an informaltourism accommodation sector Article 315
Belk 2010 Sharing Article 301
Möhlmann 2015 Collaborative consumption: determinants of satisfactionand the likelihood of using a sharing economy option again Article 299
Botsman &
Roger 2011
What’s Mine Is Yours: How Collaborative Consumption is
Changing the Way We Live Book 277
Sundararajan 2016 The sharing economy: The end of employment and the riseof crowd-based capitalism Book 267
Ert et al. 2016 Trust and reputation in the sharing economy: The role ofpersonal photos in Airbnb Article 266
Notes: Top 10 cited publications in the citation network of the two literatures, FO (top) and SE (bot-
tom). The number of citations only counts publications cited by CP publications, since citations of CR
publications are not downloaded.
Table 2.3: Top 10 cited publications in FO and SE literatures
Table 2.4 lists the top 10 publishing journals, ranked relative to the number of distinct
publications contributing to the two literatures, including both CP and CR publica-
tions. This gives an idea of the top disciplines that contributed to the FO and SE lit-
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eratures. The FO literature centres on journals publishing on economy and finance,
and management and business. Interestingly, the Journal of Applied Psychology is
among the top journals publishing work on FO. This is linked to the perceived feel-
ing of ownership (psychological ownership), which is an important topic in the FO
literature, as discussed in Section 2.2.
FO top journal Publ. SE top journal Publ.
American Economic Review 457 Journal of Cleaner Production 664
Journal of Financial Economics 457 Journal of Consumer Research 569
Journal of Finance 404 Tourism Management 497
Academy of Management Journal 373 Management Science 478
Strategic Management Journal 302 Journal of Business Research 448
Academy of Management Review 285 Journal of Marketing 443
Journal of Applied Psychology 265 Transportation Research Record 435
Journal of Political Economy 236 Transportation Research Part A 430
Administrative Science Quarterly 234 Harvard Business Review 420
Quarterly Journal of Economics 229 Annals of Tourism Research 410
Notes: Top 10 publishing journals in the citation network of the two literatures, FO (left) and SE (right).
The total number of publications published by journals counts both CP and CR publications.
Table 2.4: Top 10 publishing journals in FO and SE literatures
In the SE literature, the Journal of Cleaner Production is the top publishing journal,
followed by the Journal of Consumer Research. This suggests that understanding
why consumers participate in the sharing economy and the impact of more sustain-
able consumption are major research areas. Consumers and their choices are cen-
tral in the SE literature, leading other disciplines to study the sharing phenomenon,
for example, tourism, transport, marketing, business and management.
Table 2.5 lists the top 10 cited authors in both literatures, based on name of first
author. The top 10 cited FO authors account for about 2.68% of total citations in the
FO literature and the top 10 cited SE authors account for 3.98% of the total citations
in the SE literature. The top FO cited author accounts for around 20% of the citations
received by the top SE author.
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FO top authors Cit. SE top authors Cit.
Williamson Oliver E. 312 Belk Russell W. 1673
Jensen Michael C. 291 Botsman Rachel 1175
Jones Derek C. 278 Shaheen Susan A. 874
Blasi Joseph 266 Schor Juliet B. 670
Kruse Douglas L. 238 Hamari Juho 607
Long Richard J. 237 Zervas Georgios 571
Pierce Jon L. 236 Tussyadiah Iis 566
Hart Oliver 221 Bardhi Fleura 484
Rosen Corey M. 181 Guttentag Daniel 475
Ostrom Elinor 178 Sundararajan Arun 390
Notes: Top 10 authors in the citation network of the two literatures, FO (left) and SE (right). To count
the number of citations, only the first author of each publication is considered.
Table 2.5: Top 10 authors in FO and SE literatures
The academic provenance of the top authors and their field of expertise can be
used to qualitatively categorise the two literatures. Almost all of the top FO authors
are American economists with a major influence on economic sciences. Three are
also Nobel Prize winners, namely Williamson Oliver E., Hart Oliver and Ostrom Eli-
nor, who contributed to economic governance, contract theory and the theory of the
commons. FO authors are responsible for pioneering studies on financial economics,
political economy, worker cooperatives and employee ownership and profit-sharing.
The top 10 SE cited authors are equally distributed between the USA and Europe
in terms of academic affiliation. Their fields of expertise are diverse, reflecting the
number of disciplines that contribute to work on the SE. They include: business, mar-
keting, ecology, sociology, information and communication technology, engineering,
tourism management and transport.
The descriptive statistics show that FO is an older and smaller literature than the
work on SE. Considering only the top ranked publications, publishing journals and
authors, fewer disciplines contribute to FO literature, but they study several different
aspects (i.e., economy and finance which examine the theory of the firm, the theory
of the commons and the ownership structure of worker cooperatives). SE includes
several disciplines, but most focus on framing the sharing economy (i.e., business,
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marketing, sociology, tourism management and transport which analyse the char-
acteristics of SE). The next two sections look at the connections between FO and
SE.
2.4.3 Community Detection
This section presents the results of the Leiden algorithm of community detection.
The algorithm generates communities of nodes in the citation network that represent
clusters of publications in a literature, which are highly connected via direct citations.
It can be assumed that clusters contribute to the same topic in a literature, although
they may have weak links to other topics. The Leiden algorithm is run to detect
communities, first, in the two isolated citation networks (FO and SE) and then in
the merged network, to detect connections between clusters. Clusters are ranked
by summing the number of citations received by the publications included in those
communities, and the top 15 are analysed. Clusters are labelled based on the results
of the co-wording analysis, which extracts the most frequently occurring terms in the
titles and abstracts of the publications in each cluster. These are presented in Table
A2 and Table A3 in Annex A.1.
Communities in Fractional Ownership Literature
Figure 2.3 depicts the top 15 clusters in the FO literature. Publications related to
employee ownership are the densest cluster and are in close proximity to another
dense cluster of publications focused on psychological ownership. This part of the
FO literature studies the functioning of employee-owned organisations in relation
to perceived feeling of ownership among workers. The workers participate in the
governance of the organisation and this direct involvement can have a positive impact
on productivity. Therefore, publications on social capital are directly connected to
these clusters.
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Notes: Top 15 clusters of publications in the citation network of FO literature identified via the Leiden
community detection algorithm. Clusters are ranked by summing the number of citations received
by the publications included in those communities. Clusters are labelled based on the results of the
co-wording analysis, which extracts the most frequently occurring terms in the titles and abstracts of
the publications in each cluster.
Figure 2.3: Top 15 clusters of publications in the FO literature
Publications on Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) are connected to pub-
lications that focus on business activity whose ownership control is shared among
a group of people. These, in turn, are linked to the cluster studying the competi-
tive effect of this organisational structure in the market. Businesses based on group
ownership are linked closely to work on property rights, which relate to the cluster
studying the commons. These clusters are linked to publications that focus on the
theory of firm, which is another dense cluster in the FO literature.
There are two peripheral clusters in the FO literature: timeshare and energy com-
munity (top-right in Figure 2.3). Both are linked to the cluster on social capital and
direct involvement in ownership. Timeshare and energy community are examples of
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fractional ownership where people organise to achieve shared ownership and con-
sumption of a common asset. Timeshare refers to sharing ownership of holiday ac-
commodation among several people. Publications in the energy community cluster
focus on local level projects, to manage and take advantage of small-scaled energy
production to share the cost and enjoy the benefits of renewable energy.
Overall, Figure 2.3 shows that the FO literature concentrates on topics broadly re-
lated to the separation of ownership and control in firms. However, it also analyses
the role of social capital, implying that social relationships and social structures are
pivotal to effective functioning of cooperative and collaborative groups such as en-
ergy communities and shared holiday home ownership.
The fact that both examples of fractional ownership (i.e., energy communities and
timeshare) are isolated topics in the literature is an important signal in relation to
future research avenues that exist and can be developed. Future research in the
literature of FO should link to the sharing economy literature in order to investigate
the challenges and opportunities for fractional ownership to emerge as a model that
increase social benefits and sustainable consumption.
Communities in Sharing Economy Literature
Figure 2.4 depicts the top 15 clusters in the SE literature. The higher number of
publications in the SE literature generates clusters that are denser that those in FO
literature. The central cluster groups publications contributing to framing the con-
cept of the SE. Around this central cluster are clusters of publications that focus on
important topics in the SE literature.
These include work on access ownership which is linked to work on possession. This
indicates that the discussion on access-based consumption in the SE literature is
linked to studies of consumers’ attitudes to ownership, traditionally based on feelings
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of possession and materialism. Linked closely to the central cluster, is a group of
publications dealing with the platform economy which emerges in the SE literature in
relation to the diffusion of digital technologies.
Notes: Top 15 clusters of publications in the citation network of SE literature identified via the Leiden
community detection algorithm. Clusters are ranked by summing the number of citations received
by the publications included in those communities. Clusters are labelled based on the results of the
co-wording analysis, which extracts the most frequently occurring terms in the titles and abstracts of
the publications in each cluster.
Figure 2.4: Top 15 clusters of publications in the SE literature
At the top-right of Figure 2.4 we find a cluster of publications analysing the hospitality
sector (the second most dense cluster in the SE literature), which is in close proximity
to publications related to trust and feedback mechanisms (reviews and ratings). At
the top-left are publications dealing with platforms which are linked to the cluster on
labour and technology acceptance. This part of the citation network indicates that
the SE literature studies specific topics linked to social and economic sectors where
digital technologies play a crucial role.
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The central cluster in Figure 2.4 links on the bottom-right to publications analysing
business models which are connected to the cluster of publications studying innova-
tion. At the bottom of the figure, are publications on car-sharing, which link to the
cluster on product-service systems. This indicates that the SE literature deals with
innovative business models which contribute to making provision and consumption
of products and services more cohesive and sustainable.
In summary, Figure 2.4 shows three main areas in the SE literature: the impact
of digital technologies (clusters at the top), access-based consumption (clusters in
the centre) and provision of sustainable consumption alternatives (clusters at the
bottom).
Linking Communities in Fractional Ownership and Sharing Economy Litera-
tures
Figure 2.5 shows the links among the top 15 clusters in both literatures. Overall,
these literatures are separate with a few connected clusters, fundamental to under-
stand the topics contributing to a common conceptual basis between FO and SE.
Work on psychological ownership are linked strongly to the SE literature, indicating
that the perceived feeling of ownership is an important theoretical element explain-
ing access-based consumption in the SE. It is important, also, to note that clusters
of publications relative to social capital, property rights and the commons are con-
nected to the SE clusters possession and product service systems.
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Notes: The figure shows the top 15 clusters of publications in both FO and SE literatures that are
merged via the Leiden community detection algorithm. Clusters are ranked by summing the number
of citations received by the publications included in those communities. Clusters are labelled based
on the results of the co-wording analysis, which extracts the most frequently occurring terms in the
titles and abstracts of the publications in each cluster.
Figure 2.5: Connections between of top clusters of publications in the FO and SE literature
Figure 2.5 highlights another important connection. This is the link between the
clusters of publications studying innovation and energy communities. While previous
connections relate mostly to the theoretical conceptualisation linking the SE and FO
literatures, this connection sheds lights on real cases of FO linked to the SE literature.
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The innovation literature (related to SE) studies energy communities as a form of
grassroots innovation, where fractional ownership is a bottom-up process leading
local communities to enjoy social and economic benefits of undertaking sustainable
common actions.
The cluster of publications dealing with car sharing merits a final observation. In the
list of SE keywords (Table 2.1), I included words related to shared mobility (shared
mobility, car sharing and ride sharing) since this stream of work studies fractional
ownership as sub-model of car sharing. However, the community detection in Fig-
ure 2.5 finds no connections between this cluster and the FO literature which sug-
gests that work on car sharing does not analyse ownership in relation to the FO
literature, possibly because, as discussed in Section 2.1, car sharing is a form of
pseudo-sharing consisting of short-term renting of a car and no community engage-
ment.
2.4.4 Main-Path Analysis
To identify the historical development or knowledge flows in the SE and FO literatures
and how they have evolved over time, this section presents and discusses the results
of the MPA. The analysis was run separately for both literatures (FO and SE) and
then run on the citation network based on merging the two.
This section follows the identification pattern: red nodes FO publications, blue nodes
SE publications and green nodes common publications in the FO and SE literatures.
In addition, clusters of publications in the main-paths are coloured and labelled based
on the results of the community detection analysis. In the main-paths, the arrows
represent links between publications: the direction of the arrow indicates that a pub-
lication cites the publication the arrow points to. The thickness of arrow connecting
two nodes is proportional to their traversal count: the thicker the line, the higher the
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relevance of that link in the citation network. Nodes are ordered by publication year,
from the oldest (bottom) to the newest (top). Nodes are labelled by strings composed
of the following bibliographic elements of the publication: first author’s surname, first
letter of first author’s name, year of publication, volume number and first page num-
ber.
Main-Paths in Fractional Ownership Literature
The FO main-path in Figure 2.6 starts from Coase’s seminal work on the nature of
the firm (Coase 1937) and follows through to his study on social costs (Coase 1960)
and work on property rights (Demsetz 1967). These papers provide the basis for the
theory of the ownership structure of the firm (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The focus
on separation and control in firms is the overarching area of research in the first part
of the main-path, and is analysed from different perspectives. For example, Myers
(1977) analyses the determinants of corporate borrowing in relation to the market
value of the firm, and Jensen & Meckling (1979) examines the productivity effect of
firms in relation to the structure of the property and contracting rights. These ideas
were developed by studying the agency problem (Fama 1980, Fama & Jensen 1983)
and analysing how the firm structure affects corporate ownership (Demsetz & Lehn
1985).
The FO literature evolved by considering the value and control of corporations via
voting rights (Morck et al. 1988, Mcconnell & Servaes 1990, Coffee 1991), with ref-
erence to employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) (Stulz 1988). Corporate gov-
ernance is central to the historical development of this literature (Shleifer & Vishny
1997) and this topic opens directions for new research on legal protection of investors
(La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999). Case studies figure in the historical development
of this literature, specifically in relation to the separation of ownership and control
in corporations in East Asia (Claessens et al. 2000) and Western Europe (Faccio &
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Lang 2002).
Notes: The figure illustrates the local key-route main-path in the citation network of FO literature,
considering the first 40 links in the network, ranked by their traversal count. Red nodes represents
FO publications and green nodes common publications in the FO and SE literatures. Clusters of
publications are coloured and labelled as for the community detection analysis. Arrows represent
links between publications: a publication cites the publication the arrow points to. The thicker the line
of an arrow, the higher the traversal count of the link. Nodes are ordered by publication year, from
the oldest (bottom) to the newest (top). Nodes are labelled by strings composed of: first author’s
surname, first letter of first author’s name, year of publication, volume number and first page number.
Figure 2.6: Local key-route main-path in the FO literature
Building on the knowledge on ownership control, the FO literature developed by
analysing the competitive effect of common ownership in the market. New forms
of organisational separation and control are analysed, including blockholdings (Ed-
mans 2014), modern governance mechanisms (Mccahery et al. 2016) and horizontal
shareholdings (Elhauge 2016). The literature also studies the impact of institutional
investors on market competition (Appel et al. 2016, Fichtner et al. 2017, Posner et al.
2017, Azar et al. 2018). In more recent years, the FO literature has focused on two
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topics. The first relates to the competitive effect and the market outcome of common-
ownership structures (Brito et al. 2018, Rock & Rubinfeld 2018, Patel 2018, Schmalz
2018). The second focuses on large voting power in investments corporations and
the impact on the governance and performance of those corporations (Bebchuk &
Hirst 2019, Walker 2019, Fisch et al. 2019, Morley 2019).
MPA indicates that the main historical development in the FO literature started with
the theory of the firm, to a focus on the separation of control and ownership and
corporate finance, including notions related to legislation, antitrust and market com-
petition. The bulk of the main-path includes publications belonging to only two of the
top 15 clusters identified in Figure 2.3, which are not connected to the SE clusters
(Figure 2.5). This means that FO publications linked to work on SE are not part of
the main knowledge flow in the FO literature. However, it should be noted that the
initial two nodes in the FO main-path (Coase 1937, 1960) are green nodes, meaning
that these publications are common to both literatures.
Main-Paths in Sharing Economy Literature
Figure 2.7 shows the main-path of the SE literature. Similar to the FO literature,
Coase’s seminal work on the nature of the firm inspired the main knowledge flow in
this literature (Coase 1937). It continued by studying transaction costs (Williamson
1981) and the problem of embeddedness in interpersonal relations and institutions
(Granovetter 1985). These are green nodes, that is, common to both literatures.
In the bottom left part of the main-path, publications on materialism, possession
and extended self spurred another initial path in the SE literature (Belk 1985, 1988,
Richins 1994, Kleine et al. 1995). These works focus on consumers’ attituded to
ownership and consumption and provide relevant background to the development of
the SE literature.
57
Notes: The figure illustrates the local key-route main-path in the citation network of SE literature,
considering the first 40 links in the network, ranked by their traversal count. Blue nodes represents
SE publications and green nodes common publications in the FO and SE literatures. Clusters of
publications are coloured and labelled as for the community detection analysis. Arrows represent
links between publications: a publication cites the publication the arrow points to. The thicker the line
of an arrow, the higher the traversal count of the link. Nodes are ordered by publication year, from
the oldest (bottom) to the newest (top). Nodes are labelled by strings composed of: first author’s
surname, first letter of first author’s name, year of publication, volume number and first page number.
Figure 2.7: Local key-route main-path in the SE literature
The two initial paths converge in studies in the SE literature on the theoretical con-
trast between sharing and gift-giving (Belk & Coon 1993, Spiggle 1994, Price et al.
2000, Arnould & Thompson 2005, Giesler 2006, Belk 2007, Chen 2009, Marcoux
2009). In 2010, Belk (2010) defined the concept of sharing, framed in contrast to gift
giving and commodity exchange. While the latter two involve possession and trans-
fers of ownership, sharing involves a feeling of community, cooperation and unity.
This publication opens up new directions for SE research by providing a conceptuali-
sation of sharing which led to the cluster of publications on the framing of the sharing
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economy.
Sharing was studied initially as a form of anti-consumption (Ozanne & Ballantine
2010, Ozanne & Ozanne 2011) that motivates consumers to share rather than to
own and enables access-based consumption (Bardhi & Eckhardt 2012). The SE lit-
erature developed by studying the extended-self in the digital era (Belk 2013) and
analysing sharing practices in the Web 2.0 context (John 2013a,b) that generate
forms of pseudo-sharing (Belk 2014a). These SE literature streams converge in the
work of Belk (2014b), who defined the post-ownership economy as a situation where
people identify themselves in relation to what they can access and what they can
share. This was another pivotal publication in the SE literature which led to subse-
quent work on consumers’ attitude to sharing practices in the sharing economy.
One branch of this literature studies how trust and reputation affect hospitality and
travel behaviours (Tussyadiah & Pesonen 2016, Ert et al. 2016) and public relations
(Gregory & Halff 2017). The other focuses on the motivations for participating in the
sharing economy (Hamari et al. 2016, Böcker & Meelen 2017) and on factors related
to consumer satisfaction (Möhlmann 2015, Tussyadiah 2016). There is a strand of
the SE literature which studies promises and paradoxes related to the SE, uncovers
some controversies and analyses the tensions between a market and a non-market
logic (Acquier et al. 2017, Murillo et al. 2017, Laurell & Sandström 2017).
The most recent SE publications fall into two types. The first includes publications
on tourism and hospitality management and consumers’ attitudes to participating
in sharing practices (Hawlitschek et al. 2018), leading to a specific focus on AirBnB
(Dann et al. 2019, Adamiak et al. 2019, Domènech et al. 2019). The second includes
publications which help to frame and conceptualise the sharing economy with a focus
on sustainability and business models (Muñoz & Cohen 2017), and considering the
current socio-economic context (Ranjbari et al. 2018, Leung et al. 2019).
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MPA shows that the historical development of the SE literature started with publica-
tions related to consumer research which analysed consumers’ attitudes to owner-
ship and consumption and was extended by work on the theory of the firm and social
capital. These initial concepts contributed to framing the notion of sharing. Following
this, the SE literature focused on analysing sharing practices which deviate from the
idea of ownership, which is not debated further in the SE main-path.
Linking Main-Paths in Fractional Ownership and Sharing Economy Literatures
Figure 2.8 shows the main-path in the literature based on merging the FO and SE ci-
tation networks. The red highlighted publications belong to the FO clusters/literature,
and the blue ones to the SE clusters/literature. It can be seen that FO and SE do
not overlap, meaning that the publications related to one literature do not appear
on the main-path of the other literature. Instead, the literatures are complementary
and, more important, the origin of SE literature is linked to the earlier FO publica-
tions.
There are three main parts in the FO literature which inspired the SE literature. At the
bottom-left of Figure 2.8, are FO publications related to the theory of the firm, prop-
erty rights, governance and ownership control which are cited by SE publications. At
the bottom-right, we can see that the SE literature is connected to FO publications
on psychological ownership, which, in their turn, are linked to employee ownership.
As in Figure 2.7, SE publications related to possession are linked to publications in
the social capital cluster. More recent publications, top-left of the main-path, are the
same blue nodes in the SE main-path and belong to the clusters framing the SE and
hospitality. This indicates that the more recent SE literature has not been influenced
by the FO literature.
I next examine the blue and red nodes linking publications in the FO and SE litera-
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Notes: The figure illustrates the local key-route main-path in the citation network that merges both FO and SE literature, considering the first 40
links in the network, ranked by their traversal count. Red nodes represents FO publications, blue nodes SE publications and green nodes common
publications in the FO and SE literatures. Clusters of publications are coloured and labelled as for the community detection analysis. Arrows represent
links between publications: a publication cites the publication the arrow points to. The thicker the line of an arrow, the higher the traversal count of the
link. Nodes are ordered by publication year, from the oldest (bottom) to the newest (top). Nodes are labelled by strings composed of: first author’s
surname, first letter of first author’s name, year of publication, volume number and first page number.
Figure 2.8: Local key-route main-path in the FO and SE literature
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tures, to identify the topics linking them. At the bottom-right, the SE publication by
Bardhi & Eckhardt (2012) is connected to FO publications on psychological owner-
ship (Peck & Shu 2009, Pierce et al. 2001). Bardhi & Eckhardt argue that access-
based consumption generates a temporary perception of ownership in the consumer
without the need for actual ownership. This is one of the main driver of access-based
consumption in the SE. This connection shows that the main historical development
in the SE literature originated from the idea that the sense of perceived ownership
motivates consumers to engage in access-based consumption, even though this is
a temporary feeling which lasts for only as long as their temporary access.
The bottom-left part of the main-path indicates that the definition of sharing (Belk
2010) is the result of two main streams of research, involving both FO and SE pub-
lications, which originates from work on the nature of the firm (Coase 1937). Start-
ing with this initial publications, one path goes through FO publications on property
rights, ownership control and transaction costs and ends with problems related to
embeddedness in the social structure. The study on social capital connects the FO
literature to SE publications on consumers’ attitudes to possession, gift and market
exchanges, which are the eventual basis of the definition of sharing.
In the second FO literature stream Belk (2010) links backward to the concept of
shareable goods, proposed by Benkler (2004), based on a study of transaction cost
theory and the motivations to share. Shareable goods are “lumpy” goods, with idle
capacity whose access can be granted to others for money. Benkler (2002) links the
FO and SE literatures directly by analysing common-based peer production in con-
nection to the topic of property rights. Specifically, he links to the notion of anticom-
mons (Heller 1998) and land property rights (Ellickson 1993). The first link indicates
that the sharing economy allows for exclusion with no exclusive use privileges. This
determines the paradoxical tragedy of the anticommons leading to underutilised re-
sources, which is one of the dynamics driving the SE. The second link connects to
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the idea that close-knit groups can choose to coordinate to minimise living costs and
achieve more efficient land utilisation.
To conclude, MPA shows that the FO literature is important to understand the origins
of the SE literature. There are two main FO topics which link to the SE literature. The
first concerns psychological ownership and the second one concerns the connection
between transaction costs, property rights and social relations. Compared to the FO
MPA (Figure 2.6), FO publications on ownership control and competitive effects do
not emerge in the combined analysis. This is not surprising since these topics are
not relevant to SE. However, this lack of connection is the reason why the recent
SE literature does not debate FO: the main knowledge flow in FO is unrelated to the
SE.
2.5 Discussion
This paper provides a better understanding of the origins of the SE and sheds light
on its relations to FO. Systematic analysis of the citation networks built on the FO
and SE academic literatures identifies their common conceptual base.
Compared to work on the SE, the earlier FO literature includes fewer publications.
Economy, finance and applied psychology are the main disciplines in the FO liter-
ature. The SE literature involves several disciplines such as transport, consumer
research, marketing, business and management.
The main historical development of the FO literature shows no links to the SE. In fact,
the MPA focuses on the theory of firm, specifically, on organisations where owner-
ship and control is shared among several actors, and on corporate finance. However,
there are other clusters of publications in the FO literature that study the role of so-
cial capital in firms. In particular, this literature shows that employees’ participation
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in the ownership of an organisation generates a feeling of collective psychological
ownership (Pierce & Jussila 2010) that is similar to the sense of community gener-
ated when people organise to manage a common good. People engage in common
actions and build social relationships to share the values and norms required neces-
sary to create mutual trust and enhance cooperation and collaboration in the group.
These social structures are fundamental for effective functioning of practices based
on FO.
When analysed independently, the main historical developments in the SE literature
show its lack of links to FO. It originated from work on two main topics, which was
modified and adapted in line with the evolution of the marketplace in which the SE
occurs. The first topic is the theory of the firm, which, by embracing the notions
of transaction costs and social capital, leads to the second topic on consumers’
attitudes to possession, materialism and ownership.
In contrast to the origins of FO, the theory of the firm and the role of social capital
help to explain how the SE operates in the digital space. Here, market exchanges are
facilitated by digital platforms, with business models allowing connection between the
contracting parties, who may not be proximate and who never interact face-to-face.
On the one side, digital platforms reduce the transaction costs involved in accessing
a shared good, by eliminating the intermediaries between provider and consumer.
On the other side, since the platforms are acting as intermediaries and obtain a
marginal profit from these transactions, they can increase their profit by operating at
the global level to achieve economies of scale.
The second origin of the main historical development of the SE literature refers to
consumer research. This strand of work explains that the SE has generated new
forms of consumption behaviour in opposition to possession, thereby downgrading
the importance of ownership as the identification of the extended-self. In other words,
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the SE emphasises the post-ownership model of consumption in which possession
is no longer the ultimate goal of the consumer. Instead, consumers are more inclined
to favour access-based consumption of goods that are not directly owned.
When the two literatures were merged and analysed together, three topics in the FO
literature were shown to be at the roots of the SE literature: psychological ownership,
anticommons and group cooperation. As discussed above, in the SE, ownership is
not the ultimate desire of consumers. The connection to psychological ownership
clarifies this: consumers are motivated towards access-based consumption because
it satisfies a need through the use of a shared good, leading to a temporary feeling
of ownership (Bardhi & Eckhardt 2012).
The second aspect of FO which inspired the literature on the SE is the characteris-
tic that the shared goods are under-utilised and, hence, shareable (Benkler 2004).
Some scholars studying the SE identify shared goods as common goods. The the-
ory of common goods says that utilisation is privileged and there are no rights of
exclusion, leading to the tragedy of commons when the common good is overused
and, thus, becomes scarce. However, this theory does not hold in the context of
the sharing economy, which, instead, is inspired by the tragedy of the anticommons
(Heller 1998). It includes rights of exclusion and no effective privileged utilisation
and, if exclusion is enforced, the resources become underutilised.
The connection to the tragedy of the anticommons helps to explain two character-
istics of the sharing economy. On the one hand, anticommons determines idle ca-
pacity of resources, thereby favouring sharing practices. On the other hand, shared
goods are privately owned and access to them is granted by their owners. Therefore,
the concentration of ownership enables the rights of exclusion, often in relation to
goods or services which are fairly essential to consumers, such as accommodation
or transport. In the SE, owners that grant access to goods or services have no legal
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obligations to maintain this provision. They respond to market dynamics and can
discontinue provision for any economic, financial or business-driven reasons. Also,
consumers have no rights related to continuity of provision. The link to FO shows the
difficulty involved in the SE of combining market-driven dynamics with promises of
social equity (Richardson 2015, Schor et al. 2016, Acquier et al. 2017, Murillo et al.
2017, Laurell & Sandström 2017).
The third connection between the FO and SE literature is related to the concept of
close-knit groups and group ownership (Ellickson 1993). Developed in the context
of property rights in land, close-knit groups refer to social entities based on cooper-
ation, power distribution and continuous face-to-face interactions among members.
The group is formed to enable collective living on shared land, to increase members’
benefits, to minimise their costs and to adapt to changing economic conditions. This
strand of work suggests that informal social control could avoid the tragedy of the
commons. Within a market economy, the idea of cooperative groups becomes ap-
pealing only if it generates higher benefits than those resulting from market dynamics
(i.e., reduced costs). However, if the market offers better conditions, the reason for
a close-knit group disappears. The SE enables access to goods at very competitive
prices, discouraging possible formation of close-knit groups. Collective action and
shared ownership in the SE emerge only if the cost of owning a common good is
lower than the market cost. For example, people could jointly buy and own a car
and share its use, but access to cars provided by car-sharing platforms is cheaper.




This paper sheds light on fractional ownership to provide a better understanding of
the origins of the sharing economy. The analysis of the combined citation networks
of the two literatures provides evidence that the sharing economy literature focuses
mainly on access-based consumption of goods, which, ultimately are owned individ-
ually. This explains the rising ownership polarisation and the difficulties related to
the emergence of fractional ownership models in the context of the sharing econ-
omy.
Consumer preferences for access rather than ownership, reduce the possibility for
fractional ownership where ownership is important if it is shared. Access-based
consumption reduces identification of consumers with the shared good, since con-
sumers in the sharing economy are self-interested, lack a sense of community,
demonstrate negative reciprocity and do not trust other (Belk 2014a). The tempo-
rary feeling of ownership perceived by consumers in the sharing economy rejects the
positive impact of the collective psychological ownership perceived by participants if
the good is owned by the group, which weakens fractional ownership in the sharing
economy.
However, combined analysis of the two literatures showed that the sharing econ-
omy has resulted in emergence of the topic of energy communities, which is a case
of fractional ownership. Publications on innovation in the sharing economy litera-
ture define energy communities as forms of grassroots innovation (Seyfang & Smith
2007, Seyfang & Haxeltine 2012). Local energy communities are examples of close-
knit groups – often of neighbours – who organise to take responsibility for providing
energy at the local level. Driven by the social structure (e.g., shared values and
norms, mutual trust, group cooperation and collaboration), the participants in these
communities enjoy the social and economic benefit of engaging in sustainable com-
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mon actions. There are several real experiences of energy communities, and this
is a very positive signal suggesting that fractional ownership could be instrumental
in alleviating energy poverty (Seyfang et al. 2014, Goedkoop & Devine-Wright 2016,
Müller & Welpe 2018). Energy legislation is developing to include regulation of inter-
actions between energy communities and the private sector, to diffuse new climate
neutral technologies.
Inspired by the study of energy communities, future research on the sharing econ-
omy could be based on fractional ownership models adapted to include self-organising
communities to share the purchase, ownership and use of a common asset. More
research is needed on mobility in urban areas, where less private car ownership is
needed to make city spaces more sustainable (Meelen et al. 2019). Sharing own-
ership of a car could be a valid alternative for consumers whose budget does not
allow purchase of an individual car and who prefer to avoid public transport (or car-
sharing schemes) either because they can become congested or because they do
not serve all city districts. Communities can have a positive societal impact by in-
creasing access to and ownership of goods or services not affordable individually,
thereby alleviating scarcity and reducing poverty. It is important to examine the con-




Coalition Formation and the
Diffusion of Shared Goods
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Abstract
Citizens’ engagement and consumers’ empowerment are key drivers of the transi-
tion to a more sustainable economy. The adoption of decentralised energy systems
may improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the generation, transmission
and consumption of energy, while reducing emissions, dependence on the (often
fossil-based) national grids and energy poverty. However, this adoption, which in-
volves high fixed costs and high capacity, requires the formation of communities of
consumers. While several models analyse the diffusion of goods among agents con-
nected within a network, and several models analyse the formation of coalitions, we
lack theory and evidence about the coevolution of adoption with coalition formation.
This paper addresses this gap by developing a model that combines an evolutionary
coalition formation game with a model of diffusion within a regular network. Because
coalition formation is a necessary condition for the adoption of a shared good, it is
also an obstacle to its complete diffusion. We find that the smaller the neighbour-
hood that the shared good can serve, the lower is the share of adopters. This is
because agents that do not enter the coalition at an early stage remain isolated by
being outside the already formed coalition and too distant from agents not yet in a
coalition. This geographic constraint also limits the spread of information about the
new shared good, hampering the diffusion process before consumers have been
able to assess the convenience related to joining a coalition. The paper concludes
by discussing some policy implications in relation to increasing adoption of shared
goods.
3.1 Introduction
According to both research and policy, citizen engagement and consumer empow-
erment are key drivers of the transition towards more sustainable economies (Smith
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et al. 2014, Bauwens et al. 2016, Schot et al. 2016, European Commission 2010,
2015a,b). According to this view, consumers must be made more aware of the
environmental impact of their choices and encouraged to adopt more sustainable
goods and lifestyles (Briceno & Stagl 2006, Schweizer-Ries 2008, Hyysalo et al.
2016).
One such sustainable option includes groups of co-located households coordinat-
ing to form energy communities to jointly adopt sustainable Decentralised Energy
Systems (DES) to generate the energy that they consume (Dóci & Vasileiadou 2015,
Van Der Schoor & Scholtens 2015, Bellekom et al. 2016, Goedkoop & Devine-Wright
2016, Koirala et al. 2016, Hasanov & Zuidema 2018). DES are power sources,
scaled to household demand, installed physically close to final users and connected
to them directly (Hatziargyriou & Meliopoulos 2002, IEA 2002). The adoption of DES
in local energy communities would improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of
the generation, transmission and consumption of energy, while reducing emissions,
dependence on the (often fossil-based) national grid and energy poverty (Kirchhoff
et al. 2016, IEA 2017, Holstenkamp 2019, Katre & Tozzi 2019).
Despite these benefits, diffusion of DES has proved difficult and, to date, they occupy
a niche in the dominant centralised network (Arentsen & Bellekom 2014, Dóci et al.
2015, Strachan et al. 2015). The formation of local energy communities to adopt
DES faces a range of challenges. Apart from infrastructures requirements (i.e., en-
ergy dispatch), coordination among neighbouring households can be fraught with
heterogeneous constraints and preferences (Watson 2004, Sauter & Watson 2007,
Groh et al. 2014, Pasimeni 2019). Close local communities are likely to find it easier
to coordinate compared to scattered weakly connected communities composed of
distant members (Granovetter 1973). However, closer knot communities tend to limit
diffusion.
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Coordination and the need for DES to be physically located close to users, can hinder
diffusion. To design policies to foster the diffusion of DES (Jacobsen et al. 2013,
DECC 2014, Oteman et al. 2014, Dóci & Gotchev 2016, Süsser et al. 2017), there is
a need to better understand the role of coalition formation in the defined geographical
space (Seyfang & Smith 2007, Seyfang 2010, Seyfang & Haxeltine 2012).
This paper proposes a simple model to analyse the diffusion of a shared good, such
as DES, in a coalition formed in a geographically delimited neighbourhood. We com-
bine features from coalition formation models with those of network diffusion models.
We model coalition formation as an evolutionary game among agents that decide
to contribute to a common investment. We model diffusion using elements from
both the Bass and the threshold models where agents are located on a regular net-
work.
Users can consume a service (e.g., electricity) by purchasing it from the public
provider or by forming a local coalition to purchase a shared good and share its
use. Shared goods require the agents to form stable coalitions which satisfy all their
members (i.e., none of them prefers to exit or move to a different coalition). Some
local residents might decide not to participate in a coalition either because they are
better off with the public service or because all coalition members would be better off
if they do not join. In order to form a stable coalition, agents iteratively make offers for
a contribution which maximises their utility in coalition. At each iteration, all agents
assess their utility, which is a function, also, of the contributions of other members,
and assess how much of the shared good they will consume (their demand). Before
being able to assess the benefit of joining a coalition, agents must be informed of the
opportunity to purchase the shared good. Information spreads as informed agents
get in touch with non-informed agents, to invite them to join the coalition.
The recursive nature of the model, the heterogeneity of agents and their limited
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rationality, and the reliance of diffusion on endogenous network formation means that
the model has no analytical solution. Therefore, we simulate the model to analyse
its properties in terms of diffusion and coalition formation, and to study their co-
evolution. In particular, we study the conditions under which coalition formation leads
to or hinders diffusion, and how the results change for different properties of the
network in which the agents interact.
We find that, because the adoption of a shared good requires the formation of a
coalition, the diffusion of the shared good never reaches all of the population. To
some extent, this is because some consumers do not find a coalition that increases
their utility with respect to purchasing the public service. This depends, in part,
on the distribution of preferences across heterogeneous agents. Perhaps of more
interest, it depends also on the effect that coalition formation has on reducing the
probability of those agents who have yet to join a stable coalition, from doing so. As
already mentioned, participating in a coalition depends on the preferences of both
the individual consumer and the other members of the coalition.
The number of possible coalitions reduces rapidly if the good can be adopted only
by clustered local neighbours (e.g., DES). In this case, the smaller the size of the
neighbourhood that can be served by the good, the lower the adoption share since
agents that did not enter the coalition early become isolated between already formed
coalitions and agents who are not sufficiently proximate to enable a coalition. The
geographic location of the shared good and the location of its use constrains diffusion
if coalitions are formed before proximate agents are in possession of full information.
This happens if an agent who receives information about a shared good joins a large
coalition and is constrained from contacting neighbours because they would be too
far away from the most distant coalition partner.
The outcomes of the model could be informative for decision-makers in relation to
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supporting communities to purchase a good with a high investment cost, where be-
longing to a coalition would reduce the unit cost of the service (e.g. DES).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other published studies that consider
the diffusion of shared goods in combination with the formation of coalitions, and no
published evidence showing how the processes of coalition formation and diffusion
co-evolve. We build on several strands of work that have analysed these concepts
separately: common properties, collective adoption, diffusion in networks and coali-
tion formation. The aim of the present paper is to fill the gap in the knowledge about
how these processes co-evolve. To do so, we first abstract theoretical aspects from
the case of DES and then use them to develop an agent-based model.
The rest of the paper is organised in four sections. Section 3.2 presents theoretical
concepts related to the adoption and use of shared goods. We use these theories to
develop the model, which is presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the re-
sults and Section 3.5 concludes with a discussion of some policy implications related
to the diffusion of shared goods adopted by communities.
3.2 Theoretical Background
DES are indivisible, capital-intensive goods with high fixed costs. They produce an
amount of energy that is well beyond the needs of the average household. With a
few exceptions, they are convenient for use by households only if they are adopted
by a group of households. So, we need to study their diffusion as a “collective inno-
vation decision” occurring through “consensus among members of a systems” and
where participants “must conform to the system’s decision once it is made” (Rogers
2003, p.28). This is akin to the use of club goods by sharing groups (Buchanan 1965,
Lindenberg 1982) and differs from standard models of diffusion that analyse individ-
ual choices, including those on low-carbon technologies (Diamond 2009, Schwarz &
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Ernst 2009, Weiss et al. 2009, Bollinger & Gillingham 2012, Murakami 2014).
Group adoption has been studied in the case of agricultural technologies, for in-
stance, to analyse farmers’ decision’ to cooperate to purchase a common irrigation
infrastructure (Bardhan 1993b,a, 2000). These models of governing common-pool
resources suggest that local-level community organisations are more efficient and
effective than external governance, such as privatisation or nationalisation (Ouchi
1980, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1994). This is because autonomous local commu-
nities, although formed of self-interested individuals, coordinate via informal relations
and agree on shared norms. Shared reciprocity and altruistic behaviours can easily
resolve conflicts and ease long-run cooperation in situations of economic and social
interdependence.
Similar to other shared goods, such as the irrigation system just discussed, DES are
also non-excludable and rival goods (Bowles 2004): the users that share the good
can use the energy produced, but the energy consumed by a specific user is not
available to the others. Hence, DES, are similar to common-pool resources, which
require self-governance, trust, compliance, cooperation and coordination among
users to manage their use (Seabright 1997, Dayton-Johnson 2000, Griffiths & Luck
2003).
To achieve coordination, the collective adoption decision must be preceded by for-
mation of a coalition of agents that agree about how much they will contribute to and
how much use the will make of the shared good (Olson 1971, Hardin 1982, Oliver
& Marwell 1988, Schlager 1995). The literature on game theory has studied exten-
sively the process of coalition formation (Caplow 1956, Gamson 1961, Komorita &
Chertkoff 1973, Komorita 1974), in relation to initial conditions and network structure
(Dreze & Greenberg 1980, Axelrod et al. 1995, Shehory & Kraus 1998).
In network theory, social interactions are fundamental to understand choices of the
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players and the profit they gain (Galeotti & Goyal 2009, Elliott et al. 2019, Galeotti
et al. 2020). This is even more important when choices and coordination with neigh-
bours will impact the efficiency of equilibrium outcomes and the joint welfare (Elliott
& Golub 2019, Fainmesser & Galeotti 2020, Galeotti et al. 2021), particularly when
uneven distribution of ownership in network may generate lower aggregate welfare
(Galeotti & Ghiglino 2021). Although very different in purpose, the theory of innova-
tion network provides insights on the effectiveness of collaboration to produce (rather
than consume) new goods or ideas (e.g., patents), suggesting that forming coalition
and joining forces increases overall benefits in terms of knowledge creation and re-
duced associated risks (Jaffe et al. 1993, Agrawal et al. 2008, Boschma & Frenken
2010).
These models help to understand under which conditions homogeneous rational
agents that maximise social and individual welfare, coordinate to form simultaneous
one-off coalitions, without intervention from a central planner.
One-stage models of coalition formation are based on two main assumptions (Bloch
& Dutta 2011): agents are hyper-rational, meaning that they are aware of how other
agents will respond, and are perfectly forward-looking and are able to form a sta-
ble coalition since there is an endogenous resolution to the problem of coordina-
tion among the agents. These models generally do not consider that organisations,
based on coalitions, evolve and transform, which changes the conditions for the
agents to remain in the coalition (and, therefore, their assessments). Also, agents are
rarely homogeneous and hyper-rational (Simon 1991, Windrum et al. 2009).
Sequential games of coalition formation investigate how non-cooperating agents in-
teract to find a stable equilibrium where all the players end up in a coalition (Bloch
1995, 1996) or remain singletons and gain a payoff equal to zero (Mutuswami &
Winter 2002), with a rule of fixed sharing of the surplus among agents. Evolutionary
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game theory models relax the one-stage model assumptions of homogeneity and
rationality and study how organisations change dynamically till they reach a steady
state. For example, Axtell (1999, 2002, 2018) models the process of firm forma-
tion, showing that self-organised coalitions can achieve a better outcome than if all
the players act independently. Firms are non-cooperating agents that contribute an
amount of effort to ensure the production of a joint output, whose utility depends
on their payoff and on the contribution of the other players that enter the coalition.
Agents make proposals about their effort sequentially and to maximise the individual
payoffs, and all other players decide whether to form the coalition or not. If not, then
the agents must make another offer.
Whether individual or in a coalition, the diffusion of a new good is influenced by social
networks (Tarde 1962, Bass 1969, Rogers 1976, Burt 1987, Arthur 1989, Abraham-
son & Rosenkopf 1993, 1997). DES are no exception (Nygrén et al. 2015). There
is a large literature that studies the diffusion of goods across consumers, modelled
as nodes in a social network, linked by social ties. It shows that the speed and rate
of diffusion depend on the network structure (Delre et al. 2010, Peres 2014). Three
structures are commonly compared (Cowan & Jonard 2004): a regular (or lattice
structure) network, a small world network and a random network. In the first, every
node has the same number of nearest neighbours. Since this network is locally very
dense and has a long average path length, diffusion is slow because information
must travel through the whole network in order to reach nodes located at the oppo-
site side of the network. The small world network structure (Watts & Strogatz 1998)
is a regular network in which a few random nodes are connected to distant nodes.
This structure maintains the same level of clustering as the regular network, but av-
erage path length is much shorter, resulting in faster diffusion. In random networks
(Erdos & Renyi 1960), nodes are connected to each other randomly. This network
has low average path length and low clustering, resulting in fast diffusion, although
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nodes are not locally connected.
To understand the likelihood that DES will diffuse, we need to combine the above
theories to model the joint decision to form a coalition. The group of agents does not
exist ex ante although their social connections and co-location do exist. We follow
the evolutionary game theory literature to model the spontaneous process of coali-
tion formation among heterogeneous agents with limited information and bounded
rationality. Because the coalition is formed between agents that are co-located and
form social ties, we need, also, to model how the information about the new good
spreads through the network. A coalition is a required step to enable purchase of the
indivisible good and its shared ownership and use. We model a shared good, such as
DES, which is a non-mobile asset and can serve only agents that are co-located. We
use insights from the literature on network diffusion to study the constraints on adop-
tion of a coalition by agents in a regular network . Agents can reach out to physically
distant, but socially close peers to acquire information about the new good. Unlike
the existing research, we model the co-evolution between the processes of coalition
formation, network formation and adoption, over time.
3.3 The Model
We build on evolutionary models of firm formation and the best-reply type adjust-
ment dynamics proposed by Axtell (1999, 2002, 2018), which can be categorised
as sequential coalition formation games (Bloch 1995, 1996, Mutuswami & Winter
2002).
We model a population of heterogeneous agents that can satisfy their demand for a
service by using a public provider or by purchasing a shared good with other agents.
The individual cost paid to access the public provider is given exogenously, and the
utility of using it depends on the agent’s characteristics and preferences. The indi-
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vidual cost of accessing the services provided by the shared good depends, also,
on the characteristics and preferences of the other agents in the coalition (and the
choices they make based on these characteristics and preferences), and on charac-
teristics of the coalition such as its size. Then the utility of an agent in the coalition
depends on how the individual cost and use of the shared good are determined in
the uncoordinated process of coalition formation.
When given the opportunity to form a coalition, agents choose between doing so
or using public service, through an iterative process in which all agents attempt to
maximise their utility. Similar to Mutuswami & Winter (2002), we introduce into the
negotiation process, a conditional cost contribution, which represents the monetary
contribution that the agents are willing to commit to purchase the shared good. This
contribution is a portion of the individual agents’ incomes. Therefore, the decision
to enter a coalition depends on how much income the agents need to invest (and
their preference for income). The decision to enter a coalition depends, also, on how
much of the service provided by the shared good the agents will be able to use. As
in Axtell (2002), together with the conditional cost contribution, agents communicate
their demand for the service.
The utility function in the coalition is an adaptation of the function proposed by Axtell
(2002). The use of the good can be shared equally among coalition members, or can
be shared in proportion to the agents’ contributions or demand. Therefore, beyond
the monetary contribution and own access, the utility of each agent in coalition de-
pends also on the monetary contribution that other agents propose to commit, and
on their individual demand and the cumulative demand for the service. Since agents
respond iteratively to the choices of the other coalition members, the choice to enter
each coalition changes over time.
Agents establish a coalition when it is stable, i.e., no agent (inside or outside the
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coalition) would make a different choice, in the given time step. This means that, for
all agents in the coalition, the utility is higher and the individual cost is lower com-
pared to using the public service. Under these conditions, the agents in the coalition
adopt the common good jointly and share its use, and contribute to its diffusion. The
adoption decision is maintained for the rest of the simulation, implying that adopters
cannot form another coalition.
Agents are the nodes in a network whose structure evolves over time as new links are
formed and existing links are severed. Changes to the network structure influence
both the flow of information and the agents that can join the coalition and, therefore,
the choices of other agents (Jackson & Wolinsky 1996, Dutta & Mutuswami 1997,
Bala & Goyal 1998, Johnson & Gilles 2000, Jackson & Watts 2002).
We assume that the shared good can provide the service locally to agents that are
located in close geographical proximity. This limits the number of coalitions that
agents can join: they can form a coalition only with agents that are within a few
steps (a few links) (Watts & Strogatz 1998, Amaral et al. 2000). When a coalition is
formed, the participating agents cannot join another coalition, which would reduce
the network for the remaining agents and affect the conditions under which they
choose between potential further coalitions and the public service, in the succeeding
time steps.
The model dynamics (i.e., recursive decision making model) and endogenous net-
work formation, make it difficult to find an analytical solution which connects agent
behaviour to the macro outcome of the diffusion of the shared good. We use agent-
based computer simulations to simulate agents’ behaviour and interactions, and
we analyse the aggregate result for different conditions and different sequences of
stochastic events.
At the start of the simulation, agents are disconnected nodes who have yet to form
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links to form a regular network. Agents have a maximum of L neighbours with whom
they can form links. The model distinguishes between three types of agents: regular,
active and initiator. The sequential coalition formation game starts with m randomly
chosen initiators, who are the innovators that start the diffusion of the new good
(Gersho & Mitra 1975, Rogers 2003). Initiators differ with respect to other agents
because they: contact neighbours and form links to them to create a network of
agents that can be involved in the coalition formation process (action A1); choose
the good to buy in the coalition from a basket of available goods (action A2); start the
process of coalition formation (action A3).
Regular agents become active when they are contacted by an initiator (action A1),
and a bidirectional link is established between the two.1 When a link is formed, the
initiator informs the new now active agent about the shared good option to replace
the use of the public service. Active agents can also become initiators and can create
new links, thereby continuing the knowledge diffusion process as in the network
percolation diffusion model (Mort 1991, David & Foray 1994, Solomon et al. 2000).
An active agent becomes an initiator if its interest in the shared good is above a
minimum level which is computed endogenously at each time step. This threshold
is defined as visibility (Faber et al. 2010) and represents the minimum level of the
agent’s awareness of the new good. At every time step, a random value, RND 2
[0; 1], is generated and associated to the active agents. An active agent becomes
an initiator when this value is lower than the visibility (Wt). The visibility is computed
as:
Wt = MAX[Wt 1;min[1;Adv + (SCt 1)
⇠]] (3.1)
where Adv is the exogenous level of advertising, as in the Bass model (Bass 1969);
SCt 1 is the share of agents in the population that have already established a coali-
tion; and ⇠ is an exogenous parameter reflecting a bandwagon effect (Smallwood &
1An initiator is always active.
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Conlisk 1979). Once an active agent becomes an initiator, it remains an initiator for
the remaining time steps. Visibility increases with the number of capital goods dif-
fused in the coalition, and increases the number of agents with a chance to become
an initiator, which increases the likelihood that other agents are involved in coalition
formation and adoption. As is common in diffusion models, agents that already be-
long to the coalition and have adopted the shared good, do not participate in the
subsequent coalition formation processes, thereby reducing the number of initiators
and the likelihood of new agents to be contacted. Therefore, coalition formation and
diffusion are two co-evolving processes.
At the start of the simulation, all agents use the service supplied by the general
provider at a cost (ci1) which is a function of their demand for the service (di) and of
the unitary price of the service (p1):
ci1 = dip1 (3.2)
The cost of the service determines the agent’s utility (Ui1) related to using the public
service, together with its income (ei) and demand (di). As in Axtell (1999, 2002),
utility is modelled as a Cobb-Douglas function of the income spent to purchase the
service (ei   ci1), and the demand (di):
Ui1(p1; di; ei; ✓i) = (ei   ci1)✓i(di)1 ✓i (3.3)
where ✓i is an agent’s preference for income and 1-✓i its preference for consump-
tion.
As regular agents are informed about the option to purchase the good that provides
the same service, at a cost shared with coalition members, they can consider this
alternative if they are involved in the formation of a coalition. The initiators choose
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a shared product randomly (action A2). The good is chosen among those available
in the market, which differ in cost (I), and capacity (S), i.e., the maximum amount
of service supplied, and the unitary price of the service supplied (p2). A product q is
chosen randomly with a probability proportional to its diffusion share, calculated as
the number of products q adopted (DSq) over the total number of products already
adopted (
PQ
q=1 DSq). At the beginning of the simulation, all products have an equal







The initiators then ask their linked neighbours to join the coalition to contribute to the
purchase of the shared good q and share its service (action A3). When purchasing
a shared good in coalition, the cost to each agent of accessing the service (ci2)
depends on the agent’s demand (di) and the unitary price of this second option (p2)
compared to the public service options, plus the monetary contribution that the agent
would be willing to contribute to purchase the shared good (xi, xi<I, where I is the
total cost of the shared good). Formally:
ci2 = dip2 + xi (3.5)
In the model, xi is computed endogenously by each coalition member as the value
that maximises its utility (Ui2) in a given coalition of size N : agents choose xi to
satisfy dUi2/dx=0.
When purchasing a shared good in coalition, agents seek to maximise their utility
in coalition, by determining the contribution they must offer to purchase the shared
good (xi), and which they compare to the utility from purchasing the public service.
Utility is function of the agent’s characteristics and preferences and the decisions of
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the N 1 other participants with respect to how much they are willing to contribute to
and use the shared good. Formally, the utility function in coalition has the following
Cobb-Douglas structure:
(3.6)
Ui2(p2; di; ei; ✓i;↵i;  i; xi;D i;X i) =










where di is the agent’s demand for the service and ei is the agent’s income. ✓i is the
agent’s preference for income and (1-✓i is the agent’s preference for consumption):
a higher ✓i implies a lower propensity to invest in a shared good.
↵i 2 [0; 1] is the relative importance given to proportional division of use of the good,
based on relative demand: for higher values of ↵i agents prefer to share the use
of the good based on relative demand (if their demand is relative higher, they will
be able to use more of the service regardless of how much they have contributed).
 i 2 [0; 1] is the relative importance given by the agent to the proportional division of
the use of the good based on relative contribution ( xixi+X i ) rather than equal shares
( 1N , with N the coalition size): for higher values of  i agents prefer to share the
use of the good in proportion to the size of their contributions rather than sharing
equally.
X i and D i are, respectively, total monetary contribution and total demand of the
other N   1 coalition members. The coalition’s total monetary contribution is X,
where X=
P
xi and X i=(X-xi). The coalition’s total demand is D, where D=
P
di
and D i=(D-di). Finally, note that the utility of a single agent purchasing from the
public service (Eq. 3.3) can be derived from the utility of the coalition members (Eq.
3.6) when N=1 and D i=X i=0.
The utility of the agents that assess the purchase of a shared good and make their
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offers, depends on the coalition formation process. We assume an iterative process,
where all the agents have the chance to assess (and make an offer for) a coalition of
increasing size and varying membership. In brief, agents with network ties (initiators
and active) compare the utility of the different coalitions they could join, based on
their and other members’ offers, and consider the coalition that yields the highest
utility and the lowest cost, compared, also, to purchasing the public service. If any
of those coalitions maximises the utility of all other members, the deal is sealed and
the coalition is formed. Thus, agents adjust their choices in each iteration, in relation
to what other agents independently choose to offer. Coalition formation is modelled
as a dynamic and time consuming process of interactions among agents, as the
value of the coalitions and the neighbourhood evolve over time and agents adapt
their choices accordingly.
Let us explain this process in more detail in the context of the model and in a given
time step. We do not assume perfect information and foresight: agents have limited
time and capacity to compare all possible options, i.e., they do not assess all potential
coalitions in a given time step. We model the evaluation procedure as an iterative
bargaining process.
First, an initiator proposes a coalition to one of its neighbours to which it is already
linked (N=2). Next, one of the two randomly chooses one of its neighbours to which
it is already linked and invites it to join the coalition (N=3). This procedure continues
for an increasing number of participants, making it possible to compare their utility in
different coalitions for different investments.
For each coalition of a different size, agents iteratively make offers that maximise
their utility. For instance, in a coalition of size N=3, an agent announces the con-
ditional contribution (xi), and evaluates its utility in this coalition. The conditional
contribution of this agent changes the total contribution (X), determining changes
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to the conditional contribution of the next agents. This iterative process among the
three agents continues until their conditional contributions remain unchanged after
several announcements. The goal of this iterative process is stability. A coalition is
stable if Pareto efficiency is achieved – i.e., no coalition member can improve its util-
ity without making at least one other member worse off. More specifically, in a stable
coalition: (i) all members maximise their utility; (ii) no member has an incentive to
move to another coalition; and (iii) no other agent would prefer to enter the coalition.
Four more conditions must be satisfied to reach stability in coalition. First, the sum
of all members’ monetary contributions must be at least equal to the investment cost
(I) and must not exceed 110% of its value:
I  xi +X i  I ⇤ 1.1 (3.7)
Second, the capacity of the shared good (S) must satisfy the total coalition de-
mand:
di +D i  S (3.8)
Third (and fourth), the utility (cost) for all members in coalition must be higher (lower)
than the utility (cost) they would experience as singletons, i.e., purchasing the service
from the public provider:
Ui2 > Ui1 (3.9)
ci2 < ci1 (3.10)
At the end of the evaluation of the coalition of size N=3, if it is stable, the agents
gain higher utility than using the public service. They make a conditional decision
and provisionally store this coalition as the optimal one. If the coalition is not stable,
they store the public service as optimal conditional decision. In the same time step,
as the bargaining process continues, agents evaluate a coalition of size N=4 and
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other larger sized coalitions. If in a subsequent iteration another coalition yields a
higher utility and a lower cost compared to the earlier optimal conditional decision,
the decision is updated.
At the end of the evaluation process, all agents announce separately their optimal
decisions. If this decision is related to the common investment, they announce the
coalition they aim to set up. If all the members of this coalition announce that this
option is also their optimal option, then the coalition is established. When a stable
coalition is achieved, the coalition is established and the shared good is adopted
collectively. We assume that the goods last until the end of the simulated time steps,
and agents do not assess other options. Therefore, adopters cannot take part in sub-
sequent coalition formation processes, which reduces the number of future coalition
options in their neighbourhood.2
3.4 Results
Because the model has no analytical solution, we study its properties through sim-
ulations. We run the model for 200 time steps, where each step defines the time
needed to form links, form coalitions, bargain, evaluate and make a decision. To
control for the effect of random elements in the model on the final results, we run 40
Monte Carlo simulations with different random seeds, and present the averages. The
model is implemented on the Laboratory for Simulation Development (LSD) platform
(Valente 2008).
To analyse the model, we initialise its parameters to benchmark values, as described
in Section 3.4.1. In Section 3.4.2, we study the macro and network properties of
the model emerging from the interaction among heterogeneous agents. We focus
2A more detailed discussion of the model is provided in Annex A.2. It includes a description of the
properties of Eq.3.6 and its parameters, and provides an illustrative numerical example which shows
the process of coalition formation and the evaluation stages.
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on the dynamics of diffusion and coalition formation. Then, in Section 3.4.3, we
analyse the co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion, and its dependence on
the geographic location of the of agents in the network, by studying the parameters
that define the neighbourhood size and number of initiators.
3.4.1 Model Initialisation
The model parameters in the benchmark configuration are initialised as in Tables
3.1, 3.2. The model simulates the co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion
of shared goods in a population (P ) of 200 agents, distributed in a regular network.
In our basic configuration, only 2% of them are initiators (m=4), chosen randomly at
the beginning of every simulation (t=0). All agents have eight potential neighbours
each (L=8), with whom they can form a link.3
Parameters Value
Total population of agents P 200
Number of initiators at t=0 m* 4
Spatially bounded links in the neighbourhood (geography) Li* 8
Income ei µ=1000,  =250
Demand di µ=45,  =10
Preference for income ✓i µ=0.5,  =0.1
Preference for proportional division rule (consumption) ↵i 0.5
Preference for proportional (contribution) & equal share (size) division rule  i 0.5
Advertising Adv 0.01
Bandwagon effect ⇠ 0.85
Notes: Parameters of agents’ characteristics income (ei), demand (di) and presence for income (✓i)
are initialised based on a normal distribution with given average (µ) and standard deviation ( ). The
model is analysed with different initialisation values of parameters with asterisk: m and Li.
Table 3.1: Model initialisation
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their income (ei) and demand (di). Income,
demand and price (see below) are initialised to respect empirically observable pro-
portions. Agents are heterogeneous, also, with respect to their preference for income
(✓i), with the average agent being indifferent between income and consumption. At
3The degrees of separation between agents in a coalition may be larger than 1, because each
member could invite its own neighbours.
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the outset, each agent is assigned a value for each of the three parameters, drawn
randomly from a normal distribution with given average (µ) and standard deviation
( ).
Agents are homogeneous with respect to the two remaining preferences: propor-
tional division rule based on demand (↵i) and proportional division rule based on
contribution ( i).4 Agent’s awareness towards the shared good option increases at
each time step by 1% (Adv=1%), meaning that the chances for agents to become
initiators increase over time. Further, the bandwagon effect related to the share of
adopters is almost linear (⇠=0.85).
Initiators can choose among ten different goods (Table 3.2). Each good has a dif-
ferent cost and maximum capacity, which is the maximum quantity of the service
they can supply. These values are correlated: the higher the investment cost (I), the
higher the maximum capacity (S). We assume increasing returns to scale, so that
larger shared goods can provide the same service at a lower unitary price (p2). We
assume that there is a benefit from purchasing the shared good: although it has a
fixed cost, the unitary price of its service is at least half of the unitary price of the
public service (p1).
3.4.2 Diffusion in Coalition: Model Properties
In this section, we describe the main model properties: diffusion rate of the shared
good, coalition size (and size of the good purchased), network properties and aver-
age monetary contribution of the agents in the coalition.
4We also analysed the model with heterogeneous ↵ and  ; the results differed only marginally.
See Table A7 in Annex A.2
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Product Investment (I) Capacity (S) Unitary Price (p2)
q1 500 200 5.00
q2 600 250 4.75
q3 700 300 4.50
q4 800 350 4.25
q5 900 400 4.00
q6 1000 450 3.75
q7 1100 500 3.50
q8 1200 550 3.25
q9 1300 600 3.00
q10 1400 650 2.75
Unitary price of the public service (p1) 10.00
Notes: Ten different products are available to coalitions (q1 10). Products differentiates per investment
cost (I), maximum capacity they can supply (S) and unitary price (p2). From the least to the most
expensive, products increase capacity and reduce unitary price, which is always lower than the unitary
price of public service (p1).
Table 3.2: Model initialisation: available products
Diffusion
In our model, only agents that become aware of the new option can enter the coali-
tion; these are the active agents. As already explained, agents become active when
they are contacted by initiators that promote the new good in coalition.
Figure 3.1 plots the share of both the active agents in the population and the adopters
(i.e., those who enter the coalition). At the outset, only 2% of the population is aware
of the option to purchase the good collectively. For our benchmark initialisation,
this share increases to around 75%, on average, in about 100 time steps, and then
flattens out. This result confirms earlier results that contagion is relatively slow in
regular networks (Cowan & Jonard 2004): our agents can reach out to peers to form
only a local coalition, i.e., clustering is high. However, the figure shows, also, that
around 25% of the population never receives the information and remains isolated.
We explore this property of the model in more detail in Section 3.4.3.
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Notes: The black line plots the cumulative share of agents in the population that over time have been
informed of the option to purchase the shared good in coalition, hence being active. The dotted line
plots the cumulative share of agents in the population that establish a coalition to buy a shared good.
The shaded areas are the respective 95% confidence interval.
Figure 3.1: Cumulative share of active agents and adopter agents
In our model, a good is adopted only if a coalition is formed, so information does
not imply adoption. For our benchmark initialisation, the share of adopters reaches
about 50% in about 100 periods, on average, and then flattens out. This means
around 66% of agents are informed. The cumulative share of adopters follows the
characteristic S-shaped curve, although the initial diffusion is fast compared to the
observed diffusion curves. Since the early stages of the simulation, sharing the good
in coalition brings higher utility for the agents compared to the public service.
In contrast to the standard diffusion model (and some of the figures for individually
purchased goods, such as domestic appliances), the rate of diffusion decreases
earlier than if 50% of the population adopts the good. This is because, in our model,
adoption is conditional on forming a coalition. As we will discuss below, when a
coalition is formed, some users that did not take up the offer to join the coalition, will
remain isolated and have no other opportunity to join.
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Coalition Size and Shared Investment
What is the average size of a coalition to share a good? Coalitions can adopt 10
different goods of varying capacity and cost (with costs reducing with scale). As
discussed in the model description, coalitions will tend to choose goods that have
been adopted more frequently in the past (Eq.3.4). As the cost of the good increases,
either the individual contribution or the number of members needs to increase. As
capacity increases, it can accommodate either individuals with higher demand or
more individuals with lower demand.
Figure 3.2 plots the distribution of the size of the coalitions for different good sizes,
where q1 is the smallest good and q10 is the largest good (Table 3.2). The share on
























Notes: Curves plot the distribution of the share of adopters in the population (vertical axis) in relation
to the coalition size (horizontal axis). Each curve plots the distribution for different products purchased
in coalition. Darker curves represent less expensive and smaller products.
Figure 3.2: Share of adopters per coalition size and product purchased
As expected, agents form different coalitions to buy different goods: larger coalitions
are established to adopt higher cost and higher capacity goods; smaller coalitions are
formed to purchase smaller and cheaper goods. Distributions for small and medium
sized goods tend to be concentrated on the mean value of the number of coalition
members, suggesting that there is an optimal coalition size for a given good size.
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However, the distribution increases with the size of the good, meaning that larger
goods are purchased by different types of (different sized) coalitions. This is possible
because of the conditions in Eq.3.7 and Eq.3.8.
The result reveals that, through the bargaining process and depending on the ran-
domly distributed features of the agents that meet to form a coalition, several different
coalitions are possible. However, while small goods often involve small coalitions,
large coalitions may prefer large over smaller goods, despite the fact that coordina-
tion requires more time due to the increased opportunities to defect.
Coalition Network Properties
The size of the coalition is due, in part, to its network properties. Figure 3.3 plots
standard network metrics in relation to coalition size: radius and diameter (left panel),
density (middle panel) and centrality (right panel). Network radius and diameter
define the size of coalition network and are measured as the distance between the
two most distant nodes. As expected, both measures are positively correlated to
coalition size, suggesting that the minimum and maximum absolute shortest paths


































Notes: The three panels plot the network properties in relation to the size of the coalition (horizontal
axis) formed to purchase shared goods: radius and diameter (left panel), density (middle panel), and
centrality (right panel). The shaded areas are the respective 95% confidence interval.
Figure 3.3: Network properties for coalition size
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Network density (second panel) is a proxy for structural cohesion (Friedkin 1981),
and is measured as the ratio between the number of links over the total possible
number of links among the agents in a coalition. The negative correlation between
the density and the size of a coalition suggests that smaller coalitions are more cohe-
sive than large ones, i.e., they include a higher share of neighbours. As we discuss in
Section 3.4.3, this is a relevant property for the diffusion of shared goods, because, if
neighbours in a given neighbourhood do not enter the coalition, they become unable
to form other coalitions, because all other agents are too distant.
The connectivity within coalitions is measured by the indicators of network centrality:
the number of an agent’s links with other agents (Degree); the extent to which agents
bridge between other coalition members (Betweenness); and agents’ degree of con-
nectedness to all other agents (Closeness). Similar to density, all three connectivity
measures are negatively related to coalition size. In order to grow, the coalition must
integrate more distant neighbours; some of the closest neighbours do not gain from
entering the coalition (under the offered conditions and contributions).
Contribution to Coalitions and Free Riding
Of course, agents in smaller coalitions established to purchase a larger shared good,
must also be willing to contribute relatively more. In the model, agents commit a
monetary contribution (xi) to the shared investment that maximises their utility (Ui2).
Contributions vary with respect to the size of the coalition and the shared good being
purchased. Figure 3.4 plots the average agent’s individual contribution per coalition
size and, within each coalition, per good size. Unsurprisingly, for a given coalition
size, the larger the investment cost (I) and capacity (S), the higher the average
agent’s individual contribution (xi).
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Notes: Chart plots the average agent’s monetary contribution xi (vertical axis) in relation to the size of
the coalition N (horizontal axis) and to the product purchased. Darker bars represent less expensive
and smaller products.
Figure 3.4: Average agents’ contribution in coalition per size and product
However, and more interestingly, the average contribution reduces with the size of
the coalition, regardless of the level of the investment cost. This result is in line with
the theory of sharing groups that the higher the number of people in the coalition, the
lower the individual cost, and the larger the quantity purchased in group, the higher
the individual cost (Lindenberg 1982). This happens because, as discussed above,
some agents maximise their utility when they buy larger goods in a smaller coalition
even though they would be better off with a smaller good. However, because the
coalition only includes local members (they compare with a limited set of peers) and
members do not have full information, the coalitions becomes sub-optimal (which
improves members’ utility with respect to the public provider).
These are sub-optimal coalitions also because they leave space for free riders (xi=0)
that are able to benefit from the extra capacity of the good purchased, and pay
only the unitary consumption cost (ci2>0), which, by assumption, is lower than the
cost of the public service. As the size of the coalition increases, it is possible that
the individual contribution becomes less relevant, giving rise to free-riding (Canning
1995, Glance et al. 1997, Huberman & Glance 1996, Shehory & Kraus 1998, Axtell
2000). Figure 3.5 plots the distribution of free riders by coalition size.
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Notes: Chart plots the share of free-riders agents (vertical axis) in relation to the size of the coalition
size (horizontal axis) they enter. Free-riders do not contribute to the investment (xi=0) but they pay
the unitary consumption cost (ci2>0). The shaded area is the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 3.5: Free-riders per coalition size
In our model, we find a non-linear relation. The share of free-riders increases with
coalition size up to a medium sized coalition (N=8), and then decreases for larger
coalitions. Small coalitions, on average, purchase small goods, with little extra ca-
pacity for free-riders. Large coalitions, on average, purchase large, but expensive
shared goods, to which all participants must contribute to cover the investment cost.
Therefore, capacity (Eq.3.8) and cost (Eq.3.7) constraints reduce free-riding. In the
case of medium sized coalitions, we find the largest variety of goods (Figure 3.2) and
more opportunities for free riding.
3.4.3 Co-Evolution of Coalition Formation and Diffusion
Coalition formation and shared adoption occur in agent networks whose structures
evolve over time, and where links are formed and severed. Link formation follows
a standard diffusion dynamic: as the visibility of the new shared good increases
with the number of adopters and with advertisements, it is more likely that agents
informed about its existence, will become interested and attempt to form a coalition to
purchase the good. Link severance also follows the diffusion of the shared good: as
agents enter a coalition and adopt the shared good, they can no longer be contacted
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by other agents. In this section, we study how adoption and network structure co-
evolve, in relation to the coalition formation process.
In each time step t, the neighbours of agent i can have one of the following statuses:







hi = 8. Given W the total number of active agents










We can define the share of linked and not linked neighbours (i.e., those that can still











As l and v increase, the higher will be the number of coalitions that an agent can join
and evaluate, and the higher the likelihood that one of those coalitions may lead to
adoption of a shared good.
We analyse the relation between the share of links within active agents (l), the share
of agents in the whole population that can be potentially involved in the process of
coalition formation (v), the share of active agents in the whole population (W /P ), the
share of initiator agents and the cumulative share of adopters.
Figure 3.6 plots these five curves over time. During the first few time steps in the
simulation, the share of linked agents (l) and the share of agents that potentially
can enter the coalition (v) increase at the same pace as the share of active agents
(W /P ). Initiators contact neighbours, some of which become active and contact their
neighbours, and so on.
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Notes: The curves on the left plot five time series: the cumulative share of adopters in the population
(grey dotted line: % Adopters); the share of linked agents for active agents (dashed black line: l); the
share of linked and not linked agents in the population (black line: v); the share of active agents in
the population in a given time step (dashed grey line: W /P ); and the share of initiator agents in the
population in a given time step (grey line: % Initiators). The shaded areas are the respective 95%
confidence interval. On the right, we zoom on the initial 25 time steps of these five curves.
Figure 3.6: Co-evolution of diffusion and coalition formation
When a coalition is established at an early stage (after 10 time steps, see zoom
on the right of Figure 3.6), both series cease to grow because the share of ac-
tive agents stabilises (W /P ). At this moment, adopters are no longer available for
further coalitions since they break links with neighbours, reducing communication
between remaining agents. As soon as information starts to flow again, i.e., when
active agents become initiators, the share of active agents increases and the two
series start to rise, but with a different slope. l grows faster than v because, while
the number of new links increases (fi), the increasing share of agents in coalition







hi). This quickly stabilises around 10%, which also reduces the
pace at which new coalitions can form and, therefore, adoption of goods.
When all active agents (W ) are enclosed between neighbourhoods with established
coalitions, information can no longer flow, because active agents and initiators can-
not reach new agents that are not yet linked. This is when all curves reach their
steady state, and no more coalitions are formed.
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To show this result and better explain the dynamics in Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7 plots the
final network configuration (left) and the network structure of all established coalitions
(right) for a typical simulation run (with an average share of adopters). The black
nodes and edges represent agents belonging to a coalition (hi). The grey nodes
and edges represent linked agents (active, but not part of a coalition) (fi). The white
nodes connected by the dotted edges are neither initiators nor active (gi) agents.
Agents in the top-left part of the network in Figure 3.7 did not become active, because
they were not contacted, hence, they lack information about the shared good. They
were not contacted, because their neighbours agreed to form a coalition, before it
was necessary to contact a neighbour to do so. As the number of gi stabilises, so
does the diffusion of the shared good.
Notes: Figure shows, on the left, the final network configuration of all agents, and on the right, the
network structure of all established coalitions. These are the results of a single simulation, represen-
tative in terms of average numbers of adopters as in Figure 3.1. In the networks, black nodes and
edges are agents in coalition (hi), grey nodes and edges are active agents, hence informed, that use
the public service (fi), and white nodes connected with dotted edges are neither initiators nor active
(gi), and do not evaluate coalitions because not informed.
Figure 3.7: Final configuration: network (left) and coalitions (right)
The role of fi in reducing the pace of diffusion is less obvious. Figure 3.8 zooms in
on a section of the network in which three agents (69, 71 and 72) are not involved
in any of the closest coalitions (64-65-67-68, 59-60-61-62-63-66-70 and the network
including agents 73, 74, 75 and others). 69, 71 and 72 cannot enter an already
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established coalition among those hi agents surrounding them, and they are too
distant from other agents that are not in a coalition (shared goods such as DES
need to be installed and used locally). Therefore, their chances of joining or forming
a coalition are substantially reduced, and they are unable to improve their utility with
respect to the public provider. This means that, between established coalitions, there



















































































































































































Notes: This figure zoom on a section of the final network configuration on the left of Figure 3.7. It
shows three established coalitions that purchase the shared good (black nodes and edges, hi: 64-65-
67-68, 59-60-61-62-63-66-70 and 73, 74, 75 plus others); three grey isolated nodes (fi) that buy the
public service (69, 71 and 72); and, on the left, white nodes (gi) that are not active and not informed.
Figure 3.8: Isolated agents locked by established coalitions
To summarise, in a regular network in which agents can form coalitions only with
neighbours (e.g., due to the features of DES) and are not interested in informing
peers that are not co-located, the process of coalition formation and adoption stops
before reaching the whole population, for two main reasons. First, some agents
are never reached because their neighbours agree to enter a coalition before they
can assess the options related to expanding it and including these excluded agents.
Second, some agents explore the opportunity to enter a coalition and adopt a shared
good, but do not find an arrangement where they would be better off than purchasing
the service from the public provider. In the meantime, their neighbours form coali-
tions, and the number of alternative coalitions that they can explore reduces, which
reduces the likelihood that they will find a suitable coalition.
This shows how the two processes coevolve: coalitions are necessary to adopt
shared goods, therefore, they are pivotal for diffusion. However, diffusion changes
the network structure, reducing the pace of and eventually halting the diffusion.
100
Two conditions are likely to influence this relation between coalition formation and
diffusion: the size of the neighbourhood that can form a coalition (and contact new
agents), and the number of initiators (randomly distributed throughout the network).
We study each in turn.
The Role of Geography
To assess the role of neighbourhood size, we run the model with different initialisa-
tions of the parameter L, between 4-14, i.e., the number of closest neighbours that an
agent can contact and form links with. Figure 3.9 plots the relation between the share
of active agents (cumulative in the entire simulation) and the share of adopters, for



























Notes: The plot shows the share of adopters in the population (vertical axis) and the share of cumu-
lative active agents (horizontal axis) under different level of neighbourhood size (L). In brackets we
report the number of shared goods purchased in coalition.
Figure 3.9: Share of adopters, active agents and diffusion of shared goods (in brackets) per neigh-
bourhood size.
As already noted, there exist a positive and linear relation between the shares of
adopters and active agents: the larger the number of active agents, the greater
the number of opportunities to create coalitions and adopt the shared good. As L
increases, the cumulative share of active agents increases up to about 100% (for
L = 14). This suggests that, with larger neighbourhoods, on average, no part of the
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population is excluded from the possibility of forming a coalition and adopting the
shared good (as in the top left part of Figure 3.7).
This solves one of the problems that limit the diffusion of shared goods in coalition,
the halting of the process of information spread to the entire population. With larger
distances for coalition formation agents have more opportunities to form contacts,
which increases adoption, but remains well below 100%. To some extent, this is
because neighbourhood size does not solve the problem that agents that do not
enter the coalitions that are formed around, them remain isolated. In fact, as the size
of the neighbourhood increases, so does the average size of the coalitions (Figure
3.10). The increase in the number of closest neighbours leads to larger coalitions,
which keep active agents, in between coalitions, too distant from one another to
explore a different coalition (the grey nodes in Figure 3.7).
        	




























Notes: Curves plot the number of adopters in the population (vertical axis) in relation to the size of
coalitions formed to purchase the shared good (horizontal axis), under different neighbourhood size
(L). Darker curves represent bigger neighbourhood size.
Figure 3.10: Number of adopters per coalition size for different neighbourhood size
To further test for the role of geography in determining less than full adoption, we re-
lax the assumption that agents are located in a regular network. What would happen
if, instead of a decentralised energy system, which requires proximity of its users,
the shared good could be adopted by agents located at a distance? We initialise the
model with agents located in a random network, where coalitions can be formed with
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any other (active) agents. As suggested by earlier works, information flows more
rapidly, and adoption is faster. After the usual 200 time steps, on average, the fi-
nal share of adopters increases from 50% of the baseline scenario to 72%, and all
the agents in the population are active. Although the rate of adoption is higher than
observed if the network is regular, adoption does not reach 100%. This suggests
that, even were agents able to form coalitions with any other agent, beyond their
neighbourhood, not all would find it convenient to invest in a shared good.
The Role of Initiators
To assess the role of initiators on the co-evolution between coalition formation and
diffusion, we compare the baseline scenario with only a few initiators (m=4) to the







hi=0). This is equivalent to studying a complete network,
where agents are all informed and evaluate all possible coalitions since the network
formed.
Figure 3.11 plots the share of adopters in these two scenarios. In the complete
network, adoption is rapid and reaches a rate of 60%. As expected, the share of
adopters reaches its steady state after few time steps, suggesting that complete
information speeds up the diffusion of a shared good. However, although, by con-
struction, a complete network solves the problem of parts of the network never be-
coming active, the share of adopters is below the share that would be achieved with
larger neighbourhoods (Figure 3.9 at L=14 shows a 66% adoption rate). This is
because, although they are informed, several agents remain isolated from the coali-
tion formation process and fail, also, to form a coalition with the few peers in their
neighbourhood.
However, as discussed earlier, isolation is only part of the explanation for non com-
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plete adoption: on average, a third of agents do not find it convenient to enter a
coalition even without geographic constraints.






















Notes: Curves plot the share of adopters in the population over time. Black line represents the share
of adopters when only 2% of the population being initiator : m=4 as in the baseline scenario in Figure
3.1. Dotted line represents the share of adopter in the complete network, that is when all agents are
initiator at t=0, that is m=200. The shaded areas are the respective 95% confidence interval.
Figure 3.11: Share of adopter in a complete network
3.5 Discussion, Policy Implications and Extensions
Unlike the existing diffusion models, this paper studies the adoption of a shared good,
whose adoption requires formation of a group. Therefore, we study the co-evolution
between group formation and diffusion. We assume that the good to be adopted
is not mobile and needs to be located in close proximity to its users. Thus, users
need to form groups among geographically collocated individuals located near to the
good. We assume, also, that the service provided by the shared good is a service
that users are already purchasing from a public provider, but that the shared good
will allow its provision at a lower cost. However, consumers must pay the upfront
cost of purchasing the shared good.
We develop an agent-based model where heterogeneous agents are informed about
the option to enter a coalition and purchase a shared good with neighbours. As
information about the new option diffuses, agents compare the utility they enjoy from
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purchasing the good from the public provider with the utility from several potential
coalitions. To enter a coalition, agents make an offer for their contribution to the
shared purchase. All potential members assess their utility with respect to their own
offer, their preferences and their demand, and with respect to the offers and demands
of other members. Several negotiations may be needed to establish a stable coalition
and adopt the shared good.
Drawing on the bodies of work on diffusion and on coalition formation, we study the
emergence of shared products such as decentralised energy systems (DES) and
provide some novel results. Both coalition formation and diffusion of a shared good
depend on network effects: social networks evolve over time, which has an impact
on the speed at which information diffuses and the agents’ options related to forming
a coalition with like-minded partners. Network clustering, density and information
flows determine higher adoption in consumer coalitions. Despite the longer negotia-
tion process, consumers prefer larger coalitions to buy expensive goods with higher
capacity, since a bigger coalition means that the individual contribution is lower than
in a small coalition. However, under equal coalition conditions, the individual contri-
bution increases if higher quantities are purchased collectively. Also, larger coalitions
tend to induce free riding up to a certain size after which free riding decreases be-
cause the large cost of the investment would be unsustainable.
The model allows us to study the diffusion of a decentralised good, DES, by lo-
cal communities. The model shows that to promote the diffusion of DES, decision-
makers may need to carefully consider the preliminary formation of local groups. For
given consumer characteristics, this paper discusses a number of conditions under
which the diffusion of DES can easily take off.
First, spreading information is crucial to increase consumer awareness about sus-
tainable options and energy-efficient innovations (Lin 1999, Woolcock & Narayan
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2000, Ek & Patrik 2010, McMicheal & Shipworth 2013). Second, DES are more likely
to diffuse if consumers are strongly linked and the DES can serve a larger neighbour-
hood. Third, large-sized DES have a higher adoption probability than smaller DES,
with a smaller contribution by consumers and, also, less free riding. However, larger
coalitions take longer to form and are more time consuming to coordinate.
Although the adoption of DES (or any other shared good) depends on consumer
preferences, there is a risk that parts of the community who see no advantage from
early adoption may be unable to adopt at a later stage, because of the difficulty
related to finding neighbours who are not already in a coalition (in our model we
assume that coalitions are forever and, once they become stable, do not accept
additional entrants). Early exclusion can have a negative impact on energy transition.
Avoiding isolation and increasing social inclusion may be even more relevant in rural
areas where there is greater need to increase access to energy (Kanagawa & Nakata
2007, 2008).
These implications of our model are transferable to other sectors where information
and evidence are needed to enable the decision-making process and to respond
promptly to a societal challenge. For example, the strict Nearly Zero-Energy Build-
ings strategy is aimed at improving the energy performance of buildings (European
Parliament 2010, European Commission 2013). This ambitious plan requires cit-
izens to take actions and to be actively involved in the renovation of apartments
and houses. Some of these buildings are shared and the adoption of new building
technologies requires shared decisions. Another example is transport. Currently,
the market offers a range of shared options targeting different groups of consumers,
based, mainly, on budget constraints and flexibility. However, autonomous vehicles
are about to be introduced and they promise to substantially reduce congestion in
urban areas, but, initially, will be expensive and not affordable by the average con-
sumer. Under these conditions and subject to proper regulation, group adoption
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could be promoted as a feasible option to improve the diffusion of shared ownership
of a next-generation vehicle (Masoud & Jayakrishnan 2016).
The model has some limitations and, also, could be extended in several ways. Data
initialisation was set randomly following a normal distribution, but based on a consis-
tent proportion among the parameters although these were not calibrated based on
empirical observation. The model does not allow for the inclusion of additional coali-
tion members: it assumes that stable coalitions do not accept additional members
and, also, last for ever. These assumptions could be relaxed in future work.
We assume that the visibility of a product can only increase over time, even if in the
real-world products can lose visibility when they become less trendy. Although in
our model despite visibility increases, diffusion does not reach the entire population.
Allowing visibility to decrease would test whether this implies different outcomes on
the diffusion of the shared good. This may be linked also to another extension of
the model that considers an endogenous variation of unitary prices depending on
agents’ demand.
A future complementary analysis to this study can be done by testing the model
outcomes to results from simpler benchmark models. For example, one could use
stylised existing models of coalition formation and percolation diffusion models to
check whether results reflect key features found in this thesis. This exercise has
not been done in first instance in this paper because of the research question asks
to study the co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion and how one impacts
dynamically the other. Given the relevance of local interaction, agent heterogeneity,
non-optimal behaviour, and out of equilibrium dynamics, we opted for an ABM that
enables the study of the interaction of inner agents’ dynamics leading (or not) to
diffusion of shared good in coalitions.
Another possible and relevant extension is related to the impact of different network
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structures on the co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion of the common
good without local constraints. Finally, the model could be extended to study related
dynamics, such as network and coalition formation in international climate agree-








We propose a simple model to study the conditions under which consumers may
prefer to purchase and own a shared good in coalition, rather than owning the good
individually. We study the whole parameter value space that defines the character-
istics and preferences of heterogeneous consumers and the characteristics of the
good, and the characteristics of a public service which offers the same services as
the good. We find that shared ownership emerges in relatively low income and high
demand populations, with a higher preference for consumption. We find, also, that
coalitions tend to emerge if the good required to consume the service is relatively
small; too large goods require a large coalition where consensus becomes more dif-
ficult and coordination costs are higher. We find that the sharing option is chosen
solely by consumers who once owned the good individually, and that this does not
affect the share of users that use the public service. The result of sharing is that
the overall number of goods purchased and used reduces, producing environmental
benefits. Policies that reduce the relative price of the shared purchase should accel-
erate transition to this more sustainable option, but is more efficient for goods that
can be used by a relatively smaller coalitions where coordination is easier.
4.1 Introduction
Most households in high-income countries own a range of domestic appliances,
such as vacuum cleaners, washing machines and drills, which, most of time, are
idle. These households invariably have internet connections and routers and use
only a share of the bandwidth, for limited amount of time. They may also own a
car, which, most of the time is parked. So could these households coordinate to
purchase and consume these goods collaboratively, in line with a sharing economy
where the same good is used by multiple users? Shared ownership can enhance
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convenience by making expensive goods accessible to more consumers, and is likely
to be more sustainable by reducing the number of goods produced and increasing
their use.
Take the example of passenger cars. In Europe, the number of passenger cars has
increased from one to every three persons in 1990 to one to every two persons in
2018 (Eurostat 2020). For some users, cars offer a fast and comfortable option for
moving around cities where public transport is either very crowded (e.g., during peak
hours) or does not cover all areas adequately. However, cars generate traffic con-
gestion and increase demand for parking slots, putting pressure on urban spaces.
Cars used by a single owner can remain parked (i.e., idle) for many hours. Sharing
purchase and use of a passenger car could increase both individual and societal
welfare: users who share a car face lower ownership and maintenance costs and re-
duce the demand for cars and, therefore, the number of cars produced, which, in turn
reduces pollution and demand for parking spaces and increases urban sustainability.
However, coordinating a shared purchase involves some transaction costs (such as,
negotiating time and free-riding), which not all users may be willing to pay.
In this paper, we ask under what conditions might consumers shift from individual
consumption and ownership of goods, which often are under-utilised, to a consump-
tion model based on shared consumption and shared ownership. This model dif-
fers substantially from the more established sharing economy model, which focuses
mainly on shared consumption (Pasimeni 2020). The results of our analysis would
allow policies that would increase societal welfare by reducing the transaction costs
related to shared ownership, or increasing the costs related to single ownership, by
internalising the negative externalities of excess production.
We propose an Agent-Based Model (ABM) where heterogeneous users consume
a service in each time period (e.g., urban transportation) and can choose between
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three different purchase modes: a public service (e.g., bus), individual ownership
(e.g., individual car) or shared ownership (e.g., shared car). Shared ownership is
an alternative to individual ownership and consumption, and which allows users to
enjoy the benefits from the shared costs related to access to a shared good rather
than use of a public service. We study the formation of sharing groups that allow
participants to jointly own and use a good, in which both consumption and costs are
shared.
The choice between the three different modes of purchasing the service depends
on the consumer’s utility, which is a function of consumers characteristics (such as
income, demand for the service and preferences) and the service characteristics,
such as its cost and supply capacity. The cost differs for the three purchase modes.
The cost of the public service is given by its unit cost (e.g., the cost of a bus ticket).
Individual owners face the cost of the investment in the good that delivers the service
(which also depends on its size and duration) and the unit running costs (e.g., petrol).
Users purchasing the good in coalition pay a share of this investment cost and the
unitary running costs.
The three options differ also with respect to their capacity to satisfy consumer de-
mand. Public service capacity depends on how many other consumers are using
the same service in the same time period. In the model, this means that the utility
of using the public service reduces as congestion increases. Individual owners can
satisfy their demand in full using their purchased good. In a coalition, the consumer’s
utility depends on the size of the coalition, the contributions of the other users in the
coalition and their use of the good. If we include negotiation time and the likelihood of
free-riding, in our model, these are the transaction costs that consumers in coalition
face. We ignore any additional costs related, perhaps, to the technology to enable
the sharing such as a platform or insurance.
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A shared purchase is a collective decision and first, requires, the formation of a coali-
tion of consumers. This depends on the network of social contacts among users. To
study a collective purchase compared to the public service and an individual pur-
chase, we extend the model presented in Pasimeni & Ciarli (2018), which simulates
the co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion of the shared good purchased by
a local community, for example, a decentralised energy infrastructure.
We extend Pasimeni & Ciarli (2018) model in several ways. We relax a number of as-
sumptions in order to study the conditions under which consumers choose between
individual and shared ownership, in the presence of a public service alternative. We
remove the constraint on the number of other users they can contact to form the
coalition: consumers are displayed as a random network to allow analysis of the
conditions under which goods (e.g., a car) are mobile. As already mentioned, in this
version of the model the individual consumer can buy the same good. We exclude
the assumption that goods can be used indefinitely, with no loss in the quality/quantity
of service supplied. We introduce a lifetime for the purchased good: it depreciates
at a rate that is related to their size and use. This implies that consumers need to
make their choices several times during the simulation, under different conditions
(as other consumers shift between purchasing choices). This implies also that we
remove the assumption that coalitions have infinite lives: rather, they break up once
the good purchased is fully depreciated. We also exclude the assumption that the
public service has an infinite supply: as the number of users increases, the utility of
each consumer reduces non linearly. The congestion is a function of the provider’s
capacity and the overall number of users.
To study the consumer and product characteristics that influence the consumer’s
decision to shift from individual consumption and ownership of a good to shared
consumption and ownership we proceed in four steps.
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First, we iteratively analyse the full parameter space of the model, as proposed in
Dosi et al. (2018), to identify the conditions under which shared purchase emerges
as an option that maximises the utility of some consumers, and is adopted by at
least one group. Because ABMs include complex interactions among several pa-
rameters, sensitivity analysis of one or two parameters considered critical a-priori,
could miss the impact of the remaining parameters – either alone or in interaction
with the other parameters. A full exploration of the parameter space (i.e., a global
sensitivity analysis), allows identification of all relevant parameters. Since this re-
quires a number of combinations of parameter values, which would require too long
a study, we use a design of experiment (DoE), which includes a set of sample param-
eter value points which are representative of the model behaviour, within the whole
parameter space.
To reduce the dimensionality of the model, we first conduct a preliminary screening
of the parameters using the Elementary Effects (EE) method (Morris 1991, Campo-
longo et al. 2007) to identify the parameters most relevant to model output. We then
apply the Near Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) DoE to optimise the number of
model sampling points to be observed for the selected parameters (Cioppa & Lucas
2007). Based on these observed points, we use the Kirging meta-model to study the
parameter space (Rasmussen & Williams 2006), in which the number of consumers
opting for shared purchase is maximised. Finally, we run a global sensitivity analy-
sis using the Sobol decomposition to evaluate the individual and interaction effects
of the model parameters on the variance of the model output (Saltelli et al. 2000,
Saltelli & Annoni 2010).
We find that under most parameterisations, shared purchase is a very unlikely option:
in our model framework, under most conditions, consumers prefer either to use the
public service or, if they have the available budget, to purchase their own individual
good. Only a small customer niche opts for shared purchase.
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In the second step, we ’zoom-in’ on this small parameter space where a non-zero
number of consumers consistently opt for shared ownership across simulations, to
analyse which parameters (consumer and product characteristics) are most relevant
for the uptake of this option. We run a second global sensitivity analysis on this
smaller space and more granular sampling. We find that shared purchase is consid-
ered an option among a population of consumers with a relative high need for the
service (high demand and preference for consumption) and a relatively low income,
which reduces the utility of purchasing the good individually.
Third, we study the transition from individual ownership to shared ownership: which
consumers drive it and to what extent it leads to a more sustainable model of con-
sumption by reducing the inefficient individual purchase of goods. We narrow the
focus even further to identify the model configuration that produces the highest share
of consumers opting for the shared purchase. We find that shared purchase replaces
individual consumption, but does not affect the number of consumers relying on the
public service. The sharing alternative is preferred by consumers who are able to
establish small sharing groups to share the purchase of a good that is not too ex-
pensive and has low-medium capacity of supply. The transition from individual to
shared ownership significantly reduces the cumulative number of goods sold in the
economy, enabling a more sustainable model of consumption.
Fourth, based on this ideal world in which a significant proportion of consumers shift
from individual to shared ownership, we study two potential policy incentives based
on the unit price of the service/good and the size and cost of the good that can
be purchased in coalition or individually. We find that reducing the relative price of
using the shared good relative to using the individual good, can push consumers
to share. The capacity and cost of the good also are critical. Consumers groups
are unlikely to emerge in the case of very large goods since this would involve very
large coalitions, which would be difficult to coordinate. However, the likelihood of a
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group purchasing the good increases with goods that have low-medium capacity and
average cost.
Literature
This paper examines the case of consumers who autonomously decide and organ-
ise to purchase and use a good collectively, whose ownership is also shared by
these consumers (described as fractional ownership (Pasimeni 2020)). Shared own-
ership builds on the theory of clubs in economics (Buchanan 1965) and sociology
(Lindenberg 1982). Buchanan (1965) defines club goods as those types of goods
that cannot be categorised as either purely public or purely private. For these types
of goods, cost-sharing is possible through clubs, and club formation depends on
“the extension of ownership-consumption rights over differing numbers of persons”
(Buchanan 1965, p.1). Lindenberg (1982) extended Buchanan’s work by analysing
the conditions under which the decision to jointly own a good is preferred to indi-
vidual ownership. He focuses on goods that are not affordable for the majority of
consumers, but who may have an opportunity to access them by forming groups to
share their purchase and use (Lindenberg 1982).
These forms of sharing practices are rooted in the literature on the governance of
common pool resources (Hardin 1982, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al. 1994, Bowles
2004). The work on shared ownership focuses on use of intermediate goods/capital.
For example, Bardhan (1993a,b, 2000) studies the case of the agricultural infras-
tructure as a common asset managed by small farmers who, individually, would be
unable to accumulate or buy this infrastructure. The sharing of assets has been
studied, also, in the context of firm organisation. Shareholders are relevant in the
ownership structure of many corporations since shared ownership permits a more
flexible and adaptable management, reduces individual risk and provides more as-
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sets than would individual ownership (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Demsetz 1983). A
more recent example relates to a small-scale, decentralised energy infrastructure,
owned by neighbouring communities that benefit from cost sharing of an arrange-
ment which could help reduce the environmental impact of the national electricity
system (Pasimeni 2019).
Work on the shared ownership of final goods is more limited and studies specific
co-ownership (Hastings et al. 2006, Quigley 2015) or fractional ownership (Lawson
2010, Shaheen & Cohen 2013) experiences. Examples of ownership shared among
people who coordinate in order to buy and use a luxury good jointly, include house
sharing in crowded spaces (Hastings et al. 2006) and fractional ownership of an
aircraft (Yang et al. 2008).
Shared ownership has not been widely discussed in the sharing economy literature
which tends to focus on cases of the same good being used by multiple users (shared
consumption) and overlooks the case of the good also being owned by a group of
users. The sharing economy model consists of users’ granting one other tempo-
rary access to underutilised goods, in exchange for money, without any transfer of
ownership (Bardhi & Eckhardt 2012, Frenken & Schor 2017, Pasimeni 2020). These
practices are in line with the definition of sharing as “the act and process of distribut-
ing what is ours to others for their use as well as the act and process of receiving
something from others for our use” (Belk 2007, p.127).
An understanding of the sharing economy is important for analysing changes in con-
sumer behaviour (Botsman & Roger 2010, Belk 2014b, Hamari et al. 2016) from
enduring ownership of a good to ephemeral and dematerialised consumption of a
good accessed temporarily (Bardhi & Eckhardt 2017). In the sharing economy, own-
ership of the shared good ultimately remains private, owned either by an individual
(e.g., apartments or drills) or an organisations (e.g., fleets of shared cars or bicy-
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cles). This has strong implications for the distribution of wealth among individuals
(Richardson 2015) since most cases regarded as belonging to the sharing economy
have business models that are similar to the renting model, but where the notion of
community is absent (described also as pseudo-sharing (Belk 2014b,a, Eckhardt &
Bardhi 2015)).
Pseudo-sharing is common in the transport sector, where car leasing models have
been proposed, but are regarded as fractional ownership in the context of the sharing
economy. For instance, in 2014, Audi launched its Audi Unite programme in Stock-
holm, which allowed a group of maximum five people to share ownership of a car
for up to two years. The project ended in 2017 because of the very high competitive
Stockholm market where Car2Go and Sunfleet had a bigger share. In 2016, Ford
introduced its Ford Credit Link lease-sharing programme in Austin, Texas, which
gave the option for groups of between three and six people to share the car leas-
ing costs, for two years. The project lasted for only a few months because no one
signed up for it. In 2017, Nissan launched a similar programme, called Nissan Intel-
ligent Get & Go Micra based on the idea of small groups of people with compatible
travel needs coming together via a phone app. The group allows to lease a car for
a maximum of one year and to pay their costs based on consumption. However, the
programme disappeared from Nissan’s website and no further news on it have been
published.1
The failure of these projects launched by major automobile manufacturers suggests
that, in the transport sector, fractional ownership in the form of car leasing is not
appealing to consumers. However, the literature on car sharing studies other forms
of sharing such as the so called “true sharing” (Belk 2017, Dreyer et al. 2017, Czakó
et al. 2019), which is similar to the Swedish example of Göteborgs Bilkoop, which
1Online magazines provided updates on these programs: insidercarnews.com and nordic9.com
on Audi Unite, businesswire.com and theverge.com on Ford Credit Link, and rcimobility.com and
marshall.co.uk on Nissan Intelligent Get & Go Micra. Access: 28 October 2020.
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has had some success. In this scheme, local communities organise to share car
ownership, and the benefits derived from sharing the cost is an incentive for low-
income consumers to participate to increase their access and allow more efficient
and sustainable use of cars.
However, we know very little about why some shared purchase models are more
successful than others. This paper studies the consumer and product conditions
which lead some consumers to choose the shared purchase option. We do this by
conceptualising so called “true sharing” through the theory of clubs. Consumers or-
ganise autonomously to establish clubs to jointly purchase and use a shared good.
This option is considered an alternative to individual ownership and consumption in
the presence of a public service. In our model, ultimate ownership of the shared
good belongs to club members who share it. This broadens the concept of shared
consumption related to the sharing economy, by considering shared goods owned by
a group of consumers. We focus on users’ attitudes to shared ownership and con-
sumption, where consumption behaviour is influenced by the type of goods available
in the market. This allows us to analyse the market conditions which make shared
ownership more attractive than individual ownership.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the ABM. Section 4.3
presents the global sensitivity analysis methodology applied to the full parametric
space of the model and analyses the results of the agent-based simulations. Sec-
tion 4.4 discusses the results in the context of urban mobility and concludes the
paper.
4.2 The Model
We model the consumption choices of heterogeneous consumers, to satisfy their
demand for a good provided by a public service, by purchasing an individual good
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or by purchasing the good in a coalition. In the first period, consumers are allocated
to the first two options. For example, we consider individuals who use either public
transport (e.g., bus or metro) or buy a car in order to satisfy travel needs. The higher
the number of consumers choosing the public service, the higher the congestion
related to the service, and the lower the utility from its use.
Over time, consumers have the option, also, to purchase the same good within a
coalition with other consumers. The shared purchase requires a stable group (or
coalition) to be established, which in turn, requires consumers to have a network of
contacts with other agents over the simulation periods. We assume that consumers
who rely on the public service can make a different choice in every time period.
Consumers who own a good individually or in a coalition, can revise their choices
once the good is fully depreciated. Moving to a shared purchase requires time. The
formation of coalitions depends on each consumer’s social network, which evolves
over time. Because consumers revise their choice every time period, in each time
period, the choice conditions also change.
In each time period, consumers i 2 [1,M ] choose among the three possible op-
tions to satisfy their demand, depending on which option yields the highest utility:
Max (Ui,j), where j = 1, 2, 3 are, respectively, the public service, individual purchase
and purchase in coalition. Consumer utility depends on consumer income, demand
for the service and the cost of the service under each option, plus a number of other
parameters related to the characteristics of the consumers and the different purchas-
ing options. In turn, utility and cost depend on several features that differ across the
three options. We describe the three utility functions in turn. To simplify the notation,
time is introduced only if the time period differs from t.
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Public service
For the first option, the public service (Ui,1), the utility of consumer i depends posi-
tively on the consumer’s income (ei) and negatively on the cost of the service (ci,1),
while demand for the service (di) affects utility both negatively (by increasing the cost
of the service) and positively (by increasing demand satisfaction). Formally, this is
computed as in Eq.4.1.
Ui,1 = [ei   dip1]✓i(di ⇤K)1 ✓i (4.1)
where ✓i 2 [0; 1] is the consumer preference for income (1   ✓i which represents
the consumer’s preference for consuming the service); the total cost (ci,1 = dip1)
depends on the unit price of the public service (p1).
K 2 [0; 1] represents the loss in utility experienced by the consumer as the number
of consumers using the public service increases: the congestion. It is modelled
as a decreasing logistic function of the number of users in t-1 (A1,t 1), where the
carrying capacity is the capacity of the general provider, measured as a share of
the population of agents in the model (Z). Formally, congestion is computed as in
Eq.4.2:





where k is the lowest value that K can reach; r is an exogenous parameter that mea-
sures the rate at which the utility decreases for an increasing number of consumers;
and g is a parameter that determines the flex point of the logistic curve. Figure 4.1
plots how K varies in relation to changes to its parameters.
In this model we refer to congestion as the reduced likelihood to get access to a good
(that has limited capacity) in a specific point in time, not the congestion that its use
can determine (e.g., traffic in the case of cars). This is because the model may refer
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Notes: The black line represents the benchmark with values of all parameters set as follow: Z=100%
indicates that the capacity of the public service can satisfy the entire population; r=10 is the utility
decrease rate; k=0.5 is the value that K assumes with full congestion; and g=0.5 indicates that the
flex point is at 50% of the full capacity. Dotted lines plot K by varying one parameter at a time,
keeping others at their benchmark value. At Z=75%, K reaches its minimum (k=0.5) earlier then the
benchmark; at r=20 the decrease is sharper then the benchmark; at k=0.75, the curve moves higher
in the graph; at g=0.75, the flex point moves to the right compared to the benchmark.
Figure 4.1: Logistic function K for different parameter values
to different products, some of which create more congestion (e.g., traffic in the case
of transport) than others (e.g., access to an internet provider router). Congestion in
use is a very interesting extension of the model, which requires to make the utility
of each option dependent on the adoption of the other options. Again, making the
example of transport the use of a car affect also public transport, and vice versa.
This requires adding substantial complexity and again would need to refer to specific
cases to calibrate the model (e.g., cities). We do hope that our model will be adapted
to study those specific cases.
Individual purchase
Consumers who purchase a good individually, pay its total cost (I2). We assume
that the purchased good lasts for a finite period (L2), which depends on its use, that
is, the demand (di). Consumers can purchase goods of different size (S2), which
we assume proxies for maximum capacity, which, in turn, determines the good’s
duration. For simplicity, we assume that consumers cannot purchase an individual
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with di  S2 (4.3)
The utility of consumer i whose demand is satisfied by purchasing an individual good
(Ui,2), depends positively on the individual’s income (ei) and negatively on the overall
costs (ci,2) related to purchasing the good (I2) and the costs related to its use (p2).
As before, demand (di) affects utility both negatively (by increasing the cost of the
service) and positively (by increasing demand satisfaction). Formally, consumer’s
utility is calculated as in Eq.4.4:





where, as above, ✓i 2 [0; 1] is the consumer’s preference for income (1   ✓i is the
consumer preference for consuming the service). With respect to Eq.4.1 there is no
congestion (the consumer has exclusive access to the good), and the cost depends
on both use of the service and its price (dip2) and on the cost related to producing
the good (I2). We assume that the overall cost of the good is split equally over its
duration ( I2L2 ).
Purchase in coalition
Similarly to the two previous cases, the utility of consumer i, whose demand is sat-
isfied by the purchase of the good in coalition with other consumers (Ui,3), depends
positively on the consumers’ income (ei) and negatively on the cost (ci,3) paid to
purchase the good (I3) and the cost of its use (p3), while demand (di) affects con-
sumers’ utility both negatively (by increasing the cost of the service) and positively
(by increasing demand satisfaction).
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In contrast to individual purchase, the cost of the good is shared. As in Pasimeni &
Ciarli (2018), an agent that considers joining a coalition must offer a monetary con-
tribution xi < I3 towards the purchase of a good of size S3, which costs I3. Hence,
the total cost that must be considered by the consumers to make the decision to pur-
chase in coalition is ci3 = dip3 + xi. With respect to the use of the shared good, the
utility of a consumer who purchases the good in a coalition depends on: the total de-
mand of all the agents in the coalition (di+D i), whether use is shared proportionally
to demand ( didi+D i ), to monetary contribution (
xi
xi+X i
) or is shared equally, irrespec-
tive of demand or contribution ( 1N ). Formally, the utility of purchase in a coalition is
computed as in Eq.4.5.










where as above, ✓i 2 [0; 1] is the consumer’s preference for income (1   ✓i is the
consumer preference for consuming the service, irrespective of how it is shared);
↵i 2 [0; 1] is a parameter that measures the importance given by the consumer to
the proportional division rule based on the relative demand;  i 2 [0; 1] is a parameter
that measures the importance given by a consumer to the combined effect of the
proportional division rule based on the relative contribution ( i) and the equal share
division rule based on group size (1- i); N  M is the size of the coalition; X i =
X   xi is the total monetary contribution of the other group members l 6= i, and X
the total monetary contribution of the group; D i = D   di is the total demand of the
other group members l 6= i, and D is the total demand of the whole group for the
service.
Purchasing and consuming a good in coalition is subject to a number of constraints.
Given that S3 is the maximum capacity of the shared good, the total group demand
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cannot be higher than this value:
X
di  S3 (4.6)
Similar to goods purchased individually, the shared good lasts for a finite period, and
it is assumed that the duration period, L3, depends on its utilisation. At the limit, if






The overall cost of the shared good, I3, is split equally across the duration period.
Hence, the sum of the monetary contributions of all participants in each period needs
to be at least equal to its cost in one period. We assume, also, that the total contribu-
tion of all participants should not exceed 110% of its value since this would indicate









To assess their utility, consumers purchasing in a coalition need to decide also how
much they contribute to the shared good: xi < I3 (Eq.4.5), which will affect their utility,
and that of the other group members. We model group formation as an iterative
process occurring during each time step. Consumers compare the utility accrued
from joining one or more coalitions (more on this below) of increasing size, and
with respect to U1 and U2. They first assess coalitions of two agents, computing
the individual monetary contribution (xi) that they are willing to commit for the joint
purchase. xi is computed as the value that maximises the individual utility in Eq.4.5,
that is, the value satisfying the follow condition: dUi3/dx=0.
Once they compute their optimal contribution (taking account also the contributions
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of the other agents in the coalition), each consumer, in turn, announces the amount
they are willing to contribute. All consumers joining a coalition repeat the negotiation.
With each iteration, the total contribution of all other members (X i) changes, imply-
ing that agents continuously adapt their choices in relation to what the other coalition
members announced previously. Once the group of size 2 has been evaluated (both
participants have made their Pareto optimal offer), one of the two consumers asks
a consumer in its network to join the coalition and to evaluate a shared purchase.
The negotiation takes place among three members, until they all reach their Pareto
optimal offer (xi) with respect to other members’ offers (X i). This is followed by
another negotiation with four agents, and so on, subject to the constraints in Eq.4.6
and Eq.4.8.
Once all potential coalitions are explored, the consumers make their choices com-
paring among all the (different size) coalitions explored and the other two options,
public service and individual purchase. Each consumer communicates its (highest
utility) choice. If the best alternative for all consumers in a potential coalition of a
given size is to form such coalition, they purchase the shared good and engage in
shared ownership and shared consumption until the good fully depreciates. Until that
time, these coalition consumers make no further consumption decisions.
We assume that in the first time steps there is no purchase by the coalition: con-
sumers can only buy the public service or purchase the good individually. This is
because in the model we endogenise formation of social networks which could lead
consumers to contact peers and form a coalition. At the beginning of the simula-
tion, we assume that all consumers are isolated nodes. We also assume a random
number of socially capable consumers (which we label innovators) who can contact
other randomly chosen consumers and form bidirectional links with them. We as-
sume that each proposing agent forms only one link during each time period, but
that each consumer can be contacted by several consumers. Once agents are con-
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tacted and made aware of the possibility of forming a coalition, they become propo-
nents with a probability Wt. Following the standard assumption in similar diffusion
models (Faber et al. 2010), we assume that this probability increases as more con-
sumers become aware of the sharing opportunities (Wt 1), as more consumers join
the coalition (SharingAdopterst 1) and as a function of external advertising of the
sharing opportunities (Adv).2 Formally:
Wt = MAX[Wt 1;min[1;Adv + (SharingAdopterst 1)
⇠]] (4.9)
where ⇠ is an exogenous parameter measuring the bandwagon effect (Smallwood &
Conlisk 1979).
We assume that links can be formed only between agents who have not purchased
either individually or in a group, that is, those purchasing the service directly from
the general provider. In other words, consumers who already own the good will not
be interested in entering a coalition. However, since purchased goods last for a
limited period of time, consumers owning a good, individually or in a coalition, may
be contacted about its replacement at the end of its duration. During the time needed
to decide about purchasing individually or in a coalition, consumers use the public
service. Therefore, the network structure of connected agents evolves continuously:
new contacts are formed and other links are broken if agents decide to purchase.
Hence, every time step is characterised by a different network of consumers who
must evaluate the three options.
Equivalence between the three purchasing options
To enable comparison, the utility of the three purchasing options (Ui,j), where j =
1, 2, 3, are equivalent under certain conditions. For instance, in Eq.4.5, D i=0, X i=0
2Wt can only increase during the simulation run because there are no other goods that could
compete, hence changing visibility.
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and N=1, then the second term in the Equation is equivalent to Eq.4.1 and Eq.4.4
with the exception that the congestion term K is a property of the public service. If
consumers decide to not make any purchase and to rely on the public service, they
pay only the unitary price, p1, implying that xi=0. If agents purchase individually,
xi=I2/L2 since the agent’s individual monetary contribution in the second option cor-
responds to the total cost of the good, divided by its duration period.
The model is implemented in C++ using the Laboratory for Simulation Development




The aim of this paper is to use the above simple model to understand the conditions
that prompt consumers choosing among the three options to satisfy their demand,
to choose the more sustainable and equitable option of sharing purchase and use
of the good, rather than purchasing the same good individually (when a public ser-
vice, also, is available). To do this, we invert the usual procedure - studying the role
of a few predetermined parameters and analysing the sensitivity to other parame-
ters – and start by analysing the model’s global properties (Ciarli 2012). This allows
identification of the most crucial parameters and the conditions which might prompt
some consumers to choose the shared ownership option, that is, the extensive mar-
gin. We next study in more depth, this reduced parameter space and the effect, in
this reduced space, of the most relevant parameters for increasing the number of
3See https://github.com/marcov64/Lsd for additional information. The code is available upon re-
quest.
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consumers that opt for shared ownership, that is, the intensive margin. We also ex-
amine the policies that may nudge the consumer to shift from individual to shared
ownership and consumption. We briefly describe this procedure in the four stages
below.
In the first stage, we run the global sensitivity analysis over the entire parametric
space of the model (Section 4.3.3) which allows us to define the conditions (con-
sumer and product characteristics) which prompt at least two consumers to purchase
in a coalition. This analysis is conducted in four steps.
First, we identify the parameters most relevant for determining the consumer’s choice
among the three options, using the EE sensitivity analysis method (Morris 1991,
Campolongo et al. 2007, Ruano et al. 2012). The EE screening method is applied in
sensitivity analysis to detect non influential model parameters that can be excluded
from subsequent sensitivity methods to increase computational efficiency. A number
of model configurations are generated following the One-At-a-Time (OAT) sampling
approach. Different levels are assigned to each parameter, that is, different initiali-
sation values are applied at regular intervals between the minimum and maximum
values. Individual parameter levels change, one at a time, keeping the values of the
other parameters fixed. This operation is repeated for all parameters and all levels, to
generate several model configurations with different parametric initialisation (or tra-
jectories). The relative difference in the output of interest (in our case the number of
consumers choosing each of the three options) generated by different random levels
for each parameter, determines the EE. To assess which parameters do not influ-
ence output, two measures are computed: the mean (mu.star ) of all the EE for each
parameter, across the different levels, which measures the average impact of each
parameter, and considering that the same change in different parts of the parame-
ter space might have a different impact on the output; and the standard deviations
(sigma) of all the EE, which measures the sum of all the interactions between one
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particular parameter and all the other parameters, which provides a measure of the
non-linear and indirect effects of each parameter. Low values for both mu.star and
sigma suggest that the parameter has a less strong effect on the model output.
Second, we analyse the direct and interactive impact of the most influential param-
eters (identified by the EE method) across the whole space. Ideally, all combina-
tions, for all parameters within a reasonable range, which makes sense empirically,
should be studied. However, in models with more than one parameter, the number
of combinations to be tested increases exponentially and the time involved would
be unreasonable. DoE is used to define those points in this multidimensional space
that are statistically representative of the full parameter space and allow accurate
estimation of the impact of each parameter on the model. We use the NOLH DoE,
widely adopted to explore high dimensional simulations where there is a high level of
uncertainty about the responses to the parameters (Cioppa & Lucas 2007).
NOLH DoE enables optimisation of the number of sampling points in the parametric
space adhering to the random, hypercube and orthogonal sampling criteria. Let us
consider a model with two parameters, each with minimum and maximum values that
define their range. Let us assume that, for each parameter, we test four values within
this range. This generates a 4x4 matrix with four equally spaced levels per parame-
ter. We select four cells in the matrix, ensuring that each column and each row are
selected only once (hypercube sampling) and that each quadrant of the matrix is se-
lected only once (orthogonal sampling). The selected cells are the model sampling
points and provide the initial values of the two parameters. For a higher dimen-
sionality, the same procedure is conducted on a multidimensional hyper-plane. We
apply the NOLH DoE to define a model configurations based on different initialisation
values of the most influential model parameters detected by the EE method.
Third, we estimate the output response to each parameter individually and in com-
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bination, using the Kriging meta-modelling method (Rasmussen & Williams 2006,
Salle & Yıldızoğlu 2014). This is an interpolation model, based on a Bayesian frame-
work, estimated based on observations of the original model defined by NOLH DoE,
and provides the best linear unbiased prediction of the intermediate values. We use
the Kriging meta-model to predict the model outcome for unobserved points in the
parametric space, based on interpolation of the neighbourhood and the observed
points. To predict the model response at a specific point in the parametric space, the
meta-model takes account of the linear combination of the closest observed points
and their spatial information. The Kriging meta-model estimates the importance of
each model parameter on the variation in the model output.
In the fourth step, the Kriging estimates are combined with the Sobol decomposition
to enable a global sensitivity analysis of all the parameters in the meta-model (Saltelli
et al. 2000, Saltelli & Annoni 2010). The Sobol decomposition is a variance-based
sensitivity analysis that measures each parameter’s direct and interaction effects
on the variance of a given output of the model, where the parameters assume all
the values defined in their space between the minimum and the maximum. Sobol
sensitivity analysis does not explain parameter variability, but does estimate how
much a parameter affects the variance in the model output. We calculate the first-
order (or main effect) index, that is, the individual effect of each parameter on the
model output variance. We also calculate the total-order (or interaction) index, which
measures the effect of a parameter on the variance in the model outcome, taking
account of its interactions with all the other model parameters. The sum of the total-
order indexes may be higher than 1 since mutual interactions are calculated twice in
both parameters.
The global sensitivity analysis allows the ranking of the parameters that have the
greatest influence on the variance in the model output. The most influential are
mapped graphically based on the meta-model 3D response surfaces, to enable iden-
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tification of the model output global maxima and minima. An application of these
techniques is proposed in Dosi et al. (2018), on which we draw in our methodologi-
cal discussion.
In the second stage, based on the results of the global sensitivity analysis, we restrict
the parameter range to values which induce at least some consumers to opt for
the shared purchase (Section 4.3.4). We then perform a second global sensitivity
analysis (NOLH, Kriging meta-model and Sobol decomposition) on this much smaller
space, to more precisely analyse (detect finer changes in the parameters) which
consumers and which characteristics might induce a larger number of consumers to
purchase a good in a coalition.
In the third stage, we analyse the configuration that maximises shared consumption
to study the transition to shared purchase when this option is introduced (Section
4.3.5). We study the consumer characteristics related to the three consumption op-
tions.
In the fourth stage, this configuration is then used to assess two possible policy
interventions and their impact on the diffusion of the shared purchase (Section 4.3.6).
We examine the effect of the unitary price of consuming the service under the three
different purchasing options (which might change as a result of taxes or subsidies)
and the capacity and investment cost of the good to be purchased individually or in
a coalition.
4.3.2 Model Initialisation
We initialise the model with 200 heterogeneous consumers, who each have the pos-
sibility to forge a maximum of 20 bidirectional random links with other consumers
(Table 4.1). Consumers differ with respect to their demand (di), income (ei) and pref-
erences for income/consumption (✓i), and proportional division of consumption of a
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shared good in relation to the demand and contributions of the consumers in the
coalition (↵i and  i respectively).
Parameter Symbol Benchmark Initialisation OAT NOLH
Min. Max. EE Kriging
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Product features
Capacity S=S2=S3 600 200 1000 X X
Investment I=I2=I3 1300 600 2000 X
Price p=p1=p2=p3 1.5 1 2 X
Consumer features
Demand ddelta 30 10 50 X
dmean 50 30 80 X X
Income edelta 450 100 800 X
emean 900 600 1200 X X
Preference for income ✓delta 0.25 0.05 0.49 X X
✓mean 0.5 0.25 0.75 X X
Preference for demand ↵delta 0.25 0.05 0.49 X
division rule ↵mean 0.5 0.25 0.75 X X
Preference for contribution  delta 0.25 0.05 0.49 X
division rule  mean 0.5 0.25 0.75 X X
Public service features
Lowest value of K k 0.5 0.5 0.75 X
Steepness r 10 10 20 X
Sigmoid midpoint g 0.5 0.25 0.75 X




Bandwagon effect ⇠ 0.6
Simulation settings
Total population of agents 200
Max random links per agent 20
Model configuration 180 512+50
Simulation Runs 50
Simulation Steps 960
Final steps analysed 240
Notes: Parameters are initialised based on a uniform distribution between the minimum (c) and the
maximum (d) value. The benchmark (b) value is the average values between the two. Columns (e)
and (f) indicate which parameters are considered in the Elementary Effect (EE) and Kriging methods,
respectively.
Table 4.1: Model initialisation
To initialise these consumer features, we define values for the population average
(mean) and for the distance between the minimum and maximum values (delta),
and then assign a random value to each consumer based on a uniform distribution
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between the minimum and the maximum values. Formally, for each feature fi, where
fi = di, ei, ✓i,↵i,  i, are the population averages (fmean), and (fdelta) is the maximum
distance between the minimum and maximum values, a consumer is assigned a
value fi 2 UNIFORM (fmin ; fmax), where fmin = (fmean - fdelta2 ) and fmax = (fmean
+ fdelta2 ). This allows us to distinguish whether consumer choice is influenced by
features that differ based on the means (mean) or within (delta) populations.
The remaining model parameters define the characteristics of the good that could
be purchased to access the service privately, and the characteristics of the public
service. We assume that the same good can be purchased individually or by a group.
The good features considered are capacity (S=S2=S3) and investment cost (I=I2=I3).
As noted above, the quality of the public service depends on the number of users
and on its maximum capacity (Z), that is, the share of consumers in the population
it can cater for in one period, and the parameters that define the logistic curve which
models the relation between number of users and reduced service quality due to
congestion: k, r, and g. With respect to the unit price for consuming the service, we
assume that the three options do not differ (p=p1=p2=p3).
In this version of the model, we consider fixed unitary prices for the three options,
because the computation of unitary prices to use the goods depends on the market
of interest. Back to the transport examples, public transport is often public, and prices
do not change with demand; the cost of using a car depends on the demand for oil,
that only partly depends on cars use; the cost of he shared car, depends on the cost
pf the platform. Furthermore, the demand curve can be rather flat, as the choice of
transport will often depend on other parameters, such as location, access to travel
routes, and household composition. These market mechanisms are not obvious to
explore and need a separate model (or separate models for different markets). We do
however analyse the impact of different price structures on the model results.
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All the above parameters are presented in Table 4.1 and are studied in the global
sensitivity analysis.
We assume that 10% of the consumers are innovators, that is, consumers that at
t=0 are aware of the possibility of a sharing option and can contact other consumers
to form a coalition. The rate at the information spreads to allow other consumers
to form a coalition depends on parameters Adv and ⇠ (Eq.4.9). Pasimeni & Ciarli
(2018) show that the faster the information flows, the faster and greater the adoption
of goods in coalitions. Since in this paper we focus on the features of the con-
sumers and the good, we set these parameters to values that allow fast information
flow among agents and, over the course of the simulation time steps, will allow all
consumers to opt for shared purchase and shared consumption should this be their
preferred option.
To analyse the sharing option as a potential new alternative for individual consumers,
in an economy where consumer choice has stabilised around the public service and
a private good, we run a number (360) of time steps with only these two alternatives:
public service and individual purchase. We then consider this time step as t = 0
and run the model with all three options for 600 time-steps. We assign parameter
values to the benchmark initialisation whose relation is commensurate with the char-
acteristics of an average consumer in a high income country (Table 4.1). Therefore,
we assume that each time-step in the simulation is one month and that the model
simulates 50 years of potential transition from individual to shared purchase.
For each parameter value combination, we run 50 simulations with a different pseudo-
random seed, in order to control for the effect of the model’s stochastic elements.
The configuration represents the average of these simulation runs and the final 240
time-steps, where we know that, regardless of the model configuration, on average,
99% of all the agents in the model have evaluated coalition purchase at least once.
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We average over time steps to avoid the results being driven by what happens in a
specific period.
Table 4.1 reports the benchmark (b), minimum (c) and maximum (d) values for all the
model parameters defining the space (or range) in which they are initialised. Below,
we describe the DoE in more detail.
4.3.3 Global Sensitivity Analysis
The objective of the global sensitivity analysis is to investigate the conditions, across
the entire parameter space defining the consumer, product and public service fea-
tures, that induce some consumers to opt for the shared purchase rather than in-
dividual purchase or public service. The main output variables are total number of
consumers purchasing in a coalition (Shared Purchase), purchasing individually (In-
dividual Purchase) or purchasing the public service (Public Service).
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, we select the main parameters using the EE method.
We include in the analysis all parameters ticked in Table 4.1 column (e). EE results
in seven main parameters on which we run the NOLH – (these are ticked in Table
4.1 column (f)). To run both EE and Kriging methods, the OAT (e) and NOLH (f)
sampling procedures generate several model parameter value combinations. The
OAT generates 180 combinations and the NOLH DoE generates 512 points in the
parametric space, plus an additional 50 for external validation (see Annex A.3, which
also reports the Kriging meta-model estimates).
Elementary Effects (EE)
Figure 4.2 plots the EE for all the parameters, on the number of agents deciding
to opt for the shared purchase (a), the individual purchase (b) or the public service
(c). The vertical axis plots sigma, which are the non-linear and non-additive effects
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of each parameter and provide an estimate of the interaction effects with the other







































































































Notes: The three graphs plot the overall effects (mu.star, horizontal axis) and non-linear and non-
additive effects (sigma, vertical axis) of all parameters measuring consumer features, product
features and public service features (Table 4.1, col. (e) on the number of consumers that choose the
shared purchases (a), individual purchase (b) and the public service (c).
Figure 4.2: Elementary effects of the model parameters
The results of the EE analysis suggest that, in the case of consumer features, the
population preferences average values have a strong impact on the number of con-
sumers opting for shared purchase. These include ✓mean, ↵mean and  mean. The next
most influential consumer features (population average) are income (emean) and de-
mand (dmean). The level of heterogeneity across consumer features (delta) has a
negligible effect on the choice among the three purchasing options, with the excep-
tion of the preference for income/consumption, ✓delta. Among the product features
parameters, only good capacity (S) has a relevant impact on the number of agents
choosing the sharing option.
In the cases of individual purchase and the public service, again the most rele-
vant parameters are consumer features (population mean: demand (dmean), income
(emean) and preference for income (✓mean)), but not the preferences for the sharing
rules, which do not apply in these two cases.
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Among product features, good capacity is relevant (S). Also, in contrast to shared
purchase, in the case of individual purchase and the public service, the cost of the
good (I) is relevant since, in this case the consumer pays the entire cost of either
option. The shared purchase option is affected less by the cost of the good since
the individual contribution to the purchase (xi) reduces as the size of the group (N )
increases. However, the higher the number of agents in the sharing group, the higher
the total demand (
P
di), implying the need for a good with high capacity (S). If this
condition is not satisfied (Eq.4.6), the shared purchase is not viable, which explains
why the good capacity parameter has a strong overall effect on the sharing purchase
option. S is also relevant for the decision to purchase the good individually since
it affects good duration and the fractional cost to be paid (Eq.4.3): the higher the
capacity, the longer the duration and the lower the cost per period.
The parameters for the public service features are also relevant for the choice be-
tween public service or individual consumption: these include maximum capacity
(Z), the lowest value for congestion (k) and the value when the congestion curve is
at half of its maximum (g). When the capacity of the public service can satisfy the
demand of a high number of consumers, the level of congestion related to accessing
the service is low. As congestion increases or comes at an earlier point in time (g),
this affects consumer utility and explains the overall effect on the consumer decision
(Eq.4.1 and Eq.4.2).
Note that the size of the parameter effects differs substantially between the shared
purchase and the other two options (Figure 4.2). All of the parameters have a lower
effect on the sharing option because the maximum number of consumers choosing
this option, among the 180 model configurations generated by the OAT sampling




This section presents the results of the Kriging meta-modelling based on NOLH DoE
for the model parameters that have the strongest overall effects on the shared pur-
chase option, as estimated by the EE method. To ensure a manageable computation
time to run the Kriging meta-modelling, we arbitrarily assume that the most influential
parameters are mu.star > 1 and sigma > 2 (see Table 4.1 column (f)). We chose
to exclude the other parameters because they are all clustered at very low values
of both mu.star and sigma, which imply non-relevant impact on the model output.
The parameters are initialised (according to the NOLH DoE) at values between the
respective Min and Max in Table 4.1 columns (c) and (d). The remaining parameters
are initialised based on the average benchmark value, column (b).
Figure 4.3 plots the outcome of the sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of the
selected model parameters on the number of agents opting for the shared purchase.
The Sobol decomposition (bar chart (a) at the top of the figure) indicates that the av-
erage value of the preference for income (✓mean) is the most important value and ac-
counts for about 60% of the variance in the number of agents undertaking the shared
purchase (considering that the sum of the parameter variance might be higher than
1 due to double counting the mutual interactions among parameters). The next two
most important parameters are good capacity (S) and the average value of popula-
tion demand (dmean).
However, it should be noted that the interaction effect (grey) is always larger than the
main effect (white), meaning that the impact of these three parameters on the model
output depends on the value of the other parameters. That is, for example, the con-
sumer’s preference for income (✓mean) drives the consumer’s choice in relation to the
shared purchase option, conditional on the value of the other six parameters. This
suggests that despite model simplicity, consumer choice is the result of a complex
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interaction among consumer features (and the capacity of the good available in the
market).
(a) Sobol decomposition
(b) ✓mean=0.25 (c) ✓mean=0.50 (d) ✓mean=0.75
(e) S (f) dmean (g) ✓mean
Notes: Charts plot the results from the sensitivity analysis on the seven parameters that have largest
influence on the number of consumers that opt for the shared consumption (Figure 4.2). (a) We plot
the Sobol decomposition analysis, which provides estimates of the direct and interactive impact of
each parameter: each bar plots the Sobol index, the extent to which the parameter explains the
output variance, directly (part in white), and conditional to interaction with other six parameters (grey).
In the middle row, we plot the 3D response surfaces, generated through the Kriging meta-model
interpolation, for S and dmean at different levels of ✓mean, where the vertical axis measures the total
number of consumers that opt for the shared purchase: (b) ✓mean=0.25, (c) ✓mean=0.50 and (d)
✓mean=0.75. In the bottom row, we plot the direct impact of the three most important parameters on
the total number of consumers that opt for the shared purchase, and 95% confidence intervals: (e)
S, (f) dmean and (g) ✓mean.
Figure 4.3: Global sensitivity analysis of the impact of model parameters on the number of consumers
in shared ownership
The remaining two preference parameters (↵mean and  mean) are less relevant and
have no direct impact on the choice to purchase a shared good. This depends on the
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model construction: ↵mean and  mean relevance are weighted by 1-✓ and are related
to consumer demand and consumer income and, also, to how much the individual
manages to consume and contribute under a given sharing rule. The population vari-
ation in the preference for income/consumption (✓delta) is less relevant for determining
the consumer choice to enter a coalition to buy a good. This suggests that the level
of heterogeneity in the preference for income in the population does not greatly affect
the decision to share the purchase of a good. Surprisingly, the population income
(emean) has only a very small impact and only in relation to the other parameters, not
directly.
The other charts show the impact of the three main parameters on the average
number of consumers (from a population of 200) that opt for the shared consumption.
The charts in the centre of Figure 4.3 plot the 3D response surface for S and dmean,
with the most relevant parameter (✓mean) at its minimum ✓mean=0.25 (b), average
✓mean=0.50 (c) and maximum, ✓mean=0.75 (d) values and all other parameters are
at their benchmark value. The charts at the bottom of Figure 4.3 plot the direct
impact of the three parameters on the number of consumers in the shared purchase:
S (e), dmean (f) and ✓mean (g), with all other parameters are at benchmark value.
Overall, these results suggest that, on average, across the whole parameter space
represented by the seven parameters with the strongest impact (on shared pur-
chase), only a niche group of consumers chooses the shared purchase option: the
maximum value in the meta-model response is about 6 (out of 200) agents. This is
an indication of the small likelihood of a shared consumption models being chosen
by the population of consumers.
Cœteris paribus, those few consumers that choose shared purchase tend to be in
the population with a medium-low average preference for income (or average-higher
preference for consumption) (chart (g)) and higher demand (chart (f)), which is sat-
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isfied by a relatively small sized good that is large enough to satisfy more than one
consumer for at least a period (chart (e)). However, it should be noted that the num-
ber of consumers opting for the shared purchase is not significantly different from
zero, for varying income preference values.
How do these three relevant features interact? If we consider a good where the
population has a medium preference, on average, for consumption (i.e., they care
equally about consuming and about their savings, chart (c)), we observe the largest
number of sharing consumers if demand is relatively high and consumers can buy
a medium sized good. This relation does not hold for the maximum and minimum
levels of consumer preference for income. In the first case (chart (d)), we observe no
consumers forming a coalition to purchase the good, irrespective of level of demand
or good size. In the second case (chart (b)), the relation is less linear: we observe
coalitions only for very low levels of demand and good size. As demand reduces,
the good size leading to formation of a coalition becomes smaller than the average.
A reduced preference for income gives more importance to the second part of the
utility function (Eq.4.5), which is related positively to the total demand of the whole
coalition (D = di +D i). A small coalition established by consumers with overall low
demand makes it feasible to share the purchase of a small good.
Figure 4.4 plots the results of the sensitivity analysis for the same seven param-
eters, for the number of consumers that choose the other two options: individual
purchase (upper set of charts) and the public service (lower set of charts). As Figure
4.2 shows, ✓mean, S, emean and dmean are among the most relevant parameters for
determining the number of consumers that chose those two options (charts (a) and
(d)).
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(a) Sobol decomposition (b) emean=900 (c) emean
(d) Sobol decomposition (e) emean=900 (f) emean
Notes: The three charts on the top plot the results from the sensitivity analysis on the impact of
model parameters on the number of consumers that opt for the individual purchase. The three on
the bottom relates to the number of consumers that opt for the public service. (a) and (d) plot the
Sobol decomposition analysis. Each bar plots the Sobol index: in white the direct impact of each
parameter and in grey the impact considering interaction with other parameters. (b) and (e) plot the
3D response surface for ✓mean and S, when emean=900. (c) and (f) plot the direct impact of emean
on the total number of average consumers that opt for the individual purchase (c) and for the public
service (f), and 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.4: Global sensitivity analysis for individual purchase (top) and public service (bottom)
As in the case of shared purchase, the parameters that explain most of the variance
in the choice are the average value of the consumer preference for income (✓mean,
accounting for about 60% of the variance) and the capacity of the shared good (S,
accounting for about 40% of the variance). In contrast to the results for shared pur-
chase, the direct effect of the parameters (coloured white on the bar) is higher than
the effect due to interaction with other parameters (grey colour). This is because,
in these individual choices, the use of the service does not depend on the number
of consumers in the coalition, which make the utility from consuming conditional on
the size of the good, the individual demand and the preference for the sharing rule.
It should be noted, also, that consumer heterogeneity with respect to preference for
income (✓delta) is not relevant for determining these two consumption options.
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The other parameters that have a relatively high impact on the decision to purchase
individually or use the public service are the average values of population income
(emean) and demand (dmean). The impact of income is mainly direct, while the impact
of demand is mainly conditional on other parameters. This is because consumer
utility can only be positively related to income (in Eqs.4.1, 4.4 and 4.5, ei appears
only on the left side of the utility function), whereas consumer demand can affect
utility by both reducing income (✓i, ci = dip) and increasing use of the service (1 ✓i).
Therefore, the interaction with the other model parameters is more important. Goods
with high average consumer demand increase the cost of using the service and
require higher income consumers to increase the utility of consuming.
The two remaining preferences (↵mean and  mean), by construction, have no impact
because the utility functions of the two consumption options analysed in Figure 4.4
do not depend on these two parameters which determine the sharing rules (see
Eq.4.1 and Eq.4.4).
The other two charts focus on the impact of the three main parameters on the av-
erage number of consumers (from a population of 200) that opt for individual con-
sumption (top) or public service (bottom). The charts in the middle of the figure, (b)
and (e) in Figure 4.4, plot the 3D response surface for the two most relevant param-
eters, ✓mean and S, when the third most relevant parameter is at its benchmark value
(emean=900) and all the other parameters are also at their benchmark values. The
charts on the right plot the direct impact of emean ((c) and (f)).
Overall, for all combinations of the model parameters, most consumers opt for in-
dividual purchase or the public service. The impact of the most important param-
eters on the two individual consumption choices is symmetrical. The population of
consumers with a high preference for income (✓mean) is likely to rely on the public
service, especially in the case of a small capacity good (S). However, the number of
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consumer that purchase the good individually increases linearly with both the pref-
erence for consumption (1-✓mean) and the good size (S).
What this global sensitivity analysis shows is that the interplay among model param-
eters makes the purchasing decision dynamic. However, consumers autonomously
find the system equilibrium which guarantee the maximum individual utility.
Agents willing to share the purchase of the good in a coalition have high demand. It
might be expected that the shared good would be linked to high capacity to satisfy
the needs of a larger group of consumers and increase the benefits of cost-sharing.
However, large coalitions are more difficult to coordinate and require a lengthy ne-
gotiation process, and, also, there is a higher likelihood that some consumers might
drop out as the offers change, changing the conditions for the other consumers.
In other words, the complexity involved in coordinating a large group, which in our
model is represented by the ”tatonnement” process, may rule out the sharing option
if only large sized goods are available in the economy. Moreover, the larger the size
of the group and the larger its total demand for the good, the lower will be the dura-
tion of the good (Eq.4.7). This means that the coalition will have a shorter duration,
which might persuade the consumer to choose a different consumption option when
the good needs to be replaced; at that time, the conditions will have changed and
coalition may not be the solution yielding the highest utility for at least one mem-
ber. As duration reduces, the monetary contributions of group members required
to make the shared purchase increase (Eq.4.8). This reduces consumer utility from
a cost-sharing in coalition, which might prompt choice of a different consumption
alternative. If new consumers are invited to join the coalition to increase the cost-
sharing, the interplay between total demand and product capacity becomes crucial,
as just discussed. Shared goods with lower capacity can satisfy a smaller group with
relatively lower total demand.
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In the case of individual purchase and in the context of Eq.4.3 and Eq.4.4, large
capacity increases good duration and reduces the cost to be paid in each time pe-
riod. In the case of a low capacity good, the convenience of purchasing it individually
for the same cost decreases and agents who do not choose shared purchase, will
decide to rely on the service offered by the general provider. Overall, the impact of
product capacity on consumer utility depends on consumer demand. Consumers
with high demand use the good more frequently, with a high rate of depreciation,
which reduces its duration and, consequently, increases the overall cost of this op-
tion. If income is not high enough to offset the higher expenditure, the consumer
will opt for the public service. The public service option has no investment costs:
consumers pay only for their use of the service, which, potentially, makes this op-
tion the lowest cost and highest utility choice. However, as more and more people
choose this option, congestion increases, making all the consumers of the public ser-
vice worse off and determining a consumption shift to another option guaranteeing a
better outcome.
The interplay among these model parameters demonstrates the complexity of the
decision process leading to shared purchase. Agents negotiate in order to find the
best trade-off among all these conditions, and this negotiation is decisive for forma-
tion of a coalition. We know that coordinating a large group is more complicated than
in the case of a small group, and that a larger choice set increases decision com-
plexity. In our model, the evaluation of shared consumption in groups whose size
increases incrementally, becomes increasingly more complex, suggesting that a non
optimising, faster routine could lead to more sharers.
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4.3.4 Exploring the Niche of Sharing Consumers
One of the main results of the global sensitivity analysis presented in the previous
section, is that, according to the Kriging meta-model estimates, across all possible
configurations of our stylised economy, at most, only a small group of consumers will
opt for shared purchase, for given values of ✓mean, S and dmean. Figure 4.3 suggests,
also, that the interaction among the model parameters is important for determining
the number of consumers that choose the shared purchase, but is less relevant for
consumers that access the service individually. We find, also, that in a population of
consumers with low-medium income/consumption preferences, the shared purchase
increases with relatively high levels of average demand and lower levels of product
capacity.
It should be noted that because this Kriging meta-model estimation is based on the
results from a broad range of parameters, and because, under most parameterisa-
tions, no consumers opt for the shared purchase, the average estimated share is low.
In other words, across this broad range, the shared purchase niches are outliers and
occur in rather limited parts of the parameter space.
To investigate the conditions where shared purchase may be successfully adopted
by a significant ratio of the population, we analyse in detail the results of the 562
simulation runs of the NOLH DoE to select smaller sections of the parameter space
where the sharing consumer ratio is consistently higher. We rank the observed points
by the number of consumers choosing shared purchase and select the top three
configurations, which reach values between 22 and 28.4
We define the range of the seven relevant parameters using the minimum and maxi-
mum values across these three configurations. As before, the other parameters are
4These values differ from the global maxima in the 3D response surface, 6 out of 200. This is
because the Kriging meta-model makes an interpolation between the observed points, which, in most
of cases, is zero (Figure 4.3).
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set at their benchmark values. For each of the seven parameters, Table 4.2 reports:
the average value (b) and the range between the minimum (c) and the maximum (d)
values tested in this smaller niche; and the benchmark (e) and range (f, g) tested in
the global sensitivity analysis in Table 4.1).
Parameter Symbol Benchmark Initialisation Benchmark Initialisation
Niche Niche original NOLH (Tab.4.1)
Min Max Min Max
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Product features
Capacity S=S2=S3 460 260 660 600 200 1000
Investment I=I2=I3 1300 1300
Price p=p1=p2=p3 1.5 1.5
Consumer features
Demand ddelta 30 30
dmean 61 55 67 50 30 80
Income edelta 450 450
emean 850 710 990 900 600 1200
Preference for income ✓delta 0.125 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.05 0.49
✓mean 0.34 0.25 0.43 0.5 0.25 0.75
Preference for demand ↵delta 0.25 0.25
division rule ↵mean 0.55 0.35 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.75
Preference for contribution  delta 0.25 0.25
division rule  mean 0.645 0.61 0.68 0.5 0.25 0.75
Public service features
Lowest value of K k 0.5 0.5
Steepness r 10 10
Sigmoid midpoint g 0.5 0.5
General provider capacity Z 0.75 0.75
Notes: Parameters in the niche parametric space are initialised based on a uniform distribution be-
tween the minimum (c) and the maximum (d) value. The benchmark (b) value is the average values
between the two. Columns (e), (f) and (g) report the initialisation values for the benchmark, minimum
and maximum of the global sensitivity, as initialised in Table 4.1. Considering the range for each
parameter, the NOLH-DoE identifies new 512+50 model configurations that are the observed points
needed to estimate the Kriging meta-model.
Table 4.2: NOLH initialisation in a smaller parametric space
First, we note that the average for S, dmean and ✓mean are extremely close to the
values that maximise the number of shared purchasers in Figure 4.3 (charts e, f, g).
In the case of S, dmean, these coincide with the values for which the number of shared
purchasers is significantly different from zero. Second, although we refer to a niche,
the range of these parameter values is quite broad and covers quite distinct types of
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consumers and goods.
The values of the parameters that define this smaller space suggest an economy in
which: the capacity of the good has relatively low-medium values (between 260 and
660 compared to the average and maximum in the global analysis, respectively, 600
and 1000); consumers have relatively medium-high demand (between 55 and 67,
compared to the minimum and average in the global analysis, respectively, 30 and
50), but low-medium income (between 710 and 990, compared to the average and
maximum in the global analysis, respectively, 900 and 1200); consumers have low-
medium preference for income (between 0.25 and 0.43, compared to the average
and maximum in the global analysis, respectively, 0.5 and 0.75); and a higher pref-
erence for the demand and contribution sharing rules (averaging respectively 0.55
and 0.645, compared to 0.5 in the global analysis). All the other parameters remain
unchanged.
In other words, the global sensitivity analysis shows that shared purchase is consid-
ered an option for the population of consumers with relatively high need for the ser-
vice (high demand and high preference for consumption), which increases the value
of purchasing the good and, especially, if the public service is already congested, but
a relatively low income which does not allow them to make an individual purchase.
Consumers with tighter budgets, but higher demand are more willing to coordinate
over shared purchase. These consumers also prefer to form smaller coalitions and
to purchase relatively smaller goods.
To investigate in more detail, the conditions in this smaller parametric space, which
might prompt more consumers to opt for the shared purchase, we performed a sec-
ond global sensitivity analysis, with sampling points, again, identified via NOLH DoE
using the minimum and maximum values of the parameters reported in Table 4.2,
columns (c) and (d).
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Figure 4.5 plots the outcome of this sensitivity analysis assessing the impact of the
selected model parameters on the number of agents opting for the shared purchase
in this smaller parameter space.
(a) Sobol decomposition
(b) S=260 (c) S=460 (d) S=660
(e) ↵mean (f) ✓mean (g) S
Notes: Charts plot the results from the sensitivity analysis on the seven parameters, in the smaller
parametric space. (a) We plot the Sobol decomposition analysis, which provides estimates of the
direct and interactive impact of each parameter: each bar plots the Sobol index, the extent to which
the parameter explains the output variance, directly (part in white), and conditional to interaction with
other six parameters (grey). In the middle row, we plot the 3D response surfaces for ↵mean and ✓mean
at different levels of S, where the vertical axis measures the total number of consumers that opt for
the shared purchase: (b) S=260, (c) S=460 and (d) S=660. In the bottom row, we plot the direct
impact of the three most important parameters on the total number of consumers that opt for the
shared purchase, and 95% confidence intervals: (e) ↵mean, (f) ✓mean and (g) S.
Figure 4.5: Global sensitivity analysis and response surfaces in a smaller parametric space of sharing
consumers
The Sobol decomposition (bar chart (a) at the top of the figure), indicates that product
capacity (S) is now the parameter which has the biggest influence on the decision to
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opt for shared purchase, accounting for more that 80% of the variance in the number
of agents choosing that option. This is almost the double the number identified in
the entire parameter space (Figure 4.3), which suggests that, under certain demand
and income conditions, good size is crucial since it conditions the size and duration
of the coalition. The second most relevant parameter is the average value of the
consumer preference for the demand division rule (↵mean), that is, the importance
assigned by agents to the amount of the shared good to be used by other group
members, relative to their own demand (rather than to their contribution). Compared
to the analysis of the entire parameter space (Figure 4.3), this becomes twice as
relevant, suggesting, again, that the parameters defining coalition become crucial
under the demand and income conditions that might induce consumers to share.
The preference for income/consumption (✓), is also relevant, at a similar level as in
the global sensitivity analysis. Also, in this smaller parameter space, the effect of
these most influential parameters is, based, mainly on their interaction, rather than
being direct.
The bottom set of charts of Figure 4.5 plot the estimated direct impact of the three
most relevant parameters when all other are at their benchmark values: ↵mean (e),
✓mean (f) and S (g), and suggest that, in this relatively smaller parameter space, the
likelihood of consumers choosing shared purchase is significantly higher than for
other configurations of the economy. Under most values of ↵mean, ✓mean and S, the
number of shared purchasers is significantly different from zero and can be over
20. The number increases with the consumers’ preferences for the demand division
rule (↵mean) and for income (✓mean), and decreases with the size of the good (S),
which can be taken as a good proxy for the size of the eventual coalition. Recall
that the positive relation with ✓mean is subject to ✓mean being below its maximum value
of 0.43, that is, for a population that, overall, has an above average preference for
consumption (1-✓mean > 0.57).
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The middle set of charts in Figure 4.5 plot the 3D response surface for ↵mean and
✓mean, for different levels of S (low S=260 (b), average S=460 (c) and high S=660 (d)),
and for the benchmark values for all the other parameters. Chart (a) shows that the
impact of the parameters on the model outputs, depends largely on the interactions
with other parameters. However, the direct effect of S accounts for about 20% of
the variance in the number of agents in the shared purchase, which explains the
different peaks moving from chart (d) to chart (b): low good capacity increases the
shared option (as in chart (g)). However, the effect of ↵mean and ✓mean needs to be
analysed in relation to the interaction with other parameters, which might call for a
different interpretation compared to how we understand their direct effect only (charts
(e) and (f) respectively).
For a high value of S, chart (d), high levels of both ↵mean and ✓mean, determine the
highest number of consumers choosing the shared purchase. For an average value
of S, chart (c), the number of sharing consumers increases and reaches a maximum
of both low and high values of ↵mean, while ✓mean remains at above average values.
The number of consumers opting for the shared purchase increases even further
with very low product capacity values (chart (b)), with ↵mean at its lowest level and
✓mean above the average.
↵mean is the population’s preference for the division rule based on demand, which
leverages preference for the division rule based on contributions ( mean, see Eq.4.5).
As product capacity decreases, the level of total demand it can satisfy also de-
creases, meaning that only small coalitions are feasible. In this smaller parameter
space, we are dealing with less wealthy consumers with high demand who may not
be able to afford individual purchase; high demand depreciates the good faster en-
tailing a higher cost every time period. To achieve greater utility from a coalition, pref-
erence for the division rule based on contributions becomes more important, which
implies a lower individual contribution for the shared purchase (xi), thereby reducing
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↵mean. In the reverse situation of a higher capacity product, able to satisfy the total
demand of a bigger coalition, consumers may be willing to contribute more, subject
to being able to use the shared good proportionally to their demand. However, in this
situation, individual consumption becomes more cost-effective and fewer consumers
choose shared purchase.
4.3.5 Transition to Shared Purchase: Dynamics, Impact and Con-
sumer Features
Having studied which consumer preferences and good sizes are likely to increase the
number of consumers choosing shared purchase, we next investigate the dynamics
of that choice, starting with an economy where either only individual purchase or
the public service are available. We also examine in more depth, who are likely
to be sharing consumers. Among the 562 parameter combinations sampled using
NOLH for the niche group of sharing consumers, we now focus on the model config-
uration that results in the highest number of consumers choosing shared purchase
(on average 42 out of 200). Table 4.3 presents this configuration (column (b)) and,
for reference purposes, includes the parameter values of the niche group (columns
d-f).
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Parameter Symbol Initialisation Policy Benchmark Initialisation
niche NOLH (Tab.4.2)
Min Max
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Product features
Capacity S=S2=S3 315.58 X 460 260 660
Investment I=I2=I3 1300 X 1300
Price p=p1=p2=p3 1.5 X 1.5
Consumer features
Demand ddelta 30 30
dmean 64.63 61 55 67
Income edelta 450 450
emean 931.92 850 710 990
Preference for income ✓delta 0.13 0.125 0.05 0.20
✓mean 0.40 0.34 0.25 0.43
Preference for demand ↵delta 0.25 0.25
division rule ↵mean 0.40 0.55 0.35 0.75
Preference for contribution  delta 0.25 0.25
division rule  mean 0.65 0.645 0.61 0.68
Public service features
Lowest value of K k 0.5 0.5
Steepness r 10 10
Sigmoid midpoint g 0.5 0.5
General provider capacity Z 0.75 0.75
Notes: Column (b) shows the value of each model parameter that maximises the number of agents
that opt for the shared purchase. Column (c) indicates the parameters for which we study the effect
on the model output as proxy of the impact of policy measures. Columns (d), (e) and (f) report the
initialisation values for benchmark, minimum and maximum of the the smaller parametric space, as in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.3: Initialisation of the configuration generating the highest ratio of shared purchase
Transition to Shared Purchase
Figure 4.6 summarises the evolution of agents’ consumption decisions over 600 time
periods, which is equivalent to 50 years. Pre-t=0, the model is initialised with only
two options: individual purchase and public service. We run the model for 360 time
steps with only these two options available, to allow the model to settle around a
long term steady state, cœteris paribus. For ease of reading, Figure 4.6 shows only
the last 24 time steps (i.e., the final two years) in this initial period with no sharing
option.
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Notes: The chart shows the transition from individual to shared purchase. During the first 24 time
steps (t < 0) consumers can choose only from individual purchase or public service. At t = 0, and
for the remaining 600 time steps (50 years), consumers can also choose the shared purchase. The
medium-grey line plots the number of consumers opting for the individual purchase; the black line
plots the number of sharing consumers; and the light-grey line plots the number of consumers using
the public service. The shaded areas are the respective 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.6: Number of agents in the three options over time.
Under the current configuration, before the sharing option is introduced, more than
80% of consumers choose individual purchase with the remaining around 20% of
consumers satisfying their demand through the public service. If we consider again
the mobility example, this is close to recent commuting figures across the UK (except
London) (UK Department for Transport 2019).
At t=0, the shared purchase option is made available. As discussed in Section 4.3.2,
initially, only 10% of the population (the innovators) is aware of this additional op-
tion and able to promote a coalition (they can ask any consumer to join and inform
them about the possibility of sharing). In the first 60 time steps, only few consumers
choose to replace an individual good with a shared good. As more consumers be-
come aware of the sharing option and are able to form coalitions, the ratio of shared
purchase increases and stabilises around its maximum of 20%. Diffusion of the new
option follows the well-established S-shaped diffusion curve, and takes a long time
under the current parameterisation.
In an economy where, traditionally, consumption choice is based on individual pur-
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chase as the only alternative to the public service, the introduction of shared pur-
chase changes consumption decisions, under the conditions defined in Table 4.3.
The option of shared purchase is appealing for a portion of the population that used
to purchase and consume a good individually and perceives the sharing alternative
to be more convenient.
Crucially, the change involves switching from an individual to a shared good and not
from the public service to a shared good. The share of agents purchasing individually
decreases by around 26%, to about 60%. The share of agents deciding to use the
public service remains at about the same level. As a result, shared purchase implies
a net reduction in the number of individual purchases, which leads to a reduction in
the total number of goods purchased. But by how much?
Goods purchased, either by a group or individually, satisfy agents’ needs for a limited
time. In the parameterisation in Table 4.3, the capacity of the good is relatively small
which would result in a good duration of about 5 years (L2) in the case of individual
purchase and about 2 years (L3) in the case of group of average size 3 (N ). The
shorter duration in the latter case, is because use is shared among more than one
user and the good depreciates more quickly. After depreciation, the good is replaced
by a new individual or shared good.
Given N , L2 and L3, we can compute the average number of goods purchased yearly.
Before t=0, when approximately 80% of the population uses a good, 32.9 products
are purchased annually. This reduces to 23.6 when the ratio of shared purchases
reaches its maximum of about 20%. During this period, the consumers in a coalition
purchase approximately 6.8 goods per year, reducing by about 2.5 units, the number
of goods purchased and consumed each year. This implies that the transition to
shared purchase, studied for the case of a specific niche of 200 consumers under
specific market conditions (low capacity product), reduces the number of products
156
purchased over 50 years, by more than 120.
Figure 4.7 plots the cumulative number of goods purchased over time, individually
(grey solid line), in a coalition (black solid line) and in total (black dashed line), and,
also, the number of goods purchased were the shared option not available or if no
consumers opt for it (grey dashed line).































Notes: The chart shows the cumulative number of goods purchased in group (black line) and individ-
ually (grey line). The sum of the two (black dashed line) is the total goods purchased over time. The
grey dotted line plots the cumulative number of purchased good if the sharing option is not available
or not chosen. The shaded areas plot the respective 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.7: Cumulative number of goods purchased and utilised
The results show that, under the configuration that maximises uptake of the shared
option, a significantly lower number of goods is produced and used over the 50 years.
Annual purchases reduce by 7.4% compared to the number of goods that would be
purchased were the shared option not available, or were it not to be adopted. The
shared purchase (combined with shared consumption and ownership) leads to an
overall reduction in the number of goods purchased, but does not change the number
of consumers that have access to the good. It should be noted that the number of
goods that are eventually used, depends on both the number of sharing consumers
and the time it takes for the transition: a faster transition will lead to a faster reduction
in the number of goods produced.
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Features of Sharing Consumers
To allow for better targeting of policies to increase shared purchase, we analyse
in more detail, which consumers are likely to switch from individual to shared own-
ership. The sensitivity analysis in Section 4.3.3 shows that the population of con-
sumers with tighter budget constraints and higher demand, is more likely to coor-
dinate for shared purchase. We observe, also, that in this population, consumers
prefer smaller coalitions and smaller goods. We now focus on the parameterisation
that leads to the highest shared purchase ratio (Table 4.3, column (b)). The results
confirm and reinforce the profile of a sharing consumer, based on the sensitivity anal-
ysis, and provide some insights into the extent to which these groups of consumers
differ.
Figure 4.8 plots the average characteristics of the consumers choosing the three op-
tions (shared purchase (black), individual purchase (grey) and public service (light
grey) with 95% confidence intervals, and the population mean (dashed line). On
average, and compared to the population mean (see Table 4.3, column (b)), agents
choosing shared purchase have significantly higher than average demand and lower
than average income compared to those choosing individual purchase. Demand of
those choosing the shared purchase is not significantly different with respect to con-
sumers that opt for the public service, but their income is significantly higher. Also,
the consumers involved in shared ownership have a slightly higher preference for
income (✓) – or lower preference for consumption (1-✓), compared to the overall pop-
ulation, but significantly higher preference for income than individual consumers and
a lower preference compared to consumers that rely on the public service. Under this
specific model configuration, there are no significant differences among consumers
















































Notes: The bar charts show the average characteristics, calculated over the final 240 time periods
of the simulation runs, of consumers grouped in relation to their consumption decision: shared pur-
chased (black), individual purchase (grey) and public service (light grey). Top left chart plots consumer
demand (d); top right chart plots consumer income (e); at the bottom, in order from left to right, charts
plot consumer preference for income (✓), for the division rule based on demand (↵) and for the division
rule based on contribution ( ). Dotted lines represents population means, as in Table 4.3. At the top
of each bar we plot the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.8: Consumers’ features of consumers grouped by their consumption decision
On average, consumers opting for individual purchase have low demand, high in-
come and low preference for income. These are the wealthier consumers that can
afford individual purchase to avoid the congestion costs of the public service. The
overall cost of the purchase of the good is split evenly over its duration. Because
the duration of the good decreases with demand (Eq.4.3), individual purchasers are
mainly consumers that use the good infrequently: low demand reduces the cost in
each time period. The low level of demand and, therefore, use (for a given con-
tribution to its purchase), may mean that these consumers, also, may find it less
convenient to share: the good duration is reduced by the use of other consumers,
reducing the benefit to low level users. In the case of good availability of finance, in-
dividual purchase is fostered by a lower preference for income and, hence, a higher
preference for consumption.
High demand characterises those consumers that choose either shared purchase or
the public service. Their higher (but lower than the individual purchaser’s) income,
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allows some of these consumers to buy a shared good, which costs less than pur-
chase of an individual good. Low income makes it impossible to either purchase
individually or contribute to a group. The low level of financial resources among this
group means that they rely on the public service and have a higher preference for
income, compared to the population mean. Their income is the distinct characteristic
motivating their choice of the public service.
In a model where consumers only maximise individual utility, shared purchase be-
comes a third way for those with a preference for an individual good (initial prefer-
ence), but find it becomes unaffordable. They can increase their utility by joining a
coalition. This explains why the transition to shared purchase is driven by individ-
ual owners able to choose a less expensive option, while use of the public service
remains almost constantly and involves the same share of consumers. Consumers
with the highest incomes will pay individually to satisfy their need and will not enter
a coalition. Consumers with the lowest level of income cannot afford any kind of
purchase and, hence, use the public service.
It is important, also, to recall that, while the utility of consumers opting for the in-
dividual purchase and the public service is determined mostly by the direct effect
of consumer characteristics (Figure 4.4), in the case of consumers maximising their
utility through shared purchase, the interaction among these characteristics that is
more important (Figure 4.3). This is because establishing a coalition requires a high
level of coordination and the characteristics of the individual consumer interact with
those of the others in the coalition.
Consumers opting for the shared purchase face lower costs compared to individual
purchasers and experience higher utility. However, since the choice of relying on the
public service implies no investment costs, agents choosing this alternative have the

























Notes: The bar charts show the average consumers’ cost (on the left) and utility (on the right), calcu-
lated over the final 240 time periods of the simulation runs. In black consumers that chose the shared
purchased, in grey the individual purchase and in light grey those choosing the public service. At the
top of each bar we indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4.9: Consumers’ cost and utility grouped by their consumption decision
Individual consumers have the lowest utility, but , based on their characteristics (see
Figure 4.8), this is the option that maximises their utility. Moving to shared purchase
or using the public service would make these consumers worse off. Consumers
that rely on the public service experience the highest utility. They pay only for use
of the service and congestion does not affect their utility since a total of around 40
consumers (about 20% of the population) still makes its value close to 1 (see Figure
4.1 and Eq.4.1).
4.3.6 Policy Interventions
Assuming a population with consumer characteristics that lead to some consumers
switching from individual to shared purchase, as discussed above, we can analyse
the product features that could be used by policy to increase the proportion of con-
sumers choosing shared ownership and reduce the number of goods produced and
sold. Starting from the model configuration in Table 4.3, we study the effect of vary-
ing the service unit price (pi), and the good sizes (S) and costs (I) that are more
likely to involve successful sharing.
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Unit prices
In assuming homogeneous prices, in the foregoing, we have studied whether the
same changes to the variable costs have an influence on consumer choice. How-
ever, we should also consider the effect policy interventions to regulate these prices
(taxes and subsidies), which would introduce price differences among the three op-
tions.
We investigate the role of heterogeneous unit prices for the three consumption op-
tions. The unit price is the variable cost, in all three options, of accessing the ser-
vice. In line, again, with the mobility example, if we measure demand in kilometres,
p1 (Eq.4.1) is the cost of a bus ticket covering a given zone, while p2 (Eq.4.4) and
p3 (Eq.4.5) refer to the variable costs (i.e., fuel, road taxes) of the purchased good.
To test the potential impact of policy interventions, we performed a sensitivity anal-
ysis on the three prices, for a population whose characteristics lead to a high ratio
of shared purchase (Table 4.3). We selected the sampling points via a NOLH DoE
where the three unitary prices vary between 2[1;2].
Figure 4.10, as expected from a comparison of the three utility equations (4.1, 4.4
and 4.5), shows that the number of sharing consumers increases with the unit price
of individual purchase (p2, chart (b)) and the reduction in the unit price of shared
purchase (p3, chart (c)). The price of the public service (p1 chart (a)) has no impact
on the consumer propensity to share. In other words, in our simple model, a tax that
doubles the cost of using a private good, or a subsidy that halves the cost of using a
shared good, increases the number of agents choosing the shared purchase by 74%
(from about 42 to 73, chart (d)) and reduces the number of individual consumers by
around 50%.
The unitary price of buying the service from the public provider has no effect on the
number of shared purchases. This confirms that, in our model, the sharing option
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(a) p1 (b) p2 (c) p3
(d) p1=1.5
Notes: Charts plot the results from the sensitivity analysis on the three unit prices of the three
consumption option. On the top we plot the direct impact of the three prices on the total number of
consumers that opt for the shared purchase, and 95% confidence intervals: (a) p1, (b) p2 and (c) p3.
At the bottom we plot the 3D response surfaces for p3 and p2 where p1=1.5.
Figure 4.10: Impact of unit prices on the number of consumers in coalition
reduces the use of individual goods without inducing more consumers who use the
public service, to purchase in a coalition. The results are similar (results not shown
here) for capacity of the general provider (Z). We find that, as the capacity of the
public service increases, more consumers use it, which significantly reduces the
number of individual purchases, but has no effect on shared purchase.
Good characteristics: Capacity and Cost
Some goods may be more suited to sharing than others. The decision to purchase
a good, individually or in group, may depend also on its capacity and cost. We have
discussed the important role of size, while cost (I) has been fixed based on the
results of the EE procedure (Section 4.3.3). To assess how both of these charac-
teristics influence consumer choice, we run a sensitivity analysis over S and I, for a
population with characteristics that lead to a high shared purchase ratio (Table 4.3,
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column (b)) and under favourable policy conditions where p1=1.5, p2=2 and p3=1. We
run a full factorial DoE for sensitivity analysis, where all combinations of good size,
S 2 [200; 1000], and cost, I 2 [600; 2000], are explored, at 25 levels.
Figure 4.11 plots the number of consumers for each of the three consumption op-
tions, for different combinations of good capacity and cost. The results are presented
on heat charts, where the x-axis measures the capacity of the good and the z-axis
its cost, and the number of consumers varies along the y-axis.






Notes: We plot 3D surface for the three consumption alternatives: (a) shared purchase, (b) individual
purchase and (c) public service. The x-axis measures the capacity of the good (S) and the z-axis
measure the cost of the good (I). The vertical axis plots the number of consumers, between 0 to 200:
the higher the surface the higher the number of consumers. Surfaces are also coloured following the
black-white scale of the legend (d): black indicates 0 consumers, white 200 consumers.
Figure 4.11: The effect of product’s capacity and cost on the three consumption options
The results show that, even in a population of consumers with a likely high proportion
of sharing consumers, and under the most favourable policy setting, the number of
sharing purchases depends on the characteristics of the good. Large sized goods,
regardless of their cost, are purchased exclusively individually (in line with our previ-
ous sensitivity analyses, Figure 4.4. Small and expensive goods are not purchased
at all: consumers rely on the public service, even if utility is reduced due to conges-
tion.
Shared purchase appeals to consumers in the case of a relatively low capacity good
whose cost increases with capacity: the number of shared consumers is maximised
when the cost is in the medium range and capacity is low-medium (initialisation in
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Table 4.3). Smaller goods are likely to appeal to coalitions and, especially, if these
goods cost less. This is because small goods favour the formation of small coalitions,
which allow relatively easy coordination of participants’ contributions.
The number of sharing consumers increases, also, for increasing good cost as long
as the size of the good does not become too large. In other words, as the cost of the
good increases, to prompt a coalition requires the size of the good to increase (but
at a lower rate), to allow a larger coalition (the highest level of I corresponds to the
biggest coalitions size, N=4). As already noted, a larger product capacity requires a
bigger consumer coalition, but this is deemed infeasible due to the potential costs of
coordination and free riding.
These results are important to inform policy interventions, aimed at promoting shared
purchase among consumers for given goods that are particularly polluting. There are
some good characteristics that make policy initiatives (such as changing the price)
not effective: in the case of goods that might be shared by many consumers, the
coordination costs mean that individual purchase is preferred to shared purchase,
regardless of the cost of the good or the price of the service. To promote the diffusion
of sharing practices related to the purchase of goods, and to reduce the number of
goods needed by reducing individual purchases, the best policy option might be to
focus on goods with low-medium capacity and medium cost. It may not be effective
to nudge people to choose shared purchase of very large products.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we developed a simple model in which heterogeneous consumers can
choose to consume the same service, offered by the public provider or based on
purchasing a good. The good can be purchased individually or in coalition with other
consumers. In the latter case, cost and use are shared among the consumers in
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the coalition, and the contribution of each participant is determined based on their
preferences, income and demand. The optimal choice for each consumer depends
on a number of product and consumer features and preferences – and how they are
distributed among the heterogeneous population. The public provider has limited
capacity, so the quality of its service depends on the number of its users, but its use
entails no additional cost; individual ownership of the good allows large capacity, but
at the cost of the price for purchasing the good; shared ownership is positioned in
between: the capacity (cost) is larger (higher) than in the case of the public service
and is smaller (lower) than in the case of individual purchase of the good.
We use the model to study the conditions under which, in the presence of a public
provider, shared purchase of a good is preferred to individual purchase if consumer
demand is not satisfied by the public provider. Replacing individual with shared
ownership has the potential to increase sustainability of consumption – by reducing
the number of goods produced that stand idle and which will need to be recycled –
and increases access to the same service for consumers with budget constraints.
Examples here include cars for commuting, washing machines, drills for DIY jobs,
and holiday accommodation.
In our model, consumer utility and consumer choice depend on the behaviour of
the other consumers in the same population, in the current and past periods: this
influences the utility of using the public service, and the formation of a coalition to
purchase and consume a shared good. These simple interactions generate complex
dynamics, which we analysed using an agent-based model and simulating emergent
properties for different initial conditions.
Despite the model’s simplicity, these interactions are complex. Since we had no
prior expectations about the consumer and product features which might influence
the distribution of consumer choices in the economy, and which might lead to lower
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individual consumption. We first studied the full parameter space of the model to
identify the product and consumer conditions inducing choice of the sharing op-
tion by at least one group of consumers. We identified the parameters with the
strongest impact on the number of consumers choosing shared purchase. These
include mainly consumers features, such as average preference in the population for
income and the sharing rules, demand and income, and size of the good that can be
purchased (which also determines the size and duration of the coalition). We ran a
global sensitivity analysis to study the impact of all potential combinations of those
parameters.
Our exploration of the whole parameter space showed that shared purchase emerges
in a relatively low income and high demand population, with somewhat higher prefer-
ences for consumption (compared to saving). We found, also, that coalitions emerge
in the case of a medium or small good; a too large good requires a large coalition,
which makes it difficult to find agreement and incurs higher coordination costs.
Next, to explore the consumer and product features that maximise uptake of shared
ownership as opposed to individual ownership, we ran a second sensitivity analysis
on this smaller population, defined by a smaller range of the parameters. The results
confirmed the above individual and product features. We found, also, that consumers
that decide to purchase a good in a group, give careful consideration to the division
rules among participants, based on consumption and monetary contributions. We
found some interesting trade offs between the consumption and sharing preferences:
consumers in coalitions need to satisfy a relatively high demand, so they enter a
coalition if the use of the good is decided proportionally to demand and, especially,
if they have a higher preference for consumption. We found that those conditions
varied for varying sizes of the good purchased.
Overall, we show that, while it is relatively simple to determine the features of con-
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sumers that prefer the public service or individual purchase, emergence of the shar-
ing purchase, depends on the interactions among several consumer characteristic
for all consumers.
We examined the configuration that maximises the number of sharing users, to study
the transition to shared ownership, its impact on the number of goods consumed, and
the impact of policies. We found that, in a population where ownership and consump-
tion choices are based on maximising individual utility, shared purchase replaces
individual consumption, but does not affect the number of consumers of the public
service. The sharing alternative is preferred to individual purchase by consumers
who establish sharing groups to share the cost of purchasing a less expensive good
of low-medium capacity. Sharing purchase, ownership and consumption of a good
reduces inefficient individual utilisation of resources. In fact, under specific popula-
tion characteristics, shared purchase reduces the overall number of products in the
economy, allowing consumers to satisfy their demand, maximise utility and increase
access to goods, while enabling a more sustainable model of consumption.
Finally, by exploiting the population configuration that maximises uptake of the shared
option, we explored a potential policy instrument, which might influence consumer
behaviour and reduce the number of goods purchased, by modifying the price of
the different options using taxes and subsidies. Reducing the relative price of using
the shared good with respect to the individual good, can push more consumers to
share, but the price of the public service does not affect the choice made by sharing
consumers. We found that the capacity and cost of the good are critical and our
results suggest that policies may not be effective for influencing uptake of shared
purchase for all goods. Consumer groups are unlikely to emerge in the case of very
large goods since this would require very large coalitions, which would be difficult to
coordinate. However, the likelihood of joining a coalition and purchasing a joint good
increases with low-medium size of the good, regardless of its cost. In fact, as the
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cost increases, consumers may find it more convenient to share the purchase.
Note that, to avoid results being driven by sustainability preferences the model does
not include consumer preferences related to sustainability. Our results indicate that,
even in the absence of sustainability concerns, some consumers might still find shar-
ing a good more attractive and, especially, in the presence of policies that make it
more convenient.
To put these findings in context, let us consider the case of shared mobility in an
urban context. Individual ownership and use of private cars may not be sustainable
and, in many cities, generate negative environmental externalities (Camagni et al.
2002). Catering for all mobility needs by public transport is difficult and, in most
cases, public transport provision is inefficient (Murray 2001, McLeod et al. 2017).
Buses, trams and subways often do not extend to all urban neighbourhoods and sub-
urbs and are stretched to capacity in periods of high demand such as rush hours.
Individual car ownership is among the most frequent options to satisfy travel needs,
such as commuting, but is not affordable for everyone (Sheller & Urry 2000, Urry
2006). Car-sharing schemes, already operating in some large cities, are aimed at
reducing use of private cars by increasing efficient utilisation of shared cars. How-
ever, although these systems allow greater flexibility, they are more similar to public
transport, since users pay per use (as in the case of buses or the metro), and access
to shared cars may be susceptible to congestion.
The possibility for groups of people to organise themselves in communities and to
purchase a car collectively, has several advantages. In addition to reducing the in-
dividual cost of satisfying travel needs, compared to the individual ownership, it re-
duces the number of cars, thereby, increasing the sustainability of the city. However,
there may be a need for appropriate policy interventions to promote shared purchase
of cars. Regulators could propose incentives or lower tariffs related to shared cars
169
(e.g., parking authorisations, refuelling, insurance, etc.) or could increase the cost of
individual ownership and use (e.g., congestion taxes). The promotion of shared own-
ership and use of cars might persuade users to choose this consumption alternative,
while, at the same time, reducing demand for public transport and, thus, congestion.
Of course, increasing the capacity of public transport would have an even greater
impact on reducing the number of individual cars, but many users may continue to
need flexibility with respect to space and time and, especially, those living in areas
with less efficient or safe public services.
Nevertheless, our results suggest that tailored policy interventions could be effective
for persuading the small consumer niche that would benefit most from shared pur-
chase of a car. That is, consumers with relatively lower incomes and high demand.
In many large cities, these characteristics corresponds users in suburban areas with
many commuters and reduced access to public transport. Shared purchase could
enable consumers in these areas to reduce their transportation costs and increase
their transport efficiency. Shared purchase is also more inclusive.
In practical terms, shared purchase of a car would need to be accompanied by spe-
cific instruments, which, so far, are not available. It would need appropriate legal
conditions to facilitate group purchase, including shared car insurance, and market
conditions that would promote shared purchase as a viable option. Shared purchase
would open market opportunities for the car manufacturing industry and enable new
business models to accompany the rapid transformation already happening in this
sector. For example, if the estimates are correct, new autonomous or driverless cars
will soon be available in the market, but at prices which will be prohibitive for the av-
erage user. These new types of vehicles have the potential to satisfy large demand,
to have a positive impact on urban mobility and to enable flexible use. To increase






5.1 Summary and Key Findings
In this thesis, I studied whether sharing the consumption and ownership of goods
could contribute to sustainability. Potentially, shared consumption should be more
efficient since the same consumer needs are satisfied by a smaller amount of good,
which reduces the environmental impact. Shared ownership of a good can promote
more affordable access to essential services, since it offers a cheaper and higher
utility consumption option and increased inclusiveness towards ownership. More-
over, efficient model of consumption may also alleviate the pressure on the public
sector to provide those essential services.
The literature considers different models of shared consumption and ownership,
ranging from public goods to club goods and shared private goods. For example,
the sharing economy literature studies shared consumption of goods and highlights
more efficient consumption. However, consumption models based on the sharing
economy are characterised by individual ownership of a good, which can lead to
polarisation and concentration of ownership and accumulation of resources in the
hands of a few, and increased inequality. The literature on fractional ownership stud-
ies cases of shared consumption and shared ownership among consumers, but fo-
cuses on luxury goods that do not provide essential services.
My doctoral research project has examined how the sharing of both consumption
and ownership of a good could enable sustainable models of consumption. I investi-
gate whether these models can provide the benefits related to shared consumption,
discussed in the sharing economy literature, while reducing the risks of inequality,
based on the practices discussed in the fractional ownership literature.
If consumers organise to adopt a shared good and to share both consumption and
ownership, sharing can contribute to sustainable consumption. Therefore, it is im-
portant to understand the conditions that lead consumers to share. We need, first,
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to understand how groups of consumers form with the aim of collective adoption of
a shared good. We need, also, to understand whether diffusion benefits consumers
so that they have an incentive to share.
Consumption and ownership models related to shared goods include alternative op-
tions for consumers to satisfy essential needs. For example, energy needs are satis-
fied by the centralised energy grid, but consumers may organise in a group to adopt
a Decentralised Energy System (DES), allowing them to produce and consume inde-
pendently the energy they need. Consumers can satisfy their travel needs by using
public transport or buying and owning a private car. However, they could also choose
to organise in a group to share the purchase and use of a car, thereby increasing
consumption utility at a lower consumption cost for the same level of demand satis-
faction. In addition, the whole population could benefit from the diffusion of shared
goods that are sustainable (such as DES which have a high share of renewable en-
ergy technologies) or a reduction in the number of individual goods that are used
inefficiently (such as private cars which are idle for most of the time).
My interest in studying the impact of shared consumption and ownership on sus-
tainability, drawing on different streams of work on sharing, has highlighted the need
to understand how sharing groups are formed. This has led to my three research
questions:
• RQ1: Do fractional ownership and sharing economy differ, and what are
their conceptual and theoretical roots?
• RQ2: How does the diffusion of a shared good coevolve with the forma-
tion of a consumer coalition?
• RQ3: Do consumers shift from an individual good to a shared good?
Chapter 2 addressed RQ1, based on bibliometric analysis of publications on frac-
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tional ownership and the sharing economy and how sharing is conceptualised and
theorised in both of these literature streams. Shedding lights on the literature on frac-
tional ownership reveals aspects of the literature on sharing economy that suggest
reasons why this body of work does not propose models based on shared consump-
tion and ownership. The sharing economy literature is based on the notion that
consumers engage in sharing practices motivated by the sense of ownership they
feel when they buy individual temporary access to the good, when needed. Goods
are owned individually, which gives the owners rights of exclusion over the common
resource (i.e., anticommons). Further, consumers do not establish sharing groups to
exploit the benefit of cost-sharing because the sharing economy provides them with
access to the good at a lower price than if they were purchased by the group.
What is missing from the sharing economy literature is any investigation of the role of
shared ownership and the benefits it provides to consumers. The properties of shar-
ing economy and fractional ownership can be derived from the dialogue between
these two literature streams. This reveals the conditions that give consumers alter-
native access to the good, as in the sharing economy, by exploiting the (social and
economic) benefits of shared ownership of the good. One example is the discussion
in the sharing economy literature of grassroots innovation, which links to discussion
of local energy communities in the fractional ownership literature. Sharing commu-
nities, such as energy communities, are established to adopt a sustainable good
that is not affordable by the average individual consumer. The diffusion of shared
goods adopted in a coalition of consumers is the focus of Chapter 3 which addresses
RQ2.
I draw on the case of a DES, whose diffusion is desirable because of the environ-
mental (use of renewable energy technologies) and technological (more efficient use
and production of energy) benefits. A local energy community is necessary in order
to share the cost of ownership of a DES. Shared consumption of its output has the
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potential to increase consumer utility since users satisfy their energy demands at a
lower cost than buying from the centralised energy grid. The Agent Based Model
(ABM) simulations show the complex interplay between coalition formation and dif-
fusion of a shared good (such as a DES). Diffusion is conditioned by the preliminary
formation of a coalition, which, in turn, affects diffusion since adoption changes the
structure of the social network among consumers. Consumers form a coalition to
adopt a shared good to satisfy a demand that could be satisfied by the public ser-
vice. In this case the high price of the shared good is affordable only by purchase in
a group. Shared goods that are indivisible and non-movable, must be located close
to the final users, and replacement is not possible.
Thus coalition formation is a necessary condition for the adoption of a shared good
and, at the same time, is also an obstacle to its complete diffusion. The results show
that there can be widespread adoption of a shared good, despite the need to estab-
lish a coalition beforehand. The smaller the neighbourhood that the shared good can
serve, the lower will be the share of adopters. Agents that do not enter the coalition
at an early stage remain isolated, outside the already formed coalition and too dis-
tant from agents not yet in a coalition. This geographic constraint limits the spread of
information about the new shared good and hampers its diffusion before consumers
have been able to assess the convenience related to joining a coalition.
Shared goods can reduce the number of individual goods, which increases sustain-
ability, as in the example of private car ownership and congestion in urban areas. In
Chapter 4, I study the reduction in the number of individual goods via models based
on both shared consumption and shared ownership. Chapter 4 extends the ABM
model proposed in Chapter 3 and addresses RQ3. The model relaxes some of the
model assumptions and studies a (shared) good that is movable and affordable in-
dividually, but which depreciates and, hence, needs to be replaced. I explored the
whole parameter space of the model to identify the conditions under which consumer
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characteristics and the characteristics of the shared good make sharing a viable al-
ternative to ownership of an individual good, in the presence of a public service.
The transition from consumption models based on individual ownership to models of
shared ownership is not rapid. Under the model assumptions, wealthier consumers
will continue to purchase goods individually, regardless of the provision of the same
service by a public provider or the option to share the purchase with others. At the
same time, low-income consumers lack sufficient income to invest in either individ-
ual or shared ownership. However, there is a niche of consumers that previously
were individual owners of the good (hence, those with sufficient income), that opt
for the shared good in order to save money and increase consumption utility. The
model findings show that the transition to shared ownership is faster in the presence
of policies (taxation) that increase the consumption price of the individual good or
(incentives) that lower the consumption price of the shared good. However, policy
may be ineffective if it targets goods which do not promote coalition formation, that
is, goods with high capacity that require large coalitions which are more difficult to
coordinate and manage.
5.2 Contribution to the Literature
This thesis contributes to the literature on the sharing economy by studying how to
exploit its positive aspects without increasing inequality. I draw simultaneously on
both the sharing economy and the fractional ownership literatures, to establish a
conceptual base to investigate sharing practices that are more sustainable. Sharing
practices that combine both shared consumption and shared ownership can be more
sustainable since the shared good is used more efficiently, which reduces its environ-
mental impact. Also, consumers gain more affordable access to goods that provide
essential services which increases inclusiveness and equity of ownership.
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This thesis contributes to the literature on diffusion by studying the adoption of goods,
driven by a collective adoption decision and not by an individual decision as in the
traditional diffusion models. It contributes, also, by showing that the collective adop-
tion decision is subject to the previous formation of a coalition of consumers, not part
of a pre-existing group, but which come together with the aim of sharing consump-
tion and ownership. The novelty with respect to existing modelling literature is that I
propose an evolutionary ABM to study the diffusion of a shared good in a consumer
coalition, by combining elements from innovation diffusion, collective action, coalition
formation and network formation theories.
I use a novel global sensitivity analysis method which allows exploration of the whole
parameter space of the model and identification of where diffusion in coalition is
more frequent. The implementation of these new methodological tools contributes
to handle the typical complexity of social systems (Kirman 1992, Arthur 1999) that
is modelled in highly parameterised ABM, which are difficult to analyse. That is, the
difficulty to analyse simultaneously the combined effect of several parameters on the
model outcome. The use of the global sensitivity analysis to determine the parame-
ter space to investigate, allows to better choose the space where the phenomenon
under scrutiny may occur and is more relevant. This is what economists call a niche,
that is conditions under which certain changes may emerge in the society, hence
where a favourable combination of factors determine the possibility of the innovation
to emerge and prosper.
This is the case of the two specific empirical phenomena that I model in this thesis.
DES are energy infrastructures that already exist and can be deployed widely if sup-
ported by a favourable policy framework. The latter considers those infrastructures
pivotal to the green transition, being instrumental to move from a fossil-fuel based
centralised energy system to a decentralised one based on higher share of renew-
able energy technologies, key elements in DES. This thesis contributes to show that,
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in a favourable policy and technology context, DES can be diffused via community-
ownership, under given conditions. These conditions may be crucial for policy mak-
ers to design policies to incentivise adoption.
The second phenomena that I analyse in the thesis is the practice of sharing a
smaller good, such as car, but that does not concern car sharing schema running
under the sharing economy. In this thesis I contribute to the concept of sharing a
single car among a group of consumers (e.g., friends, neighbours or households),
which is a long-standing practice in relation to several goods that cannot be afforded
by a single user, and whose service can be shared (as they often remain idle). In a
regime based on private ownership and public transport, I show that sharing a car
can be a suitable option for a niche of consumers in the population, which gains ex-
tra benefit, such as increased utility and lower travel expenditure. In particular, those
owning a car individually in the past are the consumers more inclined to share a car
than those using the public transport, and they will do it in small sharing groups. This
shows that the decision to share a car is not always a direct substitute of the decision
to use public transport. This may be a consequence of the fact that not all individuals
have a driving license or have monetary resource to make a purchase, hence they
have the public transport as the only viable transportation option.
This thesis also contributes to the growing literature on sustainable consumption, in
line to the Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations proposing to
do more and better with less. I show that it is possible to satisfy the same consump-
tion needs with less resources keeping (affordable) access to essential goods and
services to all, even when, as in the model, consumers are not driven by sustain-
ability concerns nor preferences. The thesis shows that fractional ownership has the
potential to lead to higher sustainability. Nevertheless, it is important to understand
that these sustainability effects only concern a restricted part of the economy, and
therefore have a small impact on emissions. In this context, it is important to consider
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the rebound effect that reduce the sustainability benefits when savings generated by
fractional ownership are spent for more consumption (Binswanger 2001, Sorrell &
Dimitropoulos 2008). In fact, consumers that shift to another convenient consump-
tion option (e.g., decentralised energy or shared car) may decide to increase their
consumption at the same total cost of the previous option. This would be interesting
to test by extending the model to a more dynamic and endogenous change in agents’
demand.
5.3 Policy Implications
The findings from this thesis suggest several policy implications about how sharing
the consumption and ownership of goods can contribute to sustainability.
Improved understanding of models of shared consumption and ownership
For policy makers and organisations interested in facilitating models of shared con-
sumption and ownership, this thesis should provide a better understanding of the
foundations of the sharing economy. Chapter 2 acknowledges and reinforces the
sustainability nature of sharing practices and highlights the importance of policies
and strategies to promote not just shared consumption, but also shared ownership
in line with the principles of cooperation and empowerment. The findings shed light,
also, on the existence of a common area where the properties and benefits of shared
consumption and shared ownership are combined. Policy makers should focus on
this when developing new measures to promote and benefit from the sharing econ-
omy. They should aim, also, at reducing the risks of ownership polarisation and
inequality through the promotion of social structures intrinsic to collective psycho-
logical ownership. Policy frameworks supporting community energy initiatives, such
as grassroots innovations for sustainability, are an example of how governments
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could promote more sustainable and socially fair models of ownership and consump-
tion.
Improve diffusion in consumers’ coalitions with higher people coordination
The findings in Chapter 3 show that diffusion of a shared good can be hindered
by the problems related to coordination of coalition members. This could result in
the stakeholders in the sharing economy to reconsider the role of digital platforms,
which, currently, are the main means of mediating transactions between consumers
and providers. Platforms could play an important role in facilitating the formation of
groups of consumers willing to share both consumption and ownership of essential
goods and enabling preliminary matching of consumers’ characteristics (e.g., prefer-
ences and needs), and connecting the provider of the good to be shared. This would
create a space for new business models for service providers and offer consumers
additional consumption options, to obtain the maximum benefits from the sharing
economy. Policy makers should provide regulatory support (i.e., data gathering and
sharing rules) for the development of platforms that meet the coordination needs of
sharing groups and allow providers to supply the shared good to be adopted by the
group.
Increase affordable access with sharing communities
The results of the agent-based simulations, in Chapters 3 and 4, show that the adop-
tion of a shared good in a coalition could increase affordable access to goods for
essential services. This highlights the importance of bottom-up community-led ini-
tiatives to diffuse sustainable models of shared consumption and ownership. There-
fore, in the context of the transition towards a more sustainable economy, the mod-
els developed in this thesis suggest that policy makers should stimulate citizen en-
gagement and consumer empowerment to increase affordable access to goods.
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For example, understanding the impact of community-led initiatives for the adop-
tion of shared goods, would support policies related to the development of rural ar-
eas, where shared ownership may help to reduce energy use, transport and digital
poverty. Supporting the formation of rural communities could provide less advan-
taged and more vulnerable consumers with access to essential goods and services,
in more affordable and sociable ways. Sharing resources, as if they were commons,
can reduce the isolation of rural communities and give them the possibility of cheaper
and more sustainable consumption solutions.
Assessment of network, consumers and goods’ characteristics to improve dif-
fusion
The ABMs developed in this thesis can be used to assess the impact of the network
characteristics on the diffusion of not movable and expensive shared goods (Chapter
3), and the effect of the characteristics of consumers and goods on the diffusion of
less expensive and movable shared goods (Chapter 4). The findings suggest that,
in order to promote sharing initiatives and to diffuse models of shared consumption
and ownership, it is important to consider the type of shared good which the commu-
nity wants to adopt. To support the diffusion of goods, such as DESs, policy makers
should remove the barriers to diffusion by focusing on consumers that are proximate
and can easily connect to each other. Moreover, the adoption of movable goods,
such as shared cars as an alternative to private cars, could be boosted by targeting
smaller coalitions of consumers with sufficient budget to invest in a common pur-
chase and that have a high demand for the service. This implies that understanding
consumer preferences and characteristics in relation to the shared good that pro-
vides the service and which they want to adopt, is pivotal to the implementation of
successful policy initiatives.
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Insights into the impact of pricing policies
Chapter 4 provides some useful insights into the impact of monetary benefits, such
as cheaper prices, related to the consumption of the shared good, on the consumers’
utility from sharing. The results show, also, that a tax on the individual consumption
of a good can increase the number of shared goods. These findings should help
policy makers to assess the costs and benefits of pricing policies. For example,
promotion of the shared ownership and consumption of cars or of hand drills may
require different policies. Reducing the number of private cars is high on many na-
tional and international policy agendas as a way of increasing sustainability in urban
areas and improving living conditions. However, the current high diffusion of pri-
vate cars means that monetary policies to encourage consumption and ownership
of shared cars would be expensive. In contrast, policy initiatives to reduce individual
ownership of goods, such as hand drills, would be fairly inexpensive, but would not
lead to increased sustainability. Therefore, while the latter policy measures would be
cheaper, the former are more desirable because they would have a greater effect on
sustainability. Policy makers should focus on the diffusion of shared goods with the
best cost-benefit ratio.
5.4 Limitations and Future Research
Future research could address some of the limitations of this thesis and analyse
other aspects.
Network geography and links
The geography and the connections among consumers need further study. Although
I examined both regular (Chapter 3) and random networks (Chapter 4), all agents are
homogeneous in term of their geographic constraint, meaning that all agents always
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have the same number of possible links. To simulate real life social networks, each
agent could have a different geography in relation to the numbers of links. Making
the formation of the social network endogenous to the different individual links, would
allow analysis of the role of hubs in the coevolution between coalition formation and
diffusion, for instance. Hubs are network nodes characterised by higher numbers of
links. Are hubs enablers or inhibitors of the diffusion of shared goods in coalitions?
The model could be extended by characterising the type of link associated with each
agent. This would allow investigation of the impact of agents’ social proximity on
the formation of coalitions and diffusion of shared goods. Does the type of social
connection (i.e., the links between relatives, neighbours, friends or strangers) change
the willingness to share and collaborate? Studying both different agents’ geography
and types of links could provide useful information for policy makers related to ways
to boost shared ownership and consumption.
Empirical bases for consumers’ characteristics and preferences
The findings from this research show that consumption preferences and the con-
sumer demand for a service have a strong effect on the adoption of a shared good.
We know, also, that consumer income affects consumption choices and attitudes
to sharing. The model could be extended by adding parameters related to other
consumer characteristics. These could be latent variables (i.e., consumer percep-
tions, attitudes and lifestyles) and socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., consumer
age, education level, household composition). Do socio-demographic characteris-
tics affect consumer connectivity and coordination? How does this in turn affect the
diffusion of the shared good in a coalition? To address these questions, it would
be necessary to complete and test the model with empirical data. Future research
could identify pilot projects where community-led initiatives are implemented to share
common resources. For example, it would be interesting to collect data on local en-
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ergy communities related to the adoption of a shared good in a coalition. Surveys
of consumers’ characteristics and preferences could provide empirical information to
calibrate the agent-based simulations. Such empirical experiments should be run in
various geographical contexts and in relation to various types of shared goods.
Coalitions of coalitions
The ABMs developed in this thesis aim to simulate the collective adoption decision
process of a single good that has to be shared (i.e., owned and consumed) by a
group of consumers that coalesces beforehand in a stable coalition. This is a nar-
row example of sharing practice that may occur in small groups of consumers. But
these models may be further expanded to study other important phenomena, like the
emerging of car sharing cooperative in Switzerland and in Germany. In both coun-
tries, car sharing developed in the form of small users’ cooperatives that owned one
or more cars were membership allowed the use the shared cars. Over time, small
cooperatives have joined together assets and members, growing to the point of hav-
ing big national car sharing cooperatives. Therefore, an important extension to this
model of coalition formation and adoption and diffusion of shared goods would be (i)
to allow coalition formation co-owning multiple items of the same good, and (ii) to al-
low the formation of coalitions of existing coalitions. The first extension would enable
coalition members to purchase more than one good in order to satisfy a higher de-
mand, under the condition that this option will make all participants better off. Once
a number of coalitions are established, the second extension could be modelled by
reopening the options to the group to allow for the entry of new members, includ-
ing entire coalitions. This would make the model even more dynamic and realistic,
accommodating several more options of sharing.
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Policy Scenarios
Another direction for future research would be to study the contribution to policy of
the adoption and diffusion of a shared good in a coalition. In recent years, policy
initiatives have been proposed to support the formation of local communities since
these boost citizens’ engagement and consumers’ empowerment and contribute to
the energy transition. It would be interesting to define future energy scenarios and to
set specific targets for the contribution of communities to the adoption of renewable
energy technologies. To what extent does the diffusion in a coalition contribute to
energy targets? Future research could analyse whether and how the diffusion of
shared goods in coalitions would contribute to those scenarios/targets, and whether
nudges (to change agents’ consumption preferences) or pricing schemes, could con-
tribute to faster achievement of those objectives.
Legal Standards for Shared Goods
Transfer of the ownership of goods is legally regulated by transactions in the mar-
ket. Individual adoption is determined by the consumer that buys the good from a
provider that sells the good and transfers the ownership. In the sharing economy,
although there is no transfer of ownership, the market regulates consumers’ access
to goods that providers make available for a short time for a rental payment. What
is the legal standard to sell and purchase shared goods in consumers’ coalition?
Therefore, future research could study the legal standards that support the diffusion
of shared goods characterised by both shared consumption and ownership. This
is important because, unlike individual purchase and the sharing economy, which
involve exchanges with individual consumers, shared goods need to be purchased
and owned by a group of consumers. Consumers may be more reluctant to join a
sharing group if there is no clear basis for regulating the sharing practices.
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A.1 Annex to Chapter 2
A.1.1 Data Clean-Up Process
To highlight the issues encountered in the dataset of publication, I will consider
the manuscript by Russel Belk published in 2014, entitled “You are what you can
access: Sharing and collaborative consumption online” (Journal of Business Re-
search vol. 67, p. 1595). Based on this bibliographic information, this publica-
tion should be identified uniquely in the network as a node labelled with the string
Belk R(2014)V67:P1595. Unfortunately, references to this publication are reported
in various ways as shown in Table A1. If raw data are used with no further data har-
monisation, the six CR for this publication are represented by four different network
nodes, each labelled with a different string. The data cleaning process aimed to
harmonise bibliographic information for a given publication in order to obtain a single
node labelled uniquely. In the example, all six references are harmonised with the
string in the last column of the last raw.
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Author Year Journal Vol Page String
Belk R. 2014 J BUS RES Belk R(2014)
Belk R. 2014 J BUSINESS RES Belk R(2014)
Belk R. 2014 J BUSINESS RES V67 Belk R(2014)V67
Belk Russell 2014 J BUS RES P1595 Belk R(2014)P1595
Belk R 2014 J BUS RES V67 P1595 Belk R(2014)V67:P1595
Belk Russell 2014 J BUS RES V67 P1595 Belk R(2014)V67:P1595
Table A1: Belk’s publication as cited in different ways
A.1.2 False Negative
The historical expansion of the citation network via search communities with false
negatives is summarised in Figure A1. Circular nodes represent publications (CP)
downloaded using keywords search. Triangular and square nodes (CR) represent
works cited by circular nodes. Square nodes are identified as key publications based
on the high number of citations. These are transformed to CP, meaning that a fur-
ther search was run to extract their CR, visualised in the figure as diamond-shaped
nodes.
Figure A1: Citation network structure (Batagelj et al. 2017, p.506)
A.1.3 Traversal Counts and Key-Route Main-Path
Figure A2 illustrates three ways to select the main-path in a network based on traver-
sal counts of the links between nodes. The traversal count of the link B-E has the
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value 4 since there are 4 paths going through this link: B-E-F-H, B-E-G-H, B-E-G-I
and B-E-G-J. The local main-path starts from the source nodes (A and B) and goes
to the sink nodes (H, I and J), following the links with the highest traversal counts.
The global main-path selects the paths with the highest sum of traversal counts. The
key-route main-path first selects the links with the highest traversal counts, for exam-
ple, those with values higher than or equal to 4, then continues towards the source
and sink nodes by going through those links with the highest traversal counts.
Figure A2: Search Path Count: local (top-left), global (top-right) and key-route (bottom) main-path
(Xiao et al. 2014, p.596-597)
A.1.4 Preprint Transformation
Figure A3 illustrates how preprint transformation modifies the network and the links
among publications (nodes) citing each other in the same year. This transformation
added two preprint publications to the publications that cite each other and were
published in the same year. The original publications now cite their own preprint and
the preprint version of the other publication.
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Figure A3: Preprint transformation (Batagelj 2003, p.9)
A.1.5 Labels of Clusters Identified via the Co-Word Analysis
Table A2 and Table A3 present the list of cluster labels identified by the Leiden algo-
rithm. These are based on the top three most frequent terms in publication titles and
abstracts. The table reports, in order from left to the right, the label of the cluster,
the total number of citations, the number of nodes (or publications) and their ratio for
each cluster.
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Label Cit. Node Ratio Top 3 terms per cluster Occur- Rele-
rences vance
ESOP 246 24 10.25 Employee Stock Ownership Plan 9 1.29
ESOP 12 1.24
Firm 13 1.10
Employee 910 50 18.20 Effect 17 1.31
Ownership Employee Ownership 28 1.16
Study 16 0.53
Theory of Firm 530 43 12.33 Ownership 27 1.05
Theory 19 1.05
Firm 20 0.89
Psychological 374 28 13.36 Psychological Ownership 16 1.29
Ownership Ownership 16 1.10
Organisation 16 0.61
Productivity 675 44 15.34 Firm 28 1.40
Effect Productivity 15 1.21
Effect 21 1.18
Commons 95 10 9.50 Common 5 1.33
Resource 5 0.83
Tragedy 3 0.83
Ownership 550 36 15.28 Ownership 17 1.43
Control Firm 17 0.91
Control 11 0.66
Competitive 277 31 8.94 Competitive Effect 5 2.15
Effect Effect 10 1.25
Mutual Fund 7 1.19
Timeshare 207 34 6.09 Study 21 1.39
Timeshare 14 0.98
Timeshare Industry 14 0.64
Participation 117 16 7.31 Firm 6 1.62
Evidence 6 1.58
Financial Participation 6 0.82
Social Capital 58 6 9.67 Firm 3 1.00
Social Capital 4 1.00
Trust 3 1.00
Governance 92 14 6.57 Internal Governance 2 3.93
Market Economy 2 1.98
Incidence 2 0.96
Business Group 80 11 7.27 Business Group 2 2.69
Chile 2 2.69
Evidence 2 2.69
Property Right 175 15 11.67 Resource 8 1.39
Property 7 1.37
Property Right 5 0.24
Energy 78 15 5.20 Community 11 1.44
Community Renewable Energy 9 0.98
Paper 6 0.58
Table A2: Labels of clusters in FO literature identified via co-word analysis
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Label Cit. Node Ratio Top 3 terms per cluster Occur- Rele-
rences vance
Framing Sharing 6740 113 59.65 Economy 78 1.71
Economy Study 56 1.35
Sharing 41 0.85
Hospitality 3217 94 34.22 Study 64 1.54
Airbnb 58 1.43
Accommodation 38 0.58
Carsharing 1547 67 23.09 Car Sharing 23 2.25
Car 44 1.54
Carsharing 32 1.23
Possession 593 27 21.96 Consumer 12 1.23
Article 11 1.07
Possession 9 0.70
Labour 320 27 11.85 Worker 19 1.27
Work 19 1.13
Platform 16 0.60
Trust 995 48 20.73 Trust 40 1.76
Model 24 1.12
Study 25 0.99
Acceptance 439 19 23.11 Order 3 2.93
User Acceptance 4 2.04
Usage 5 1.68
Platform 670 33 20.30 Platform 23 1.43
Economy Economy 13 0.78
Firm 13 0.78
Review 320 20 16.00 Review 16 1.41
Study 15 1.41
Mouth 9 0.18
Business Model 465 28 16.61 Business Model 26 1.44
Literature 15 1.13
Firm 11 0.44
Product Service 377 24 15.71 Product Service System 18 1.52
System Pss 15 1.37
Consumption 15 0.61
Access Ownership 324 18 18.00 Access 11 1.29
Service 10 1.02
Ownership 8 0.69
Innovation 218 18 12.11 Article 7 1.22
Change 10 1.22
Innovation 9 0.56
Platform 686 33 20.79 Study 19 1.37
Paper 12 0.82
Platform 16 0.82
Rating 337 19 17.74 Airbnb 6 1.49
Rating 7 1.49
Ebay 6 0.02
Table A3: Labels of clusters in SE literature identified via co-word analysis
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A.2 Annex to Chapter 3
A.2.1 Properties of the Utility Function
The utility function related to the shared option (Ui2, Eq.3.6) includes two parameters,
↵i and  i, allowing for the linear combination of three elements. The first element,
di
di+D i
, is the approximate percentage of the total service, S, provided by the shared
good and consumed by agent i in coalition (see Eq.3.8). The second, xixi+X i , is the
approximate percentage of the value I of the shared good, purchased by agent i in
coalition through the monetary contribution (xi, see Eq.3.7). The third element, 1N ,
represents the equal split of the service based on the number of coalition members.
Then Eq.3.6 can also be written as:
(A1)
Ui2(ei; ci2; di;D i; xi;X i;N ; ✓i;↵i;  i) =








Eq.A1 implies that, by neglecting the effect of ↵ and  , the agent’s utility function in
coalition, along with the money saved from individual income (first part of the equa-
tion), depends on the linear combination of (i) the individual demand for the service,
(ii) the return from the common purchase (total service produced, di + D i, divided
by the total cost spent to purchase the shared good, xi + X i) multiplied by the in-
dividual monetary contribution committed in the common purchase, and (iii) the total
service produced by the shared good split equally among coalition members.
Figure A4 shows how the parameters of the utility function, cœeteris paribus, influ-
ence the agent’s utility in coalition (Ui2 vertical axis) and the monetary contribution
(xi horizontal axis), and their relation.





Figure A4: Impact of model variables on monetary contribution and utility in coalition
saving), while a low level of ✓i indicates a higher preference to consume (demand
satisfaction). When ✓i=1, the utility depends only on the income saved. In the oppo-
site case, when ✓i=0, agent utility depends only on consumption. When the prefer-
ence for income is high (high ✓i, and the preference for consumption is low), cœteris
paribus, an agent in coalition maximises its utility (Ui2) by reducing the individual
monetary contribution (xi). When ✓i is lower (hence, a higher preference for con-
sumption), the agents in coalition are willing to contribute more in order to maximise
utility.
The relation between di and xi and Ui2 is similar. A higher demand raises the cost
(ci2=dip2), reducing the contribution that maximises utility. Instead, agents in the
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coalition with higher incomes (ei) are willing to contribute more compared to those
with lower incomes. This is because the savings are higher if the income is higher,
and utility increases even though the contribution is higher, cœteris paribus.
↵i and  i influence individual utility and contribution in opposite directions. With
higher (lower) values of ↵i ( i), utility reaches its maximum at a low level of monetary
contribution. This is because ↵i measures the importance given by the agent to the
proportional division rule based on consumption. The higher the ↵i, the higher the
importance assigned to the fact that the agent is using only part of the service pro-
vided by the shared good. Therefore, as ↵i increases, utility decreases. Parameter
↵i captures the individual perception of the attitude to sharing; an agent agrees to
share use with others, but, at the same time, is reluctant to limit its own consump-
tion.
 i instead measures the importance given by the individual agent to the proportional
division rule based on contribution. A higher value indicates a preference for con-
suming a portion of own income while owning and using part of the shared good.
Also, a higher  i signals that the agents give lower relevance to the number of coali-
tion members. As a result, individuals with high  i are willing to contribute more to
the common purchase, due to their higher interest in sharing the cost proportionally
with others. With respect to coalition size (N ), individuals participating in smaller
coalitions increase their utility by contributing more than in larger coalitions.
The last three terms are also straightforward. The higher the unit price (p2) of the
service in coalition, the lower the utility. The higher the other members’ total contri-
bution (X i), the lower the individual contribution, and the higher the other members’
total demand (D i), the lower the individual contribution. These latter two character-
istics, in combination with other factors in the utility function, might induce members
to free-ride.
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A.2.2 Example of Coalition Formation
Here, we provide an illustrative example of the co-evolution of coalition formation
and diffusion. The initial parameters are set as in Table A4. For simplicity, it is
assumed that initiators can only choose one product. Agents are heterogeneous
only in respect to their demand (di), while all the other parameters (ei, ✓i1, ↵i and  i)
are set equal for all agents. Each agent has different cost and utility in relation to the










Table A4: Illustrative example: initial parameters
Agent 1 2 3 4
di 30 55 35 45
ci1 300 550 350 450
Ui1 145 157 151 157
Table A5: Illustrative example: agents’ parameters
For graphical convenience, the example includes only eight agents, located in a reg-
ular lattice. Each has four spatially limited potential links in their own neighbourhood.
Panel (a) in Figure A5 shows an initiator agent in the population.
At every time step, the initiator forges a link with one of its available neighbours that
is not yet linked (action A1). The choice is random among the spatially limited links.
Bidirectional links are formed. The linked agent becomes active and is informed of
the opportunity to make the common purchase. In this example, agent-1 contacts
agent-2 and they establish a link (panel (b) in Figure A5).
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(a) Initiator (in black) in
regular network structure
1









(d) Step 3: coalition estab-




Figure A5: Illustrative example: co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion
In this moment, agent-1 is the initiator, but agent-2 is not. Both agents and all the
other agents in the population, satisfy their demand via the public service. Eq.3.2
and Eq.3.3 calculate their individual cost and utility. Only agent-1, the initiator, can
start the process of coalition formation. Before doing so, a product is chosen (in
this example only one product is available) and the relative common purchase is
proposed (action A2). The process of coalition formation starts (action A3): agent-1,
the initiator, contacts the linked agent-2 (panel (b) in Figure A5) and they evaluate
the common purchase in coalition (Eq.3.5 and Eq.3.6). The two agents make a
conditional decision among the options to invest in coalition or to use the public
service. The option that makes an agent better off is stored as optimal. When all
coalitions have been evaluated (in the example only coalition (1-2) is available), all
agents announce their optimal conditional decision.
Now, assuming that the coalition (1-2) is not established because it does not satisfy
all the stability conditions, the two agents can contact more neighbours and forge
more links, thereby improving and enlarging their network. However, only initiators
can do this. At the beginning of each time step, all active agents check their level of
awareness (Eq.3.1) to become initiators. Assuming that agent-2 becomes an initiator
in this step, the two agents can each contact one additional neighbour (action 1),
choose a product (action 2) and start the process of coalition formation (action 3).
As shown in panel (c) in Figure A5, agent-1 contacts and forges a link with agent-3
232
and agent-2 does the same with agent-4. Subsequently, the two initiators choose
the product they want to purchase with others, and they start the process of coalition
formation as explained before.
The coalition formation starts from initiators. First agent-1 and later agent-2 begin
this process by evaluating coalition size 2 and then, depending on the available links,
evaluate bigger coalitions. In this case, the full coalition, size 4, is the largest they can
form. Table A6 summarises all possible coalitions that can be formed and evaluated
in this network of agents. There are three coalitions with size 2 (1-2, 1-3 and 2-4), two
coalitions with size 3 (1-2-3 and 1-2-4) and one coalition with size 4 (1-2-3-4).
Agent Agent




di  S 1 2 3 4
1-2 xi 101 72 173 x 85 X stop
1-3 xi 97 89 186 x 65 X stop
2-4 xi 78 88 166 x 65 X stop
1-2-3 xi 138 76 127 341 X 120 X continue decision
ci2 288 351 302 ci2 < ci1 X X X
Ui2 163 169 164 Ui2 > Ui1 X X X
1-2-4 xi 142 84 108 334 X 130 X continue decision
ci2 292 359 333 ci2 < ci1 X X X
Ui2 167 173 171 Ui2 > Ui1 X X X
1-2-3-4 xi 161 81 145 113 500 X 165 X continue stop
ci2 311 365 320 338 ci2 < ci1 x X X X
Ui2 163 169 164 167 Ui2 > Ui1 X X X X
Table A6: Coalitions evaluated
The three coalitions with size 2 do not satisfy the condition in Eq.3.7, i.e., the total
monetary contributions of all participants is not enough to cover the investment cost
(I). Consequently, these three coalitions are not formed and they do not provide any
optimal conditional decision for the agents involved. Agents stop evaluating these
coalitions. The agents then evaluate the two coalitions of size 3. These satisfy
both conditions in Eq.3.7 and Eq.3.8, so agents continue the evaluation process and
consider their individual cost and utility in coalition (Eq.3.9 and Eq.3.10). All agents
in these two groups are better off, therefore, the two coalitions of size 3 are subject
to further negotiation in the final decision step. In the full coalition option, i.e., size 4,
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even though it satisfies both initial conditions, agent-1 does not gain compared to the
public service (the cost is higher in coalition). Therefore, agent-1 exits this coalition,
which implies that the full coalition is not stable and is not considered further by
agents.
The four agents involved in the final decision step have to make their own optimal
conditional decision. Agent-1 and agent-2 want to establish coalition (1-2-4) since
their utility would be higher than in coalition (1-2-3). On the one hand, agent-3 has
coalition (1-2-3) as the only available option to improve individual utility, on the other
hand, agent-4 has coalition (1-2-4) as the only available option to improve individual
utility. Based on these conditions which the agents announce, coalition (1-2-4) is
established. This implies that these three agents have coordinated, agreed on their
monetary contributions and can jointly purchase the shared good. The coalition is
established, which means that coalition members are out of the game, leaving agent-
3 isolated in the network. Figure A5 panel (d) shows how the network structure
changes after adoption. The three agents in the established coalition (1-2-4) break
their existing already formed links (e.g., link 1-3) and do not take up those potentially
available in their neighbourhood (e.g., links 2-3, 3-4, etc.). Agent-3 remains isolated,
but being an active agent, in the next time steps agent-3 can re-evaluate whether or
not to become initiator (Eq.3.1). If agent-3 does so, the process continues with the
remaining agents in the population.
A.2.3 Check on Agents’ Preferences on Division Rules
Here we provide the results of the additional check on the impact of heterogeneity in
agents’ preferences on the proportional division rule based on consumption (↵i), and
the proportional division rule based on contribution, and the equal share division rule
based on coalition size ( i). In the baseline scenario, all agents have the same pref-
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erences (↵i= i=0.5). We run the model with three different initialisations, in which
values are assigned to agents randomly from a normal distribution (Table A7). Under
these new conditions, the adoption share increases by about 8% , on average, com-
pared to the baseline case of homogeneous agents where the final adoption share
is 50%.
↵i  i % Adopters
i) µ=0.5,  =0.1 µ=0.5,  =0 54.0%
ii) µ=0.5,  =0 µ=0.5,  =0.1 53.7%
iii) µ=0.5,  =0.1 µ=0.5,  =0.1 53.9%
Table A7: Adoption share varying ↵i and  i
A.3 Annex to Chapter 4
A.3.1 Kriging Meta-Model
The Kirging meta-model provides linear unbiased predictors for complex, non-linear
simulation models, enhancing traditional linear interpolations. Kriging is a spatial in-
terpolation method used to predict unknown points in the parametric space, based
on known observations. To predict the model response to a not observed point in
the parametric space, the Kirging meta-model uses a correlation function to make an
interpolation among the closest observed points, by also considering spatial informa-
tion related to these points. The NOLH DoE is the best sampling method to select
points in the parametric space to be observed via simulation runs. Five different cor-
relation functions are tested, for which the estimation of the Kriging meta-model is
validated via both cross in-sample validation (Q2 predictivity coefficient) and external
out-of-sample validation (root mean square error (RMSE) measure). Among the
correlation functions, we chose the one with a combination of higher Q2 and lower
RMSE values. The Kriging method statistically estimates the coefficients of each
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model parameter in relation to a specific correlation function. However, the coeffi-
cients provide only a rough (inverse) estimate of the importance of the variation in
the model output. Therefore, we combined the results of the Kirging meta-model with
the Sobol decomposition in order to run the global sensitivity analysis. The effect of
each model parameter on the model output, is high if the value of the estimated coef-
ficient is low. Below we report the results of the five alternative correlation functions
(Table A8) and the coefficient estimation of the best performing one among these
alternatives (Table A9).
Validation Trend Matèrn 5/2 Matèrn 3/2 Gaussian Exponential Power exp.
Shared Purchase
Cross Q2 Constant 0.000 0.409 0.073 0.344 0.380Linear 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.348 0.447
External RMSE Constant 2.615 2.673 2.758 2.573 2.634Linear 2.710 2.534 2.784 2.462 2.714
Individual Purchase
Cross Q2 Constant 0.947 0.953 0.933 0.918 0.956Linear 0.959 0.958 0.945 0.932 0.958
External RMSE Constant 7.242 6.826 6.505 8.043 6.464Linear 5.680 5.803 8.717 7.506 5.608
Public Service
Cross Q2 Constant 0.977 0.970 0.973 0.937 0.966Linear 0.979 0.976 0.967 0.949 0.973
External RMSE Constant 3.831 4.430 3.849 7.023 5.482Linear 3.557 4.026 4.107 6.314 4.089
Shared Purchase - niche
Cross Q2 Constant 0.870 0.848 0.832 0.750 0.813Linear 0.852 0.852 0.883 0.753 0.870
External RMSE Constant 3.628 3.436 2.617 3.571 3.234Linear 3.351 3.372 2.638 3.499 2.874
Notes: Comparison of alternative correlation functions for the Kriging meta-model: Shared Purchase
in Figure 4.3, Individual Purchase and Public Service in Figure 4.4 and Shared Purchase smaller
space in Figure 4.5. Higher Q2 and lower RMSE values are preferred.
Table A8: Comparison of alternative meta-model specifications
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Shared Individual Public Shared Purchase
Purchase Purchase Service niche
Trend function Linear Linear Linear Linear
Intercept 2.038 138.866 60.626 4.033
Correlation function Power exp. Power exp. Matèrn 5/2 Gaussian
Estimated coefficient
S 0.232 0.225 0.264 0.158
dmean 0.442 0.541 0.614 0.838
emean 0.701 0.656 0.639 0.511
✓delta 0.816 1.728 2.000 2.000
✓mean 0.320 0.384 0.374 0.332
↵mean 0.693 2.000 2.000 0.247
 mean 0.598 2.000 2.000 2.000
Cross validation Q2 0.447 0.958 0.979 0.883
External validation RMSE 2.714 5.608 3.557 2.638
NOLH samples used 512 512 512 512
External validation samples 50 50 50 50
Notes: Kriging meta-model estimation. The value of the estimated coefficient indicates the impor-
tance of each parameter on the variation model output: higher coefficient indicates a smaller influence
of the parameter on the model output.
Table A9: Kriging meta-model estimation
